

**The initiatives of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation *vis a vis* the  
European Security Architecture:  
Unpacking the Objectives, Factors and the Outcomes**

**Eka Akobia**

**A dissertation submitted to the  
Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University  
In Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**Supervisor:  
Neil S. MacFarlane, Lester B. Pearson Professor of International Relations, St  
Anne's College, University of Oxford**



**February 2016**

*Dedicated to the memory of my Mother  
and  
to the bright future of Luka and Anna*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Prof. Neil S. MacFarlane of University of Oxford, for his continued involvement in my work in progress, excellent academic mentorship as well as friendship that kept me inspired and motivated to perform to the best of my ability and deliver the results at the end of a five year journey.

My deep gratitude goes to my co-supervisor Prof. Zurab Davitashvili, whom I have known since the first year of my BA studies and who has been a role model of academic rigor and determination throughout these years.

I want to also thank wholeheartedly the administration of the TSU Center for Social Sciences (CSS), Ms. Marine Chitashvili, Ms. Manana Mikaberidze and Ms. Diana Lezhava for their invaluable contribution to making this international PHD program possible and for their excellent execution of the program.

I want to thank very much the Open Society Institute HESP program, and specifically its then Director, Mr. Giorgi Shervashidze, whose vision and tireless efforts to contribute to the development of the academic research and excellence in Georgia has been instrumental in supporting my academic career.

I also want to express my sincerest gratitude to my family members, friends and colleagues, who have seen me through, during the writing of this thesis. I would like to single out my life partner, Sergi Kapanadze, who has stood by me and provided comfort and encouragement.

Last but not least, I want to thank my students from past and present, who have inspired my academic preparedness and have imbued me with the sense of responsibility to make progress.

In the end, I want to express my deepest gratitude to two persons no longer with us, who have contributed to my development as an individual, supported my every endeavor in their own ways and have been the noblest people I have known in life: my late mother, Nona Kartoza and my beloved Professor, Dr. Alexander Rondeli.

## RESUME

The topic of this research is the continuity in the Soviet/Russian preferences for the European security architecture during and after the Cold War through the prism of the identified initiatives. The historical episodes denoted by introduction of such initiatives are as follows:

1. The Soviet Proposals on the German question and the General European Collective Security Treaty (1952-1955);
2. The Soviet and the Warsaw Pact campaign for the European Security Conference (1966-1973);
3. Gorbachev's Common European Home proposal (1985-1990);
4. The Yeltsin-Kozyrev quest for Pan-European Security architecture (1993-2002);
5. The Medvedev Initiative - the Treaty on European Security (2008-2011).

The findings of this single case study are divided by five historical episodes. The findings are concisely reproduced in a table and are interpreted through the rationalist theory of international regimes (Hasenclever et. al, 2000).

The thesis finds that the Soviet and the Russian preferences towards the organization of the European Security architecture have mostly remained the same. In all five episodes, the Soviet Union (the first three episodes) and then the Russian Federation (the last two episodes) have put forth quite similar preferences towards the overall organization of the European Security architecture. A second finding of this thesis is that a failure to build more holistic security architecture in Europe can be traced back to the Soviet/Russian incapacity, throughout the studied period, to adequately address the existing security agenda in Europe and become integrated. Notably, the Soviet/Russian rhetoric that the exclusive Alliances during the Cold War and the maintenance of NATO after the Cold War with continued exclusion of Russia from the veto wielding institutions is the major cause of failures of the European security architecture is not supported by the findings. On the contrary, it is shown that Russian insistence on the inverted chain of causality (Alliance causes security problems v. Threats condition the creation of Alliances) has been largely futile and served as a veil to the real security problems in Europe, postponing their resolution.

The developments in Ukraine and the subsequent severing of cooperation with Russia as well as the deterioration of disarmament and arms control regimes in Europe show that the 6 decade long campaign to improve security architecture in Europe is still an unfinished business. Clearly, there is the need to bridge the security outlook among its actors and major part of it lies with Russia's capacity to acknowledge its own shortcomings. In conclusion, the thesis interprets the data with the use of regime theories finding that a security regime cannot be imposed over by a treaty and has to be a product of integration. Any overarching security regime in Europe would need to be based on states' common commitment to the existing rules of the game as well as a more inclusive incorporation of these soft security considerations into the new security architecture.

## CONTENTS

<b>CHAPTER 1:</b> Introduction .....	4
<b>CHAPTER 2:</b> The Soviet Proposals on the German question and the General European Collective Security Treaty (1952-1955) .....	32
<b>CHAPTER 3:</b> The Soviet and the Warsaw Pact campaign for the European Security Conference (1966-1973) .....	77
<b>CHAPTER 4:</b> Gorbachev's Common European Home proposal (1985-1990) .....	119
<b>CHAPTER 5:</b> The Yeltsin-Kozyrev quest for Pan-European Security architecture and the Creation of the NATO-Russia Council (1993-2002) .....	157
<b>CHAPTER 6:</b> The Medvedev Initiative - the Treaty on European Security (2008-2011) ....	201
<b>CHAPTER 7:</b> Conclusions .....	238

## CHAPTER 1: Introduction<sup>1</sup>

### **The topic of the research**

After the Cold war, with the ending of the bipolar rivalry and the onset of a new order, search hastened for a type of security architecture in Europe, which would incorporate all the European states, including former enemies under one roof. Many academics supposed that the end of the Cold War presented a good opportunity to establish a new order in Europe based on the principles of Collective Security (for example, see Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991). It was also believed that Europe was now 'primed for peace' (Van Evera, 1990/91).

In reality, instead of an overarching single architecture, a post-Cold War European security order became to be characterized by a network of overlapping or independent institutions including the NATO, the EU, the OSCE and the CIS and a number of fundamental security regimes each regulating a specific issue in either disarmament or other security area (such as the INF, START, CFE, Open Skies, CSBM's).

While the EU, NATO and the OSCE have contributed greatly to major positive and stabilizing developments in Europe (See for example Caruso, 2007) in a number of cases, the European security architecture failed to effectively respond to the disorder within the system, among others in cases of Bosnia and Kosovo (Wouters and Naert, 2001), conflict situations in the former soviet union states, while on one particular occasion - the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008, the existing security institutions completely failed to curb the opportunism for the use of force and military intervention. This was the first time in the history of the OSCE that one member state used force against the other in complete breach of the fundamental principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, hence undermining the sanctity of the principles of non-intervention and inviolability of State borders. The war was devastating for Georgia and its aftermath disturbed already volatile security environment in the region. Russia became a subject of diplomatic isolation, albeit for only a brief time period, and there were number of measures put in place, albeit insufficient ones, to punish Russia for its military adventurism. Hence, the occurrence had further reaching consequences: it had disrupted existing cooperation and ongoing projects between Russia and other Euro-Atlantic states and rushed in a huge dosage of mistrust

---

<sup>1</sup> *The views and opinions expressed in this doctoral dissertation are those of the author and should not be attributed to any of her employers.*

and confusion on the future of cooperation with Russia, an unknown feeling since the end of the Cold War.

In explaining the macro reasons for this kind of turn of events, official Russia has alleged that such systemic failure in the European security was a result of Russia's on-going isolation from Europe's security institutions, the maintenance of block mentality by the West and continued enlargement of NATO (See Medvedev, 2008). To improve the dysfunctional security architecture Medvedev proposed in November 2008 a draft Treaty on European Security, which basically offered a legally binding agreement that would put in place an overarching collective security type order in Europe, with exclusive competence in the hard security area in which Russia would find itself on par with other major European and Euro-Atlantic powers.

It is known to the scholarly world that it is not the first time Russia has come forth with such overarching and all-encompassing initiatives for the European security. However, the survey of the existing literature below shows that no literature in international relations or history field evaluates the Soviet/Russian approach towards the European Security through the prism of these initiatives and their subsequent outcomes.

This thesis maintains that 2008 was not the first time Russia proposed such an initiative. In fact, this thesis claims that during and after the Cold War there have been five different episodes in history when the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation have come forth with similar proposals regarding all-European security architecture. These historical episodes are as follows:

1. The Soviet Proposals on the German question and the General European Collective Security Treaty (1952-1955);
2. The Soviet and the Warsaw Pact campaign for the European Security Conference (1966-1973);
3. Gorbachev's Common European Home proposal (1985-1990);
4. The Yeltsin-Kozyrev quest for Pan-European Security architecture (1993-2002);
5. The Medvedev Initiative - the Treaty on European Security (2008-2011).

The topic of this research then is the continuity in the Soviet/Russian preferences for the European security architecture during and after the Cold War through the prism of the identified security initiatives, despite changes in the governments, ideologies and political and security environment.

This thesis has two main goals. **The first aim** is to provide a detailed historical description of the continuous Soviet/Russian attitudes towards the organization of the European security architecture during and after the Cold War. Showing the continuity in this respect is important for two main reasons: first of all, such an endeavour will significantly enhance our descriptive understanding of the European security during and after the Cold War from the prism of concrete Soviet/Russian grand initiatives towards the makeup of European security, the implications of such initiatives, the objectives sought and the outcomes achieved. Second, showing the major objectives sought by the Soviet Union/Russia throughout the period sheds a new light on the Soviet Union but most importantly on Russia as a security actor in Europe.

**The second aim** is to explain, based on regime theories, the outcomes or failures of such initiatives and factors contributing to their relative success or failure. These are important inferences as Russia continues to be a major factor in the European security affairs and explicating its constant preferences as well as the Western reactions and the ensued cooperation or failure could provide important theoretical as well as policy implications for the future.

### **The main research questions and objectives**

This thesis is interested to show the following:

- What has contributed to the cooperation or failure to cooperate between Soviet Union/Russia and the Euro-Atlantic states on the issue of organization of the European Security architecture?
  - What were the concrete initiatives of the Soviet Union *vis a vis* the preferred way of organization of the European Security?
  - What were major Soviet preferences *vis a vis* European Security architecture across the identified historical episodes?
  - What were the Soviet/Russian end goals when proposing these initiatives?
  - What were the factors that resulted in failure of cooperation over the proposed initiative?
  - What were the outcomes and the factors that contributed to certain outcomes as a result of these initiatives?

The description of each episode will focus on the overall security and political setting in which the proposal was introduced, how it was perceived by other European and Euro-Atlantic states, how the initial proposal evolved and what were the goals and the actual outcomes of the proposal. A major aim of this thesis is to unpack the essence of the initiative in terms of commonalities across the span of 60 decades along with differences, goals sought for each



episode, factors for contributing to cooperation and factors contributing to failure to cooperate in each episode.

### **The significance of this research**

Notably, the issue of “order” in Europe continues to be a bothersome theme for Russia above all the other security problems. In 2014 a second time president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin made a “harsh” (*in his own words*) speech at the annual Valdai conference, expressing his detestation with the ongoing developments:

“The Cold War ended, but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty with clear and transparent agreements on respecting existing rules or creating new rules and standards. This created the impression that the so-called ‘victors’ in the Cold War had decided to pressure events and reshape the world to suit their own needs and interests. If the existing system of international relations, international law and the checks and balances in place got in the way of these aims, this system was declared worthless, outdated and in need of immediate demolition” (Putin, 2014).

The long speech blamed almost every problem in the world on American unilateralism, from extremism to failed revolutions and conflicts in the Middle East or elsewhere, first and foremost in Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine was labelled as nothing more or less than “one of the examples of such sorts of conflicts that affect international power balance”. No mention was made of the right of Ukrainian people to choose their own destiny or Alliances. More than that, the people propelled Association Agreement with the EU was labelled as a “hasty backstage decisions” ... “fraught with serious risks to the economy” (*ibid.*). It was maintained that during the Cold War the United States had hijacked the security agenda and made the European Allies to bear the cost of NATO finances while it dominated its management. It was claimed that it is how the situation was “presented” as such, lacking real substance. The bloc mentality and coalition building were once again condemned:

“Today, we are seeing new efforts to fragment the world, draw new dividing lines, put together coalitions not built for something but directed against someone, anyone, create the image of an enemy as was the case during the Cold War years, and obtain the right to this leadership, or diktat if you wish” (*ibid.*)

However, without too much accounting for objectivity, Russia's own preferred Alliances such as the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and others were hailed as "integration-oriented, positive [and] peaceful" (ibid.). In the end, Putin's 2014 Valdai speech reminisced about the agreement reached in Helsinki in the 70's and called for a similar approach.

Besides the Russian official rhetoric and the logic of thinking, famous core realist thinkers similarly argued that the NATO and EU institutional enlargement brought about the Russian alienation and subsequently caused the tragic crisis in Ukraine with more than tacit Russian involvement (Mearsheimer, 2014).

Besides this thick antagonistic rhetoric, there are real developments that really attest to the lack of cordiality and cooperation in European security. It was not only in 2008 that the European security architecture was shaken but the aftershocks of even greater magnitude appeared in 2014 when Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimea in March 2014.

The annexation was preceded by the Euro-maidan processes in Kiev, a process which was seen in Crimea as a state coup serving as a purpose for declaration of insubordination to Kiev and later of the independence in February 2014. With the help of Russian security services a complete takeover of governmental buildings took place, followed on March 18 by a largely illegal referendum, where 97% of voters voted for the secession from Ukraine. Already on March 23, 2014 Crimea was declared as a part of the Russian Federation (Ukraine: Timeline, BBC, 2014).

The referendum and all the consequent changes on the peninsula were declared illegal and in violation of existing treaties (i.e. Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia of 1997) and fundamental principles of the international law. In 2014 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution "territorial integrity of Ukraine" with 100 votes in favour and 11 against (n. a. UN webpage, 2014).

The military assistance to insurgents, hands on involvement in the ongoing conflict in Donbas, lack of progress in cease-fire as per the Minsk Agreement and many atrocities accompanying the conflict, have served as the new watershed in European security, bringing about tectonic shifts in

Russian and the Western relations, denoted by the imposition of sanctions and a disruption of most of the existing institutional ties.

Both of these cases represent, no matter how one looks at them, a clear demonstration of Russian revisionism and assertiveness in the face of its perceived threats and challenges, which beside the civilian suffering in Europe, hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons and the innocent casualties, also affects overall European and Euro-Atlantic performance in terms of tackling other emerging crises in the Middle East or globally.

The US and European countries as well as institutions maintain that the main fault with the current picture arises from the Russian incomppliance with the existing norms and principles enshrined in the basic and fundamental agreements in Europe including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and refuse to accept the notion that there are “spheres of influences” in Europe, which disregard completely the sovereign rights and desires of the countries involved.

Hence, for a fuller and more inclusive picture of the European security landscapes, it is expedient to study the objectives historic as well as most recent, of the one major peripheral actor – the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation.

### **Key Concepts:**

#### **European Security Order/Architecture:**

This thesis is about Soviet and then Russian proposals regarding the organization of European security. In official texts or verbal language the European security architecture or European security order are the terms used interchangeably to convey these proposals.

Hence, c Despite the fact that the concept appears in innumerable researches, there is virtually no effort made to explain the implied definition. The terms are treated as if they are self-explanatory and objective. One of the few authors that delved into the meaning of ‘order’ is Hedley Bull. In his seminal book *the Anarchical Society; a Study of Order in World Politics (1977)* he defines the etymological meaning of order:

“to say of a number of things that together they display an order is, in the simplest and most general sense of the term, to say that they are related to one another according to some pattern, that their relationship is not purely haphazard but contains some discernible

principle” (Bull, 1977, p. 3).

However, based on Augustinian sense, Bull believes that order exists only in relations to given goals and that in social life there are three underlying and unifying primary goals: 1) that life will be in some measure secure against violence resulting in death or bodily harm 2) that promises, once made, will be kept, or that agreements, once undertaken, will be carried out 3) the possession of things will remain stable to some degree, and will not be subject to challenges that are constant and without limit (1977, pp. 3-4). They are primary because other goals presuppose realization of these; they are universal in that all societies take account of them. Bull contends that these goals are not paramount or mandatory and they are independent of rules; they are valuable because they give predictability to human life (ibid., pp. 6-7).

Basically, this specific understanding of order, however primary, is still subjective; it's a byproduct of certain discernible principle, or to say otherwise, a product of a specific structural design. In as much as this thesis endeavours to grasp the design of the Soviet/Russian proposals and their intended outcomes, it is perhaps more relevant to use less value laden term, which is architecture. One of the simplest definitions is the “complex or carefully designed structure of something” (n. a. Oxford Dictionary online). Hence, when we discuss Soviet or Russian initiatives throughout chosen period (during and after the Cold War) it is implied that each initiative proposes a certain design for European security. What will be the outcome of that design, whether an order in Bullian terms, a balance of power in Waltzian terms or normative security community in Deutschian terms, or any other understanding, is a matter of further interpretation.

Hence, when used with respect to European security, in its simplest and purest terms, the security order or architecture must mean Soviet/Russian preferences of how things should be related to one another in European security realm or what should be the principle of organization or the design of the structure. In the following five chapters the research will describe each set of proposal, as it unfolded in a specific, discernible time period.

The literature review at the end of this chapter will review the existing literature that deals with the issues of security order/architecture in Europe in order to prepare the ground for placing the findings of this thesis in the existing body of knowledge on the subject.

**Geopolitical Terms:** There is no uniform understanding of which countries are the participants in the European Security. However, there is an explicit understanding that the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation as well as the United States have been and remain as major actors in European security. When describing the security environment during the Cold War period terms used in this thesis is the West and the East, to describe the opposite blocs or the countries that allied to either of the two poles - the United States or the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the thesis also often refers to European and Euro-Atlantic States, which is a group of states geographically situated in Europe and North America and being part of one or the other regional security organization such as NATO and the European Union. A more comprehensive grouping is under the OSCE, which now incorporates 57 participating states, a geopolitical area often also referred to as from “Vancouver to Vladivostok.” The OSCE has the widest possible membership of countries that can be regarded as having a stake in European Security.

### **Research methodology, methods, validity and limitations**

Stephen Van Evera identifies seven ideal types of dissertation missions and the eighth possible one. The later is **the historical descriptive mission**, which focuses on past events and conditions. He believes that such thesis is justified since students who seek to “explain or evaluate phenomena that others have not fully described must first devote heavy attention to description.” However, he asserts that student must also do some explaining or evaluation (1997, p. 95). This thesis is a type of research, which is focused on the historical description and then the analysis of a single historical phenomenon: Soviet/Russian preferences for security order/architecture in Europe and its outcomes.

Researchers also agree that there seldom are ideal types of thesis and each thesis may be a hybrid version of several missions (Van Evera, 1997; Odell, 2001). Hence, this thesis is also a **historical explanatory dissertation** that uses theory “to explain causes, pattern, or consequences of historical cases. Such works provide a good deal of description but mainly focus on explanation of what is described” (1997, p. 93). Van Evera notes that such dissertations have value in as much as “without explanatory historical work history is never explained; and without evaluative historical work we learn little from the past about present and future problem-solving” (Ibid.,).

**The project's research design is a single case study** and it is based on single historical phenomena - Soviet/Russian preferences towards organization of European security architecture during and after the Cold War. The case study design of this project is primarily determined by the topic and goals sought. The research aims to explain what have been the Soviet/Russian preferences and effects on the make-up of the European security order/architecture.

Notably, there is no single or imperative definition of a “case” in social science. According to Levy, researchers who are primarily interested in understanding and interpreting a particular historical episode, define case in terms of a set of events bounded in time and space (2002, p. 434). Hence, this thesis focuses on a single case/phenomenon, which is the Soviet/Russian preference towards organization of European security during and after the Cold War. The single case is presented as a set of five historical episodes and each episode is described in a way to answer the stated research questions. Similarly to Van Evera, Levy and Odell agree that single case study can be descriptive but also interpretive case study, one that is aimed at explanation, which is structured by a theoretical framework. This is analytic history as it explains particular historical episode rather than develop or test theoretical generalizations (Levy, p. 435).

Although, in general such research projects are viewed less favourably in social sciences today, they have important value as “theoretically guided, interpretive case studies can significantly enhance our descriptive understanding of the world, and international relations scholars have much to contribute to this task” (p. 435). Odell attests that such works can be influential:

“They may create memorable analogies that later practitioners use to identify pitfalls to avoid and strategies that work. Descriptive studies may stimulate scholars to think of new analytical idea, and their evidence may be used in evaluating theories” (2001, p. 163).

As for the theory, this thesis will use regime theories to explain the subsequent outcome as well as failures per the Soviet/Russian initiatives across the five historical episodes. The thesis will then identify analytical evidence both for perfecting existing theories and producing policy relevant advice.

## **Data sources**

This thesis will draw on all major sources of data such as primary, secondary and tertiary. In describing these historical episodes, the thesis will focus heavily on the study of **primary sources** pertinent to the historical episode under study. “Primary sources originate in the time period that historians are studying. They vary a great deal. They may include personal memoirs, government documents, transcripts of legal proceedings, oral histories and traditions, archaeological and biological evidence, and visual sources like paintings and photographs” (Storey, 1999, p.18). Primary sources provide direct evidence of the event studied. Among these, “government documents are invaluable source of primary data... the provenance, rather than the format, makes government information unique” (Danto, 2008, p. 65). In order to provide a thorough and coherent description of the five historical episodes under study, this thesis draws materials from number of governmental archives such as the State Departments’ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) archive, Documents of the Prezidium of the Soviet Union and other Russian Federation official archives, Wilson Center Digital Archive and Presidential Speeches and memoirs made available by official Presidential libraries or various publishers. Notably, FRUS provides invaluable and most unique primary data for the study of the cases during the Cold War. The primary data that has become available through this archive have elucidated important insights on the chosen topic from the perspective of policy as well as decision makers of the period under study.

To some extent and especially in cases where primary sources have not yet been made available or for some objective reasons are outside of reach of this researcher, this thesis will also use **secondary sources**, which are materials that evaluate, analyze and interpret information contained in the primary sources or other sources. These include works of historians, biographies, and opinion pieces.

This thesis will also draw on **the tertiary** materials. In addition to describing each historical episode, the existing literature pertaining to the five cases will be analyzed to identify the offered academic knowledge on the phenomena under study. Tertiary material hence will provide contrast to the undertaken research and permit the assessment of its credibility.

**The collected data is analyzed by using qualitative methods.** The first step towards analysis is data presentation, which I obtained using multiple sources related to the historical episode under study. Each history episode ends with Chapter conclusions, which transforms the thick description of raw data such as speeches, diplomatic notes, newspaper articles, statements,

proposals and other documentary information, into the meaningful units to provide explanation to the posed research questions. According to Elliott and Timulak “The meaning units are the units with which we do the analysis. However, it is good to be able to trace them back to the full data protocol, in case we need to be able to clarify something from the context” (2005, p. 153). After description and classification effort is made to connect related concepts or findings (Blaikie, 2000, p. 240). Elliott and Timulak warn that it is very important to avoid stopping with a set of categories and refrain from abstracting the main findings. Researchers must ask what categories are required to communicate the essence of the phenomenon. This part usually involves graphs, diagrams, figures, tables, and narratives (2005, p. 155). However, effort must be made so the findings can be traced back to the data (Ibid.,). In this respect a cumulative graph will be provided in the concluding section of this thesis to convey the essence of the research phenomena as well as to allow for further theoretical explanation. The cumulative information in the graph can be easily traced back to the thick description in the history chapters.

### **Validity Strategies**

Creswell identifies eight primary strategies and recommends the use of multiple strategies to enhance the researcher’s ability to assess the accuracy of findings (2009, p. 191-192). This thesis employs following strategies:

- In order to examine the evidence and build a coherent justification for the presented themes, this thesis uses triangulation of different data sources of information, including primary, secondary and tertiary data. In descriptive part original information is interpreted and codified into presentable data by this research, in addition to reviewing the existing literature in regards to themes in each historical episode.
- This thesis employs a thick description of the case study and provides many perspectives about the case. Special care is used to make sure and present all the major sources on the topic. Although there are relatively little secondary sources in Russian on the topic all the major primary resources represent original sources such as speeches, diplomatic notes, statements and draft treaties.
- The researcher has a clear understanding of a possible bias in interpreting the raw data due to the fact that during the timeframe of writing this thesis Georgia claims that two of its regions are under Russian occupation and accuses the later of blatant violation of fundamental principles of the international law. However, it must also be stated that this



research is not about Russia-Georgia relations per se but about the problems of European security from the standpoint of Soviet/Russia preferences and actions. The research is about a bigger picture of European security, in which Russia is a major security actor and understanding of its nature is the key for understanding the overall European security environment and the ways for improvement. Moreover, where it was available this thesis has provided the Russian view as well and has provided multiple sources to document the description or the analysis.

- Lastly, the internalization of the feedback from the reviewers will help to further validate the research findings.

### **Theoretical framework**

Essentially, what the Russian Federation and its predecessor the Soviet Union have been proposing all along - a pan-European collective security system that fully regulates the hard security area - is basically a security regime regulating the involved states' behaviour in the specific issue area.

International Regime has become a very popular topic in the 80's of the previous century. Writings by scholars such as Ruggie (1975), Keohane and Nye (1977), Haas (1980), Young (1980), Krasner (1983) and many others have served the purpose of explaining as to what accounts for the emergence of a rule based behaviour in the international system and whether or not they mitigate the consequences of Anarchy.

Overall, these various theories can be combined into three broad schools of thought: neoliberalism, which bases its analysis on constellations of interests; realism, which focuses on power relationships; and cognitivism, which emphasizes knowledge dynamics, communication, and identities (Hasenclever et. Al., 1996, p. 178).

Here, it would be relevant to provide for some of the prevalent and consensual definitions of regimes. In 1982 number of scholars have agreed on a consensual definition of regimes "as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Haas, 1982, p. 211). Notably, regimes create some artificial order of values among actors. Hence, "order, then, refers

to the benefits a regime is to provide; system refers to the whole in which collaboration toward an order takes place” (Ibid.,).

This research is thus specifically interested in theories that focus on the regime creation in the area of security. To that effect, in parallel to the consensual definition, Robert Jervis defines a security regime as:

“those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate. This concept implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest” (Jervis, 1982, p. 357).

Jervis contends that the possibility of cooperation, in other words the Prisoners’ Dilemma is far greater in the security realm because of primacy, competitive and unforgiving nature and uncertainty over how much security the states need and have (Ibid., p. 359). Jervis highlights four factors that need to be met for a regime formation in the security area:

- First, the great powers must want to establish it-that is, they must prefer a more regulated environment to one in which all states behave individualistically. This means that all must be reasonably satisfied with the status quo and whatever alterations can be gained without resort to the use or threat of unlimited war, as compared with the risks and costs of less restrained competition.
- Second, the actors must also believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation. In principle this is simple enough; in practice, determining whether others are willing to forgo the chance of forcible expansion is rarely easy.
- Third, even if all major actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes cannot form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion.
- The fourth condition for the formation of a regime is a truism today: war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly (Ibid., pp. 360-361).

Overall, according to Jervis “the most propitious conditions for regime formation, then, are the cases in which offensive and defensive weapons and policies are distinguishable but the former are cheaper and more effective than the latter, or in which they cannot be told apart but it is easier to defend than attack” (Ibid., p. 362).

Jervis believes that the best example of a security regime is the Concert of Europe that prevailed from 1815 to 1823 and, in attenuated form, until the Crimean War (Ibid., p. 362). Another possible type of security regime is the balance of power, in the environment when the restraints on state action it involves are norms internalized by the actors or arise from the blocking actions of others and the anticipation of such counteractions (Ibid., p. 369). In that respect a Kaplan's view of moderate system is more helpful than the Waltzian system in which moderation is a systemic side-effect rather than a states' intention (Ibid.,).

In his assessment after the war there was little evidence for a security regime between the two blocs. The fact that peace necessitated cooperation does not account to the existence of regimes. Even when the 1972 Summit in Moscow adopted language that resembled the regime, the use of "regime-like language" does not amount to a regime (Ibid., p. 372). Moreover, Jervis believed that a security regime would not have been possible between the two superpowers because they saw mutual security as a myth and states' beliefs that their security requires making others insecure (Ibid., p. 375). Overall, Jervis doubted that "whether there will ever be strong political pressures in favor of a regime unless there is dramatic evidence that individualistic security policies are leading to disaster" (Ibid., p. 378).

However, the degree of institutionalization in many issue areas, especially since the Cold War cannot be sufficiently explained by power based regime theories only. Notably, beside the groundbreaking and important formation of the European Union, there have also been number of agreements regulating security cooperation in specific issue areas, involving the Western countries and Russian Federation. This thesis discusses specifically the Soviet Russian initiatives and their subsequent follow up process. Notably, each historical episode ended with differing outcomes. While there is complete lack of cooperation in the 50's, the outcome of the second episode is greater in magnitude in terms of creating a joint institution. Overall, the sought type of security regime – the collective security Pan-European order– has not yet been achieved in Europe. Hence, we need more sophisticated theoretical tools to account for the variance as well as to answer the major question of this research - What has contributed to the cooperation or failure to cooperate between Soviet Union/Russia and the Euro-Atlantic states on the issue of organization of the European Security architecture?

In that respect, this thesis wants to draw on the synthesizing work of Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, who contend that none of the three schools of thought are strong or compelling

enough to become a clear winner. Hence, “the variables separately emphasized by the three schools-interests, power, and knowledge-somehow interact in bringing about and shaping international regimes” (2000, p. 6). In terms of synthesis, authors make three assumptions:

1. Neoliberalism and realism, while sharing a commitment to rationalism offer the prospect of a more unified rationalist theory of international institutions.
2. ‘Weak cognitivism’, can serve as an analytically necessary supplement and can be incorporated into the rationalist account of international regimes.
3. A ‘grand synthesis’- is not possible as ‘Strong cognitivists’ have ontological and epistemological commitments that are strictly opposed to those of neoliberals and realists. In this case, continued intellectual competition is both more likely and more desirable than ill-fated attempts to merge two mutually exclusive paradigms of inquiry (Ibid., pp. 6-7).

In addressing the first proposition, the crucial point is to underline the fact that both neoliberals and realists concede to one another that the other side’s arguments and predictions about the primacy of either relative or absolute gains are valid *provided* that certain conditions hold which their opponents have failed to acknowledge and to specify so far (p. fa). Hence, the first step towards the synthesis (which authors refer as a contextualized rationalist theory) would be to construct a theory which specifies the conditions under which relative gains concerns are severe and the conditions under which they are slight or completely dominated by calculations of absolute gain (Ibid., p. 17).

Hence, a contextualized rationalist theory of international regimes would be concerned with three types of situations or contexts (See table 1). Strategic situations defined in terms of socially problematic context defined as:

“A problematic social (or mixed-motives) situation is one in which the uncoordinated pursuit of one’s individual interest may result in a collectively suboptimal outcome. This is true of neither zero-sum nor Harmony situations. In such non-problematic situations the theory would expect international regimes not to be created or to be inconsequential, if they are” (Ibid., p. 16).

Next concern is to specify the conditions under which relative gains concerns are severe and the conditions under which they are slight or completely dominated by calculations of absolute gain

(Ibid., p. 17). Authors rely on Grieco’s analysis of the factors affecting gains considerations. According to Grieco, both the present and the past of the relationship concerned influence states’ intolerance for relative losses. It makes a difference whether one’s (potential) cooperation partner is a longtime ally or a longtime foe; whether the states in question are at the brink of war or are members of a Deutschean pluralistic security community (Ibid., p. 17). Further, it is asserted, based on Gowa (1989) and Snidal (1991) that relative gains concerns tend to be suppressed when the states share a common adversary or when the power difference between them is so large that no conceivable gap in payoffs from cooperation is likely to affect their relative positions to a noticeable degree (Ibid., p. 17). Moreover, this synthesized theory considers that state motivations matters and threat perceptions also matter.

However, even this rationalist theory of international regimes is not sufficient to explain cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States and other European and Atlantic countries in 1970’s or even later on, when important security agreements (regimes) were reached, such as the CFE. Hence, the synthesis brings in the role of weakly cognitivist theories, which emphasize “governmental learning” and “careers of ideas” (Ibid., p. 27). It is asserted “that ideas which create convergent expectations permit actors to coordinate their behaviour in a mutually beneficial way and, at the same time, explain the specific content of the resulting regime” (Ibid., p. 29). However, unlike in the case of rational theories, weakly cognitivist arguments address *subsequent links in a single causal chain* and may be either causally prior or causally posterior to the rationalist ones (Ibid., p. 26).

In conclusion, although authors rule out the possibility of deeper convergence of these theories nonetheless it is assumed that “specifying the interrelationship between power, interests, and knowledge in the emergence and continuation of rule-based cooperation holds considerable promise and should certainly be followed up and further developed” (Ibid., p. 30).

Hence, this thesis, which brings a thick description of five broad episodes representing a single case, highlights many circumstances including power, interests and knowledge. Hence, this proposed synthesized theory would be applied to explain the findings.

**Table 1: Contexts and Hypotheses in a Rationalist Synthesis**

Context	Non-problematic Social Situations (Zero-Sum or	Relative-Gains Dominated Situations	Absolute-Gains Dominated Situations (Neoliberal
---------	--	-------------------------------------	---

Hypothesis	Harmony)	(‘realist situations’)	Hypotheses Situations’)
Overall Likelihood of Regime Creation	very low	low	high
Factors Affecting Likelihood of Regime Creation	Power structure (in zero-sum situations)	Availability of regime formula securing balanced gains	Issue-density; Situation-structure (PD, Battle etc.)
Regime Features	Imposed regime with skewed distribution of gains (in zero-sum situations)	Balanced gains; Mechanisms making gains more ‘equitable’	‘contract’ with compliance mechanisms (PD) or ‘convention’ (Battle)
Regime Stability	very low (in zero-sum situations)	low	high

*Source: Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., and Rittberger, V., 2000. p. 16.*

Besides the international regimes approach, in order to explain the reasons as to why the Soviet Union/Russia have adopted the same policy across various governments and historical periods, this thesis will be guided by the realist theoretical framework, namely, the structural realism as well as be guided by the notion of “security community” (Deutsch, 1975) in explaining the Western approaches.

### **Literature Review and the place of this research in the existing literature**

Surprisingly, there is not a vast body of literature in the field of international relations dealing directly with the issue of security order in Europe after the Cold War. In this section, I will review works, which try to pinpoint theoretical foundations of the concept of security order and deduce information from the existing literature on the nature of security order in Europe.

Adrian Hyde-Price (2007) argues that the structural neorealist theory is the best-suited analytical tool to unpack the problematique facing the European Security. Based on neorealist theoretical argumentation, Hyde-Price concludes that Europe is not ‘primed for peace’ as wrongly thought by liberal-idealists. He argues that the changed balance of power in Europe at the end of the Cold War posed a renewed turbulence and uncertainty to the European Security system. The Iraq War, emergence of a resurgent and increasingly assertive Russia as well as Germany’s renewed role as

the pivot of the European balance of power are given as examples of the deep divisions in transatlantic relations (Ibid.,).

Author believes, that Europe faces new security threats and the challenge of multipolarity. Price asserts that today Europe is characterized by a balanced multipolarity and stresses that although the emergence of 'balanced' multipolarity has weakened the cohesion of both NATO and the EU, it has also created new possibilities for great-power cooperation to tackle security problems. Author believes that neorealism is the best-suited theory to describe patterns of behaviour "by analysing the structural distribution of relative power capabilities in contemporary Europe" (Ibid., p. 30).

Based on neorealist theory Hyde-Price asserts that "the underlying ordering principle of international political systems is the balance of power, not institutional arrangements, shared norms or moral suasion" (Ibid., p. 40). According to Price:

"A stable balance of power between the system's most powerful actors is thus the basis of international order, within which minor powers can manoeuvre to gain advantages, and upon which arrangements for international 'governance' can develop. If power is balanced, then a rudimentary 'society of states' can emerge, in the minimalist sense of a basic understanding between major powers of the advantages of cooperation for system maintenance and milieu-shaping. But these forms of cooperation do not negate, nullify or tame anarchy" (Ibid., 40).

In a 'Balanced multipolarity' none of the great powers can become hegemons, therefore they emphasise security maximisation over power maximisation. In a balanced multipolarity great power cooperation becomes possible, and can assume the form of the nineteenth-century 'Concert of Europe' while concert diplomacy allows for great power cooperation in collective milieu-shaping and for the joint pursuit of second order interests (Hyde-Price, 2007, pp. 59-60).

Smith et al. (2001) attempt to tackle the security order issue in the context of Europe after the end of the Cold War. Drawing mainly on Hedley Bull's seminal work, Clive Archer establishes that there are at least three levels of order in the world system – a global one, an international one and ones local to particular states or societies (Archer, 2001). Moreover, there is no direct linkage between the achievement of order at all three levels (even if order is understood as

‘peaceful or harmonious condition of society’ at all three levels) as the values and norms of the elements of world society can conflict with those of international society, as well as of any one state’s or society’s order (Archer, 2001, p. 6).

Existence of three levels of order is seen to have potential consequences for notions of security (Archer, 2001, p.7). Archer summarizes that along such traditional notions of security as national security and collective security there has been an emergence of such notions as common, co-operative, comprehensive, soft and human security in post Cold War Europe (Archer, 2001, pp. 8-12). While most of these notions of security are from the realm of an international society of states, some notions of security, such as soft and human security also represent the values of a potential world society (Archer, 2001, p. 12). Pursuit of these notions of security accentuates the contradictions between world and international order and carries the potential to contradict the domestic order within states.

In the European context, these contradictions are well exemplified in the case of the OSCE. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act carries the seeds of international society and world society in Europe, as well as the contradictions involved in both. The elements (sovereign equality and the respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against each other, inviolability of frontiers, refraining from military occupation, whereas frontiers could be changed through peaceful means and agreement and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states) enshrined in the Helsinki Act represent in Bull’s terms the primary goals of the society of states sustained by international order. However, Final Act embodies other elements as well, which could be attributed to notions of a world order (i.e. respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms ‘including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief’ as well as promotion of ‘civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms’ and equality before the law for national minorities). Moreover, Helsinki Act recognized equal rights and self-determination of people, elements that go beyond Bull’s understanding of international order. And yet other element, such as ‘well being of peoples’ presupposes cooperation across states’ borders in various fields with that providing for the rudimentary formation of the European bases of a world society as opposed to the society of states (Archer, 2001, p.13).

Archer concludes that these elements planted in the Helsinki Final Act were supported by actual events in the 80’s and 90’s which allows for the ideas of security based more on international society, or even on world society, could be tried as opposed to coping with international anarchy



(2001, p. 14).

Main question that Archer poses in this respect are whether these changes will allow for the EU to turn into a security community (in Deutschian terms), and weather relationships with the states outside the EU, most importantly with Russia be that of a security regime (as defined by Jervis) that sustains an international society of states with agreed norms, values and institutions. Archer believes that achievement of such an order, even short of a world society would be a much-valued prize (2001, p. 17).

Sperling and Kirchner (1997) approach the issue of order from the perspective of newfound peace on the European continent and the opportunities deriving from it. They argue that since 1989 the Cold War European Security Order was transformed in a way that it fostered greater cooperation among states in both military and economic security realms. In a post Cold War Europe, the security concerns of Europeans, and particularly of Germans are increasingly expressed in an economic rather than military terms. That, according to authors could have well inverted the relative importance of military security *vis a vis* economic security, raised new opportunities for cooperation in military and economic security affairs and conditioned the need for a new balance between the economic, political and military requirements of security (Sperling & Kirchner, 1997, p. 2).

The authors perceive the European Security system after the end of the Cold War to be composed of two mutually constitutive elements: political-military and the economic, therefore “issues of political economy must be treated as elements of the new security order...” (1997, p. 2). The growing importance of economic issues and subsequent diminishment of the importance of the military issues is argued due to three developments: change in the structural characteristics of the states (meaning that states are economically more open, interdependence has taken precedence over autonomy and that states are ceding their sovereignty to supranational actors), in the currency of power (meaning that military power has been devalued in favour of commercial competitiveness and economic capacity) and in the change of contextual environment from enmity to amity, as expressed in Robert Powell’s terms (1997, pp. 3-6). The end of the Cold War has also lessened constraints of the two security dilemmas: one concerning Jervis’s paradox that increasing security of one decreases the security of the other, and the second concerning the traditional competition between butter and guns (1997, pp. 6-10).

From the perspective of 1997, authors argue, “systemic stability and the prospect of a peaceful and cooperative pan-European security order are largely contingent upon the successful transition to the market and multi-party democracy in central and eastern Europe. And those transitions, in turn are contingent upon a stable economic and military environment” (1997, p. 10). It must be noted here that while CEE states transition and integration into European structures is largely complete, stable economic and military environment is not yet ensured in Europe. Therefore, a necessary institutional arrangement as envisaged by the authors for such condition to be reached remains of relevance even today.

According to this study “the stability of the emerging European security architecture depends upon the congruence and interdependence of the economic and military security regimes governing the European security space” (Sperling & Kirchner, 1997, p. 17). Regime congruence is defined as norms governing economic and military regimes are mutually reinforcing and not in conflict, while interdependence refers to the situation in which norms of military regimes generate positive externalities that support the norms and institutions of the economic regimes and vice versa. This also presumes inherent mutual dependence, meaning that instability in one domain of the security architecture will damage the stability of the other (1997, p. 17).

Sperling & Kirchner maintain that comprehensive security system in Europe must therefore be dealt with in three directions: institutional configuration of the security architecture, resolving dilemmas of cooperation within and between issue areas and identifying the content of the emergent security architecture (1997, p. 18).

Most importantly, authors argue that the choice of institutions varies across national boundaries, while competition for delivering blueprints is most marked between the United States, the major western European states (Britain, France, Germany) and Russia. Such diversity poses barriers to great-power cooperation in constructing a coherent European security system and an actual choice of institutions will define the nature of order for Europe (1997, pp. 21-23).

Authors discuss the preferred architecture of the identified states, seeking points of tangency, opposition and parallelism (1997, pp. 235-237). It is argued that these preferred security architectures and Russian security requirements will shape the institutional make-up of the Euro-Atlantic security order. Authors maintain that the path is unclear yet, but identify three possible scenarios: one of integration, differentiation and disintegration.

One of the shortcomings of this work is a lack of a clear definition of security order or the architecture. It is sometimes unclear whether term is used interchangeably or architectures are treated as constituting parts of an order. While no definition of order is offered, in the final chapter authors presume that “the function of a security architecture ought to be the diminution of the anticipated threats to stability and order” (1997, p. 254). This study, while anachronistic in some respects, can be viewed as an important contribution to the debate on the post Cold War security order, its components and functions. In contradiction to the realist and liberal-institutionalist traditions authors go at length to emphasize the importance of institutions, including economic and military ones and the norms that govern these institutions. While they argue that the specific choice of norms and institutions is upon states, they are important in recasting the European security order while their effectiveness is again contingent upon states’ willingness and ability to exert leadership (1997, p. 264).

Carr and Callan (2002) see an even greater role for international institutions in the post-Cold War world compared to their role in the Cold War period. Authors argue that “the transition from threats to risks and the growing importance of political, societal and economic elements in security and stability have made the functions of institutions integral to order” (2002, p. 198). The new security environment requires a response from more than one institution; Authors argue that the concept of security architecture of overlapping institutions has been established but is not yet fully cohesive (2002, p. 3). Importance and relevance of the institutions is exemplified by the commitment given to institutional building by states. Both NATO and EU are involved in a costly as well as cumbersome process of internal re-adjustment and development as well as processes of “outreach” and enlargement with outside states. Major states such as Germany, France and Britain are key to the EU and the USA to NATO. The role of OSCE to realize its goal of a pan-European security provider is greater than ever, as it is one of the most inclusive institutions as opposed to NATO’s and EU’s exclusivity.

According to the Authors, states see their interests being served through international institutions. However, placing those interests in an institutional context affects how those interests are both articulated and realized (2002, pp. 82-116). On the other hand, the capacity of institutions to regulate the behaviour of their members varies according to perceptions of need, vulnerability to sanctions and the degree to which institutional norms are embedded in the state (2002, p. 199).

Effectiveness of international institutions is challenged, as they are not free from constraints either internally as organizations or from the new security environment. The major contemporary challenge for international institutions is intra-state conflict. Institutions formed to address the security of states now have to adapt to the politics of conflict within states. The new challenge has affected strategies of peacekeeping, enforcement and peace-building, prompting the not so smooth process of the development of a 'second generation' peacekeeping and peace-building techniques in which intervention occurs in a situation of ongoing conflict (2002, pp. 200- 201).

Moreover, we see the containment of conflict as a rationale for intervention in some places and a refusal to intervene in others, notably Russia's 'Near Abroad'. The resolution of intra-state conflicts generates tension within alliances and organizations. Selectivity in intervention demonstrates the continuing tension between the interests of states and human rights (2002, p. 202).

Realism and neorealism are seen as the prevalent theories through which international order and institutions could be judged during the Cold War; however, the intensification of economic agendas in the international system of the 1970's are better explained through theories of interdependence and regime theories (2002, pp. 3-14). Authors argue that in view of ongoing changes, institutional theory must encompass the challenge of intra-state as well as interstate conflict and the neorealist and neoliberal debate on institutional relevance needs to be revised to address contemporary conflict patterns (2002, p. 203).

Kupchan and Kupchan (1991) are more revolutionary in their attitudes as they argued in favor of collective security structure as the best supplant of the outdated European security architecture. Authors maintain that collective security would provide a more stable and less war prone alternative to the balancing acts under anarchy for three reasons:

“First, collective security more effectively deters and resists aggressor states. It does so by making more likely the formation of an opposing coalition and by confronting aggressors with preponderant, as opposed to roughly equal, force. Second, collective security organizations institutionalize, and therefore promote, cooperative relations among states. Third, collective security ameliorates the security dilemma and therefore reduces the likelihood that unintended spirals will lead to hostility and conflict” (1991, p.

125).

From the continuum of possible collective security arrangements, Authors deem Concert type order as more stable, as it has fewer disadvantages of the Collective security (Ibid., p. 138). Although concerts also rest on the notion of all against one, membership in a concert is restricted to the great powers of the day:

“A small group of major powers agrees to work together to resist aggression; they meet on a regular basis to monitor events and, if necessary, to orchestrate collective initiatives. A concert’s geographic scope is flexible. Members can choose to focus on a specific region or regions, or to combat aggression on a global basis. Finally, a concert entails no binding or codified commitments to collective action. Rather, decisions are taken through informal negotiations, through the emergence of a consensus. The flexibility and informality of a concert allow the structure to retain an ongoing undercurrent of balancing behavior among the major powers. Though a concert is predicated upon the assumption that its members share compatible views of a stable international order, it allows for subtle jockeying and competition to take place among them. Power politics is not completely eliminated; members may turn to internal mobilization and coalition formation to pursue divergent interests. But the cooperative framework of a concert, and its members’ concern about preserving peace, prevent such balancing from escalating to overt hostility and conflict” (1991, p. 120).

The authors maintain that post-Cold War setting is even more suited than that of 1815 to a concert-based security structure as four key features present then are also present in a post-Cold War Europe. These are: (1) common satisfaction with the status quo; (2) common appreciation that war between major powers is of little utility; (3) the practice of reciprocity; (4) a high degree of transparency. Authors also ascertain that the three major assumptions that are necessary for the emergence of a collective security type order: that major powers share compatible views of an acceptable international order, a minimum sense of political community among them and that no state is so powerful that it is immune to collective sanctions, are all present (1991, p. 144).

The authors argue that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is a framework, which could be turned into a concert-based collective security organization. Authors maintain that a new security system must reflect power realities, therefore they propose a two-

tiered design for CSCE: a security group consisting principally of Europe's major powers, with jurisdiction over core level security issues; and the full thirty-four member body, with jurisdiction over a host of other security-relevant matters (1991, pp. 153-160).

The authors also contend that at an initial phase NATO must be maintained as a safeguard against a possibility of re-emergence of aggression on behalf of the Soviet Union, until political and economic conditions in the Soviet Union stabilize. However, authors contend that if Soviet Union maintains "current trajectory" NATO should cede its powers to CSCE and later be eventually transformed into a fully-fledged collective security structure built around a concert of the big five (1991, p. 161).

### **Place of this research in the existing literature**

As presented above, the existing literature regarding the security order in Europe can be broken down into two broad categories. Literature which immediately after the end of the Cold War have dealt with the questions of what could emerge in place of the old bipolar stand off and the literature which tries to assess the on-going state of the security architecture and issues that are associated with it.

Literature on the subject is unanimous in assessing that both Russia and the US will continue to be major players in the European security realm. The US is regarded as the dominant player while Russia is considered to be struggling to find its place within the European security order. Conclusively, it is believed that Russian preferences will continue to shape the future of the security order in Europe.

This thesis will aim to take a closer look at the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation as security actor in the European security affairs from the prism of the initiatives they have historically put forth.

The single case study will show that while the initiatives were never discussed *per se* on a pan-European scale such initiatives have served as the impetus for convening important pan-European gatherings, which have yielded important decisions for Europe, namely the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, 1990 Charter of Paris, the creation of a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the 2009 Corfu Process, which aims at streamlining OSCE operating capabilities, across the

three dimensions (security, economic and human dimensions).

Beside the aim of presenting a more connected narrative from this prism, this thesis will also try to pinpoint how have these initiatives about the overall security order been turned into forums for creating common foundations for Europe in the security realm and putting the issues of human security on the pan-European agenda.

Although in reality a pure collective security type order in Europe, despite Russian wishes, remains as an unattainable objective for number of fundamental reasons, not excluding the Russia factor (for example, see Ebegebulem, 2011) and the West has dismissed all of these initiatives in their original form as either utopian or redundant, these initiatives have nonetheless influenced the make up of the Security order in Europe, as one way or another they have served as a reason for initiating talks on the institutional build-up in Europe. The phenomena that the Soviet Union and its legal successor – the Russia Federation might have maintained almost unchanged attitude towards the issue of European security architecture over the span of almost 6 decades, irrespective of change of ideologies, governments, security and political environment, deserves a coherent description and scholarly attention.

Besides evaluating empirical evidence, this thesis will aim to support the neorealist theoretical framework, by arguing that irrespective of regime types, where there is high security competition, states continue to worry about relative gains and try to increase their relative power. In this case, there are little prospects for establishing a fully-fledged security regime. On the other hand, this thesis will build on the security community notion by attesting that integration into the security community is possible only through the process of sharing values of this community.

This research can then be used to evaluate, test or even upgrade existing theories on security regimes, grand schools of thoughts, including neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. The detailed description of such a picture should also produce important conclusions regarding the nature of Russia as a security actor and its future roles in European security affairs.

## References

- Archer, C., 2001. What Security? What Order? In M. A. Smith and G. Timmins eds. 2001. *Uncertain Europe, Building a new European security order?* London and New York: Routledge. Ch. 1.
- Blaikie, N., 2000. *Designing Social Research*. Polity Press.
- Carr, F. and Callan T., 2002. Managing conflict in the new Europe: the role of international institutions. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Centre for German and European Studies, pp. 287–326.
- Caruso, U., 2007. Interplay between the Council of Europe, OSCE, EU and NATO, European Academy, Bolzano. [online] Available at: <<http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/autonomies/minrig/Documents/Mirico/Report%20on%20interplay%20WEB.pdf>> [Accessed on July 10, 2015].
- De Haas, M., 2010. *Russia's foreign security policy in the 21st century: Putin, Medvedev and beyond*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Deudney, D., and Ikenberry, J. G., 1999. The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (April), pp. 179-196.
- Deutsch, K. W., et al., 1975. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Deutsch, K., et al., 1969. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Dunay, p., 1993. Euphoria and Realism in Post-Cold War European Security, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 347-355.
- Ebeqbulem, J. C., 2011. The Failure of Collective Security in the Post World Wars I and II International System, *Transcience*, Vol. 2, Issue 2. [online] Available at: <[http://www2.huberlin.de/transcience/Vol2\\_Issue2\\_2011\\_23\\_29.pdf](http://www2.huberlin.de/transcience/Vol2_Issue2_2011_23_29.pdf)> Accessed on January 30, 2016].
- Elliott, R. and Timulak, L., 2005. Descriptive and interpretive approaches to qualitative research in Miles, J., Gilbert, P. eds. *A Handbook of Research Methods for Clinical and Health Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gowa, J. 1989. Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade, *American Potuical Science Review*, 83, pp. 1245-56.
- Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., and Rittberger, V., 1996. Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes.” *Mershon International Studies Review* 40 (Supplement 2). pp:177-228.
- Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., and Rittberger, V., 2000. Integrating Theories of International Regimes. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 3-33



- Hide-Price, A., 2007. European security in the twenty-first century, the challenge of multipolarity. London and New York: Routledge.
- Jervis, R. 1982. Security Regimes. *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring), pp. 357-378.
- Levy, J. S. 2002. Qualitative methods in International Relations. in Brecher, M. and Harvey F. P., eds., *Millennial Reflections on International Studies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Mearsheimer, J. J., 2014. "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93 No. 5 (September/October), pp. 1-12. [online] Available at: <<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>> [Accessed on December 10, 2015].
- n. a. 2014. General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region, UN webpage. [online] Available at: <<http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm>> [Accessed on January 10, 2016].
- Odell, J. S., 2001. *Case Study Methods in Political Economy*, *International Studies Perspectives*, 2: 161-176.
- Putin, V., 2014. The World Order: New Rules or a Game without Rules. Excerpts from transcript of the final plenary meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club's XI session. [online] Available at: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860>> Accessed on January 10, 2016].
- Snidal, D. 1991. Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation, *American Political Science Review*, 85, n. 33.
- Sperling, J. and Kirchner, E., 1997. *Recasting the European Order: security architectures and economic cooperation*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Storey, W. K., 1999. *Writing History: A guide for Students*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Van Evera, S. 1990/91. Primed for peace: Europe after the Cold War, *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 7-57.
- Van Evera, S. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Wouters, J., and Naert, F., 2001 How effective is the European security architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp: 540-576.

## **CHAPTER 2:**

### **The Soviet Proposals on the German question and the General European Collective Security Treaty (1952-1955)**

#### **Introduction**

The first historical episode under study encompasses the timeline from 1952 till 1955. Within this episode the Soviet proposal, based on the Western reactions and feedback, as well as the ongoing developments in European and Soviet politics, varied from their initial proposals but the core subject was intact – conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Germany under the condition of German neutrality and the All European security pact. The first historical episode - focusing on the Soviet proposal on European collective security pact - can be divided into three sections: the Stalin Proposal, the Molotov Proposal and the Bulganin Proposal.

#### **1. The Stalin proposal - 1952**

##### **Background in which the proposal was unveiled:**

Even before the World War II was over, in 1944 the Soviet Union has started to secure its sphere of influence and actively modify the political landscape of the occupied Eastern states. This was carried out by demolishing democratic institutions via murders, terror campaigns and various tactical moves that allowed for the system of control and domination (Applebaum, 2012). Based on her research of archival data, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin was well prepared for the take over even before he entered the East European states. For example, the police and secret police forces were organized in advance for each of the countries before occupation. He did not just have ideological purpose; he had economic and geopolitical interests as well. The intention was not to create a buffer zone between the East and the West, but the main thinking was the expansion of the socialist revolution. The master plan was to move from East to West (Applebaum, 2012; Kramer, 2009).

In his election speech of February 9, 1946 Stalin revived the old themes of “capitalist encirclement” and “inevitable conflict” between capitalism and socialism (Stalin, 1946), raising warning alarms in the West. Although reluctantly, but surely, the United States and other Western countries were waking up to the possible security threats that could come from the East.

Speech by W. Churchill on March 5, 1946, titled “The Sinews of Peace” framed gloomy the prospects of the East West relations at that time: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent” (Churchill, 1948). The Fulton speech encapsulated the warning of Soviet Union’s ideological expansionism to the democratic West. Churchill had warned of the growing challenge of Communism and the Fifth Columns, which were being established all over the Europe and working with the Communist center (Churchill, 1948). Churchill’s message was not received well by the American public, who was still feeling comfortable with the newfound peace.

In March 1947 The Truman Doctrine was born in light of the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union and the signs of its meddling in Greek and Turkish affairs. From 1946 it was already emerging that it would not be possible to achieve a post-war rapprochement with Stalin. Four setbacks contributed to this understanding: the Soviet failure to withdraw from northern Iran, Soviet pressure on Iran for oil concession and its supposed fomenting of irredentism in Northern Iran, Soviet efforts to press the Turkish Government for base and transit rights through the straits and its rejection of the Baruch plan (Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1945–1952, The Truman Doctrine, 1947).

The most crucial issue of all the security questions on which the East and the West could not agree on at that time was the future of Germany and conclusion of the Peace treaty. For that purpose the Council of Foreign Ministers conference was held between the four powers on 15 December 1947 but ended without any result on the German question. The Communist takeovers in Europe exacerbated the Western threat perceptions and made it urgent for the western allies to think of bolstering the democratic West Germany.

Stalin, however, knew of the western intentions, and he had plans of his own, predating the Western awakening to the Soviet expansionist threat. As early as 1944, even before the war was over, Stalin demanded from Churchill that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary form a belt of “independent, anti-Nazi, pro-Russian states” (Miller, 2000, p. 5) Germany was supposed to be part of this intended buffer zone as well. Already on June 4, 1945, Stalin was unveiling his plans with Communist leaders in Germany on how he would establish Soviet dominance in Eastern occupation zone, undermine the British position, then eventually the US would withdraw after a year or two, clearing the way for the creation of a unified Germany within the Soviet orbit (Miller, 2000, p. 6). In March 1948, in a meeting with Stalin, the Soviet-controlled Party of

Socialist German Unity (SED) expressed fear of total defeat at the upcoming October elections in Berlin, unless the Western powers were removed from the City. Stalin offered to make a “joint effort” to kick the Western powers out of Berlin (Miller, 2000, p. 1).

In the background, the Western states were meeting in the London 6 Power Conference format, which aimed at merging the three occupying zones and creating a Federal government. The Soviet Union was not invited to the London Conference and that served as a reason to firstly obstruct and on March 20 to break up the Allied Control Council as well as to plan for other open counter measures (Giangreco and Griffin, 1988). The Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia and the death of Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia Jan Masaryk on March 11 in suspicious circumstances aided to speed up French cooperation on the German issue. With French governments’ approval, the planned currency reform, in accordance with the London agreements, was announced on June 17, 1948 and became effective on June 20. By the end of July 1948, it was evident that the first phase of currency reform had been successful. The Soviet Union protested the move as it violated the Potsdam agreement which stipulated that Germany be treated as a unified economic zone. In response, on June 23, 1948, the Soviet Military Administration issued an Order, which proclaimed a currency reform for the Soviet Zone and all sectors of Berlin. A chain of confrontational counter actions followed (Giangreco and Griffin, 1988).

The climax of the ensued confrontation was Stalin’s order to blockade the access to Berlin to the three Western countries. The blockade started on 24 June 1948 and lasted till 12 May 1949. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union continued to tamper heavily with the political landscape in the Soviet occupation zone. After successful airlift from the Western countries, the blockade was over, but the German question was still up in the air. On the importance of Germany for both sides, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov has aptly stated – “What happens to Berlin happens to Germany; what happens to Germany, happens to Europe” (cited in Giangreco and Griffin, 1988).

The Western sense of threat has grown exponentially by that time, prompting the European countries to abandon the idea of exclusively West European collective defense, as embodied by the 1948 Brussels agreement from March 17, and bring in the Atlantic powers - first and foremost the United States as well as Canada - into the Alliance. On April 4, 1949 a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created primarily as a collective defense organization,

with Article 5 stating that a military attack against any of the signatories would be considered an attack against them all (For the origins of the Alliance see Duignan, 2000). NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay is accredited for coining a famous parsimonious description of NATO's mission "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down" (cited in Joffe, 2009).

The USSR met the process of the Alliance making with harsh rhetoric. On January 29, 1949, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov together with his aids drafted and published a lengthy declaration of protest to the forthcoming Alliance. In Soviet terms NATO could not possibly be a defensive Alliance and was a realization of America's "policy of encirclement" (for detailed discussion of the Soviet perceptions of NATO see Vojtech, 2002).

In September 1949 it emerged that the Soviet Union had tested its own nuclear bomb. Stalin, based on this new found perceived strategic parity had unleashed a more aggressive Asia policy, especially reinforcing its China policy and in April 1950 consenting to North Korean leader, Kim Il-sung to invade South Korea, under the condition that Chinese leader Mao Zedong would send reinforcements if necessary (Weathersby, 2002, p. 12). As per Stalin's strategy, there would be no direct engagement of Soviet forces in combat; however, Soviet Union armed North Korea and its Generals were sent there as the Soviet Advisory Group, who have helped prepare the plans for the attack (Weathersby, 1993, p. 30). In June 1950 the North Korean army had crossed the 38th parallel and war ensued, drawing in the United States. The Cold war was effectively in place.

### **The proposal:**

The initial Soviet proposal that alluded to some sort of all-European security settlement unfolded in the geopolitical and security setting in which the West was profoundly shaken by Stalin's political decisions, which were directly guided by his desire and ideological convictions, to expand the communist domain. According to Gellately, after the communist invasion of South Korea, the USSR's image as the enemy of democracy and freedom has strengthened in the West. Stalin needed to recover from such an image blow and put the West back into the defensive

(2013, pp. 327). Thus, what became known to the world, as a March 10, 1952 Soviet diplomatic note was a purposeful and timed tactical and strategic proposal.<sup>2</sup>

The note sent to the other three wartime Allies introduced the Soviet approach to the settlement of the most important European security question at that time – the German issue and the signing of the Peace treaty. In its diplomatic note the USSR urged the Governments of the USA, Great Britain and France to:

“Urgently discuss question of peace treaty with Germany with view to preparing in the nearest future an agreed draft peace treaty and present it for examination by appropriate international conference with participation of all interested governments. It is understood that such a peace treaty must be worked out with direct participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government. From this it follows that USSR, USA, England and France who are fulfilling control functions in Germany must also consider question of conditions favoring the earliest formation of all-German Government expressing the will of German people” (FRUS, 1986, Document 65).

The March 10 Note had also included the Draft of the Peace Treaty with Germany. The draft had raised many problematic issues (such as the issue of final boundaries of the German state etc.) but the most important one, which met Western resistance, was the Political Provisions section, paragraph 7, which demanded that Germany would not join any kind of coalition or military alliance, directed against Allied powers. The Para 7 read:

“Germany obligates self not to enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in war against Germany” (FRUS, 1986, Document 65).

The Western reply Note to the Soviet proposal was delivered to the foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Mr. Andrey Vishinsky on March 25th, 1952. In this reply note the United States, in consultation with the government of the United Kingdom, France the GFR and the GDR,

---

<sup>2</sup> Stalin’s March 10, 1952 note was followed with the extensive exchange of notes between the Soviet Union and the three European states in 1952: first it was the initial Soviet Note of March 10 and the Western Reply of March 25; The Soviet Note of April 9 and the Western Reply of May 13; The Soviet Note of May 24 and the Western Reply of July 10 and the Soviet Note of August 23 and the Western Reply of September 23.

reiterated commitment to the just and lasting peace treaty, which would also end the division of Germany. However, the position was that such a treaty could only be concluded with the participation of an all-German government, expressing the will of the German people (FRUS, 1986, Document 78).

For the United States the Soviet proposal was all too unclear in this respect, as it did not specify how and when the free and fair elections would be held and the independent government would be put in place. The American reply note stated:

“Such a Government can only be set up on the basis of free elections in the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone of occupation and Berlin. Such elections can only be held in circumstances, which safeguard the national and individual liberties of the German people. In order to ascertain whether this first essential condition exists, the GA of the UN has appointed a Commission to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone and Berlin. The Commission of Investigation has been assured of the necessary facilities in the Federal Republic and in Western Berlin. US Government would be glad to learn that such facilities will also be afforded in the Soviet Zone and in Eastern Berlin, to enable the Commission to carry out its task” (FRUS, 1986, Document 78).

The United States rejected any negotiations on the peace treaty until the issue of free and fair election and independent all-German government, which would then participate in talks as a Sovereign entity, were firmly decided. The issue of conducting the UN mandated Commission observation mission in both Germanys in the run-up, during and after election process remained as the firm Western demand, which was repeatedly underlined in the American reply notes of May 13, July 10 and September 23 (FRUS, 1986, Document 101, Document 124 and Document 138).

There were many contentious issues about the Soviet proposal; however, the elections issue and the restrictions imposed by paragraph 7 of the draft Peace Treaty were the principal ones. The United States, France, UK and the German Federal Republic adamantly opposed to the paragraph 7 of the draft Treaty. The March 25 US reply note stated:

“US Government also observes that the Soviet Government now considers that the peace treaty should provide for the formation of German national land, air, and sea forces, while at the same time imposing limitations on German’s freedom to enter into association with other countries. US Government considers that such provisions would be a step backwards and might jeopardize the emergence in European of a new era in which international relations would be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. Being convinced of the need of a policy of European unity, the US Government is giving its full support to plans designed to secure the participation of German in a purely defensive European community which will preserve freedom, prevent aggression, and preclude the revival of national militarism. US Government believes that the proposal of the Soviet Government for the formation of German national forces is inconsistent with the achievement of this objective. The US Government remains convinced that this policy of European unity cannot threaten the interests of any country and represents the true path of peace” (FRUS, 1986, Document 78).

On this issue the subsequent Soviet Note of April 9, 1952, stipulated, in view of the USA position, that:

“In such a suggestion there is no inadmissible limitation on the Sovereign rights of the German Government. But this suggestion also excludes the inclusion of Germany in any group of powers directed against any peace-loving state” (FRUS, 1986, Document 82).

In the next reply note of May 13, 1952 the United States again rejected this idea: “It cannot admit that Germany should be denied the basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itself with other nations for peaceful purposes” (FRUS, Document 101, 1986).

The United States government alluded in its reply that its insistence on Commission verification and on the forward-looking solutions to enable an independent All-German government was consistent and based on the developments in both Germanys – on the one hand the constitutional process and overall progress in the FRG and on the other hand, divergent developments in Eastern Germany (FRUS, Document 101, 1986).

In the next reply note of May 24, the Soviet Union repeated the previous propositions regarding the necessity and responsibility of the Four to make arrangements to hold elections, create a



unity government and in parallel work out a Peace Treaty. Again, these points were not answering the USA inquiries but were reciting the previous positions without a change (FRUS, Document 102, 1986).

In addition the Soviet Union registered a formal concern in relations to the “separate negotiations with the Bonn Government of Western Germany regarding the conclusion of the so called “general” contract.” Plans for the European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Army were dubbed as the beginning for remilitarizing the West Germany and then including it into the “the aggressive North Atlantic bloc” (FRUS, Document 102, 1986).

In its July 10 reply Note the United States again repeated its points regarding the preconditions before any negotiations regarding the peace treaty. Specifically the United States expressed concerns over Soviet actions in East Germany as destructive and opposite to its declared will to reunite the two Germanys. Further, the United States underscored once more that choosing one’s alliances was a basic right of sovereign countries and thus it could not be denied to Germany that:

“has recently adopted without any justification a series of measures in the Soviet Zone and in Berlin which tend to prevent all contact between the Germans living in the territory under Soviet occupation and the 50 million Germans in the Federal Republic and in the Western sectors of Berlin. These measures aggravate the arbitrary division of Germany. The United States Government wishes to emphasize that the agreements recently signed with the Federal Republic open up to Germany a wide and free association with the other nations of Europe. The United States Government cannot, as it has already emphasized in its note of May 13, admit that Germany should be denied the basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itself with other nations for peaceful purposes” (FRUS, Document 124, 1986).

In the last exchange of notes both governments reiterated their positions with additional suggestions that would take their proposed agenda forward. In its final reply of September 23, the United States government, among other longstanding issues, expressed dissatisfaction that the initial Soviet position that the All-German government should have been part of the treaty process, was replaced, in the latest August 23 Soviet note (FRUS, Document 125, 1986), with a

position that only provides for the presence of the representatives of the Soviet zone and the FRG “during the discussion of relevant questions” (FRUS, Document 138, 1986)

No reply note was ever issued by the Soviet Union to the US September 23 reply note. On March 5, 1953 Stalin had died.

To summarize the first set of the Soviet proposals, spelled out in aforesaid Soviet diplomatic notes, they called about the post-war Peace treaty between East and West by creating a unified but neutral Germany. On the positive side, it must be underlined that the Soviets displayed willingness to consider German interests of unification, withdrawal of forces and normalization of the relations with the West. It is not so conclusive however, whether Stalin’s offer was genuine. In response to Molotov’s concern that the Soviet proposals would interfere with their German policy, Stalin responded: “Do not worry. We will implement it in our way later. The essence is in correlation of forces” (Zubok, 2007. p. 22). According to Meissner, Stalin’s 1952 proposal corresponded to the Soviet diplomatic efforts in 1951 and 1952 to create a neutral zone from Scandinavia, through West-Central Europe, to the near and Middle East (1968, p. 238). Evidently, at this initial stage there were many common objectives at play, however, two issues: the issue of free all German elections and Germany’s freedom to choose its own Alliances - stood out as problematic, in the end forestalling any prospect of solution.

Basically, the Soviet Union, despite its initial displayed willingness to settle the German question and withdraw forces after the signing of the peace treaty, stiffened its position and continued to call on the Peace Treaty, drafted by the Four and forced on the all-German government. The United States on the other hand never agreed to get involved into negotiations on the treaty without solving the basic questions of free and fair elections and the formation of an independent all-German government. This interaction over Europe’s pressing security issue was undergoing in the environment of ideological rivalry, with Stalin’s imperialist policies and success in forceful establishment of communist governments in Eastern Europe, matched from the West by the US Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan.

## **2. The Molotov proposal - 1954**

The second set of Soviet proposals on the All-European security treaty is more pertinent to the central focus of this thesis. It was in 1954 that the Soviet Union firmly connected the German

question to the issue of the All-European Security order. If in 1952 Stalin was pretty straightforward about its desire to neutralize Germany as a military power, in 1954, the Soviet Union, now ruled by Beria, Malenkov and Khrushchev, linked the German question to an All-European security pact proposal, making the resolution of one contingent on the resolution of the other.

This proposal was unveiled in two slightly different versions, reflecting the change in the Soviet domestic political landscape. The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Molotov presented the preview to the first version at the Berlin foreign Ministers' conference, with subsequent exchange of notes. The new Soviet Premier, Bulganin presented a final version at the Geneva Summit in July 1955. The proposal was then discussed at length during the Geneva Conference of foreign ministers.

### **Background in which the proposal was unveiled:**

As the news about Stalin's death spread, the world was cautiously optimistic about the possibility of a renewed peace or at least of lowering the tensions which grew intense since the end of the WWII. The first signs of reconciliation and improved rhetoric was voiced on the day of Stalin's funeral on March 9, 1953 when Georgii Malenkov, the new Soviet Premier spoke of the possibility of prolonged peace. He stressed that the Soviet Union was against instigation of a new war and was for the policy of international cooperation and development of human contacts between all the countries. This approach was rooted in Leninist-Stalinist philosophy of prolonged co-existence and peaceful competition between two different systems – capitalism and socialism (Malenkov, 1953).

It was becoming evident that in practice too the Soviet Union was relaxing Stalin's hardline policies in certain respects; for example, in relations with Israel, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Korean issue. In return, the Western countries also responded with analogous rhetoric. On April 16, 1953 President of the United States, Dwight Eisenhower delivered his famous speech in which he spoke of a "chance for a just peace:"

“The Soviet system shaped by Stalin and his predecessors was born of one World War. It survived with stubborn and often amazing courage a Second World War. It has lived to threaten a third... Now a new leadership has assumed power in the Soviet Union. Its links

to the past, however strong, cannot bind it completely. Its future is, in great part, its own to make” (Eisenhower, 1953a).

In little over a week’s time Moscow responded to the Eisenhower speech with an article published in the newspaper *Pravda*. Among other issues, article raised the German question and renewed the calls for the conclusion of the Peace treaty as soon as possible (Pravda, 1953). On 11 May, 1953 Winston Churchill, who had by that time returned to the post of British Prime Minister addressed the House of Commons proposing a meeting of the leaders of the great powers seeking again to somehow secure peace in the Cold War (Churchill, 1953).

In the background, the Western countries were trying to go forward with the Bonn-Paris agreements (1952 – 1954) ratification that would put the European Defense Community in place. As the opposition to the EDC grew in some European states, first and foremost in France, the Soviet MFA, still headed by Molotov, decided to try and seize the initiative anew. There were no immediate solutions as the political crisis grew in the German Democratic Republic. Migration from East Germany to West Germany got bigger, threatening the USSR’s political, economic and strategic interests. In this situation, as Roberts points out, Malenkov thought it best to put German reunification at the forefront of the German population, even having a priority over building a socialism. However, the proposed remedy fell short of solution, as on June 16-17, 1953 there was a revolt in East Germany causing the Soviet Union to strengthen its efforts to maintain order in GDR. At the same time, in July 2-7, 1953 the special plenum of the CPSU Central Committee denounced Lavrentii Beria for his domestic policies and for wanting to seize power for himself. Accusation in regards to giving up the policy of building socialism in the GDR was also featured among the charges. Khrushchev was most acute in blaming Beria, while Molotov also denounced him stating that Beria was wrong for believing that there could be peace loving capitalist Germany and that his own opinion was to slow down the pace of building the socialism not to abandon the idea as such (Roberts, 2008, pp. 14). According to Roberts:

“By linking Beria with the idea of surrendering the GDR, his former comrades added to the case that he was not just a political renegade and would-be dictator, but also an imperialist agent. The charge against Beria was led by Khrushchev and it may be that his highlighting of the German question stemmed from doubts about or opposition to the one Germany policy. Certainly, during the next two years Khrushchev was to emerge as an ardent supporter of the GDR and an exponent of the two Germanys line” (p. 14-15).

The Beria affair and Khrushchev's position defined the new tactical details of the upcoming Soviet proposal that would be unveiled at the Berlin Conference. The Soviet delegation, headed by Molotov went to the Conference with a set of new proposals, all checked and agreed with the Presidium (for in-depth discussion of the policy modifications on behalf of the Presidium see Roberts, 2008, pp. 15-16).

### **Berlin Conference - 1954**

The Berlin Conference opened on January 25, 1954 and lasted until February 19. The chairmanship was rotating among the four occupying powers. The first issues for discussion were the German and Austrian questions. After more than two weeks of arduous deliberations the sides had not reached any agreement on the existing agenda. On February 10 the head of the Soviet delegation delivered his key speech, unveiling the two brand new proposals.

In his opening statement Molotov brought the fact of the USSR's dissatisfaction with the ongoing processes to the attention of the three Western countries but that discussion on the German question should have continued despite differences. The key objective should be to avoid division of Europe into military groups. In his words, the way to prevent the looming third world war was by preventing the development of opposing military groups. NATO was dubbed an anti-Soviet bloc, resembling the anti-Comintern pact, which led to unleashing of the Second World War. The EDC was identified as a very dangerous project, with no benefits in comparison with the Collective Security needs of Europe (needs of 32 states as opposed to the needs of the 6 states). The membership of only the six states in the EDC was qualified as divisive for Europe and a precursor for tensions. Western plans in regards to formation of the EDC and stationing of foreign troops in Europe for 50 years would threaten Eastern security and would postpone unification of Germany and the signing of the German peace treaty. As a solution to these looming problems Molotov offered a practical implementation of the general European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe (FRUS, Document 451, 1986).

Molotov stressed that this Collective security treaty should be concluded fast. Contrary to longstanding Western demands, the offer was to sort out the German and Austrian questions at a later time and that the conclusion of such a pact could precede the final settlement of German and Austrian questions (FRUS, Document 451, 1986).

The proposal in relations to the German question was titled “On ensuring European Security”. It was a draft of a statement on behalf of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Pending the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Germany and the reunification on a democratic and peace-loving basis, the agreement called for a simultaneous withdrawal of occupation forces, with only limited contingents in place necessary for protective functions in their respective zones of control. GFR and GDR were allowed to have police units, the strength and armament of which would be determined by agreement between the Four Powers. As per the draft statement, in order to have ensured the compliance with this Agreement in Eastern and Western Germany, inspection teams composed of representatives of the Four Powers would be formed (FRUS, Document 516, 1986).

The final, article 3 pledged the neutralization of Germany and the conclusion between European states of a Treaty on Collective Security:

“In conformity with the provisions set forth above, the implementation of which will ensure that neutralisation of Germany and the creation of conditions favourable to a solution of the German problem in the interest of stabilizing peace in Europe, the Four Powers shall take immediate steps to facilitate the conclusion between European states of a Treaty on Collective Security providing adequate guarantees against aggression and violation of peace in Europe. To this end the Four Powers agree to take the initiative in calling an appropriate conference of European states” (FRUS, Document 516, 1986).

The second proposal was a draft of the Treaty on Collective Security titled “General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe.” The draft treaty consisted of introductory basic principles and 11 operative articles. The basic principles represented general recitation of the UN charter, evoking the purpose of peace and security and the need to strengthen international cooperation based on the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of non-interference in their internal affairs (FRUS, Document 517, 1986). The main purpose of the treaty was identified:

“Prevent the formation of groupings of some European states directed against other European states, which gives rise to friction and strained relations among nations, and to achieve concerted efforts by all European states in ensuring collective security in Europe” (FRUS, Document 517, 1986).

Under the treaty, all European states would be eligible to become part. Until the unity was reached, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic were allowed to become parties to the Treaty, enjoying equal rights as other states (FRUS, Document 517, 1986).

Article 2 was a declaration of non-aggression and non-use of force. Article 3 was a declaration of collective defense. Article 4 determined the mechanism in which case the act of aggression would invoke the collective defense mechanism. The article conferred the right of “individual or collective self-defence”. Article 5 specified the mechanism of joint discussion to determine the procedure under which the Parties, in the event of a collective defense, would provide assistance, including a military one. Article 6 of the draft treaty spelled out the necessary actions vis a vis the United Nations in case of taken or envisaged actions for the purpose of exercising the right of self-defence or of maintaining peace and security in Europe (FRUS, Document 517, 1986).

Then there was article 7, which called on the parties not to enter in any coalition or alliance that would be contrary to the purpose of the Treaty on Collective Security in Europe. Notably, paragraph 7 of the Draft of the Peace Treaty with Germany, included in the March 10, 1952 Stalin note, similarly called on Germany to refrain from memberships in the coalition or the military alliance. Basically, the current treaty was of same purpose and character, only now applied to a bigger, all-European scale (FRUS, Document 517, 1986). The treaty called on States to:

“undertake not to participate in any coalition or alliance nor to conclude agreements the objectives of which are contrary to the purposes of the Treaty on Collective Security in Europe” (FRUS, Document 517, 1986).

Article 8 spelled out the provisions, which would be necessary to implement the Treaty. These were:

- a) regular or, when required, special conferences at which each State shall be represented by a member of its government or by some other specially designated representative;
- b) the setting up of a permanent consultative political committee the duty of which shall be the preparation of appropriate recommendations to the governments of the states which are Parties to the Treaty;

- c) the setting up of a military consultative organ the terms of reference of which shall be determined in due course.

Article 9 of the proposed draft made special concessions to the other non-European permanent five states - the United States and the Chinese People's Republic to participate as observers:

“Recognizing the special responsibility of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Parties to the Treaty shall invite the Governments of the U.S.A. and the Chinese People's Republic to designate representatives to the organs set up in accordance with the Treaty in the capacity of observers.”

Each Treaty signatory would also undertake a responsibility that each of their international agreements and obligations would be in conformity with this treaty (Article 10) and that the treaty would last for 50 years - Article 11 (FRUS, Document 517, 1986).

Molotov's statements were met with a mixture of astonishment, opposition, rejection and even disappointment by the other three official delegations. The State Department archive materials include memo from the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State, dated February 11, 1954 which summarizes the major points raised by the participants on February 10, after they heard Molotov's statement. According to the document, the head of French delegation, Foreign Minister Bidault had spoken at length invalidating each proposition, including the historical comparisons, made by Soviet leader (FRUS, Document 451, 1986). In terms of the German question and the logic behind the proposed security treaty, the French position was:

- No change had registered regarding German settlement; instead abandonment of NATO and EDC plans by the West has become prominent issues of the Conference.
- Soviet proposals show clearly that Soviet delegation now wants not only neutralized Germany but also neutralized Western Europe (for 50 years) by compulsory abandonment of EDC and NATO; and would prolong division of Germany for 50 years by postponing peace treaty.
- Soviet proposal is so one-sided; it is not acceptable. Security of Europe includes, but is not limited, to security of USSR.



- In reference to Molotov's critical reference regarding American troops in Europe - had such troops been in Europe in 1919 to 1939 there would have been no World War II. France has no intention of shaking off a worthwhile friendship.
- Amazed at Soviet suggestion to offer to the United States an observer status.
- The path on which West has moved was dictated by a situation, which West did not create. The East and particularly East Germany did not wait upon a collective security pact before raising and strengthening military force. How can defensive efforts of West create such a threat to security of Europe as Molotov alleges? EDC excludes possibility any individual armed action. EDC system provides organic security guarantee of a new type by associating Germany with countries whose desire for peace cannot be questioned. Molotov does not deny this but fears Germany might cut loose from this association; if that were really the problem we could consider firmer clauses; but he does not seem to want anything except abandonment of EDC and NATO and exclusion of the US from Europe. Soviet side must face the facts of Europe today, facts that face us all (FRUS, Document 451, 1986).

The head of the United Kingdom's delegation to the conference was Secretary Eden. His comments in regards to key Soviet proposals were as follows:

- Soviet proposals appear to resemble a sort of Monroe Doctrine for Europe designed to break up NATO and exclude US forces from Europe. The US contribution is too valuable and is part of history.
- NATO is a foundation of the United Kingdom's policy; it is physically impossible to initiate aggression under it. It offers threat to no one; we cannot give it up. Within it, we have useful associations with other nations, not limited to military matters; and as necessary military build-up tapers off other aspects of association (economic, cultural) will become more important. NATO involvement does not exclude friendship with others; but is vital part of life of free nations of West.
- Free elections seem to have disappeared and German problem is shelved.
- The general collective security plan, like the German arrangements, appears to put things in the wrong order. These broad horizons of collective security must come after settlement of the German problem.
- Soviet collective security proposals would require us (Article 7) to give up our right of association in non-aggressive alliances; to deprive us of our freedom of choice

while not apparently depriving USSR its freedom of choice (in reference to Article 10).

- Insofar as new proposals are directed at the abandonment EDC and NATO, it appears Soviets have ignored all that was said in past two weeks about defensive character of these arrangements and about West's willingness to guarantee Russian security.
- In summary, all Soviets want is dismantlement of NATO and Western defensive alliances without any comparable dismantlement of their apparatus. This is not a possible foundation for work we have to do (FRUS, Document 451, 1986).

Before the US Secretary of State Mr. Dulles spoke, Molotov intervened giving counter proposition to the expressed objections. In conclusion, he summarized that some remarks seemed to imply the rejection of the idea and requested a "clear statement on this since if idea is unacceptable, obviously Soviet draft is of no use; but if the idea is viable, perhaps amendments possible" (FRUS, Document 451, 1986).

Mr. Dulles registered the dissatisfaction with the fact that regarding Germany Soviet proposal has not changed and that it would have been irrelevant to make further explanations anew. The existing proposal in his understanding would "leave West Germany and consequently much of Western Europe exposed to any threat of external aggression." In reference to the proposed Conference Dulles retorted that:

"it seems, whenever we have a conference which is unable to settle anything, the Soviet Union proposes that we have another conference which can only breed other conferences is the best we can do. That is a rather disheartening conclusion" (FRUS, Document 452, 1986).

In terms of the second proposal regarding the general European treaty on collective security in Europe the United States representative refused to comment directly on the text as the Soviet draft excluded the USA from that enterprise. In his understanding as well the proposed treaty for European collective security would be in reality a replacement of the North Atlantic Treaty (FRUS, Document 452, 1986). In this regard Secretary Dulles tried to explain the vested American interests in Europe and that the US actions were at behest of European countries:

“When that war was over [First world war], we took our troops home at once. Then the same story was repeated under Hitler in the Second World War, and again, after some delay and when the danger not only to Western Europe but also the Soviet Union, was immense, and when we ourselves seemed threatened, we made gigantic effort of putting troops and supplies in Europe to help to save Europe from the renewed militarism of Germany. And, after the Second World War we withdrew all our forces from Europe, except a relatively small number who were required for occupation purposes in Germany” (FRUS, Document 452, 1986).

He then questioned Soviet logic and the interpretation of history. In respect to Soviet suggestion that the US participation in the present Defense of West Europe causes the division of Europe, Dulles exclaimed:

“this is one of these strange reversals of history - the upside-down talks - to which unfortunately we have had to accommodate ourselves. Everyone knows that the division of Europe was created before the action to which I refer and that our action was taken only because of the division of Europe” (FRUS, Document 452, 1986).

He brought in the recent history examples including the refusal of the Soviet Satellites, under the direction of the Soviet Union, to share in the Marshall plan. Division of Europe, in his opinion had started back in 1939, when the Soviet Union, despite the wording of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, had annexed the Baltic States. As secretary Dulles put it in a nutshell:

“It is a division between those who have been absorbed and the others who do not want to be absorbed” (FRUS, Document 452, 1986).

As it was reported by one of the eyewitnesses of the Berlin Conference, excluding the United States participation was a gross tactical error by Molotov:

“Then came the block buster. The U.S. was specifically excluded from the collective security pact...At that point we all laughed out loud and the Russians were taken completely by surprise at our reaction. Molotov did a double take and finally managed a smile, but the Russian momentum was gone” (cited in Roberts, 2008, p. 24).

In the following days, Molotov, pressed by Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister and Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary took a step back on the NATO question and the US participation. On February 17, he stated that there were legitimate Soviet concerns on the issue of NATO, therefore, to answer the question of compatibility or incompatibility of NATO and the general European security pact would only be possible after joint study of the question (FRUS, Document 452, 1986).

On 19 February the Berlin conference adjourned without any concrete results. The four States only agreed to a future conference of the big five with the Republic of Korea and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and other countries, which participated in the armed hostilities in Korea, to meet in April in Geneva to discuss a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. In the adopted joint Communiqué of the Berlin Conference only a dismal reference was made in relations to the issues that were being discussed for the period of more than three weeks:

“The four Ministers have had a full exchange of views on the German question, on the problems of European security and on the Austrian question but they were unable to reach agreement upon these matters” (FRUS, Document 525, 1986).

According to archival materials, after the completion of the Berlin Conference three additional rounds of exchange of notes followed. The note dated March 31, 1954 was the culmination of the Soviet proposal to the issue as it offered the West that the Soviet Union also joins the Alliance. In that Note the Soviet side identified the problem of a general arms reduction and the prohibition as a heavy burden on “peoples” and a solution to this problem as highly significant to promoting peace and the security. The note encapsulated the concern of that time – the ongoing arms race, the scientific discoveries and the dangers of possible use of nuclear weapons, especially the newly discovered hydrogen bomb, in an armed attack. It expressed the need for an agreement to regulate the use of such weapons and commitment that the Soviet Union will continue to seek such an agreement (Soviet Note, March 31, 1954).

The lengthy diplomatic note included the Soviet position in regards to the guarantees to security in Europe – as proposed in the Berlin Conference. The note stressed that the proposed draft “provides for a general European system of security based on the collective efforts of all the countries in Europe (Soviet Note, March 31, 1954). Furthermore, it renewed its position in regards to the German question – that the two Germanys, pending integration, would also be

signatories to the Treaty. According to the proposed logic, the creation of a general European system of collective security would preclude formation of antagonistic military groups. The note recounted the arguments exchanged in Berlin as to why the EDC, the European Army project and NATO were regarded as offensive by the USSR and not defensive, as claimed by the West:

“Plainly enough, given the proper conditions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could lose its aggressive character, that is, if all the big powers which belonged to the anti-Hitler coalition became its participants. In view of this the Soviet Government, guided by the unchanged principles of its foreign policy of peace and desirous of relaxing the tension in international relations, states its readiness to join with the interested governments in examining the matter of having the Soviet Union participate in the North Atlantic Treaty.” (NATO archives, Soviet Note, March 31, 1954).

The next paragraph further called out to the governments of the three states that “they will look with favor on steps to ensure such a situation whereby the North Atlantic Treaty would acquire a really defensive character and the ground would be laid to prevent any part of Germany from becoming involved in military groups.”

In the last paragraph, it was stressed that after such action, the NATO would cease to be a closed military group and would be open to all European countries (Soviet Note, March 31, 1954). No specific mention was made of the mechanisms of US membership or that of Canada in the possible future pact but by that point it was implied and was stressed via diplomatic exchange that the US participation would not be questioned.

The Western countries weighed in on the proposal and on May 7 issued Tripartite Reply to Soviet note of March 31, 1954 (NATO Archives, RDC (54) 240). The note consisted of nine paragraphs, responding to each Soviet line of argumentation. It was underlined from the outset that the content of the Soviet note of March 31 was already “fully discussed by the four Foreign Ministers at Berlin”.

The note provided an account of the Western view and position on the disarmament issue. They stressed the importance of the President Eisenhower’s initiative and the upcoming negotiation on the disarmament issue in the United Nations and expressed hope that the USSR would

participate constructively (NATO Archives, RDC (54) 240). As per the issues of collective security, it was hinted that:

“A sense of security and confidence must first be established. In this light, according to Western study of the issue, the Soviet side offered nothing new. What was repeated in the Note, as per Western perception was a new collective security treaty which is avowedly based on the neutralization and continued division of Germany, while leaving unchanged the Soviet Government’s close political, economic and military control over the countries of Eastern Europe. This can only prolong insecurity and division in Europe. These proposals, even when amended to permit United States participation, do not provide any foundation for genuine security” (NATO Archives, RDC (54) 240).

The Western countries maintained that the collective security mechanism for Europe was not necessary as such a mechanism was already covered by the UN – a world-wide security organization and that collective security would best be safeguarded if the Soviet Government would permit the United Nations to function as intended by its Charter:

“The Soviet Government has also suggested that its proposed collective security pact should be accompanied by an extension of the Atlantic Pact through the adherence of the Soviet Union to the North Atlantic Treaty. It is unnecessary to emphasize the completely unreal character of such a suggestion. It is contrary to the very principle on which the defence system and the security of the Western nations depend. These nations have bound themselves by close ties of mutual confidence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is much more than a purely military arrangement, is founded on the principle of individual liberty and the rule of law. The means of defence of its members have been pooled to provide collectively the security, which they cannot attain individually in the face of the military preponderance, which the Soviet Union has attained in Europe since 1945, and of the westward expansion of a political, economic and military system subject to its sole control. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is wholly defensive. There is free and full exchange of information between all its members. All its decisions are taken by unanimous consent. The Soviet Union as a member of the Organization would therefore be in a position to veto every decision. None of the member states is prepared to allow their joint defence system to be disrupted in this way” (NATO Archives, RDC (54) 240).

In further passages the Soviet proposal was termed as a “illusory security organization” and a mere facade as opposed to “defensive association of like-minded states.” In exchange, the Western note put forward a five set of steps necessary for defusing the sources of international tension: solving the Austrian and German questions, reaching an agreement on disarmament and prohibition of atomic weapons, finding solutions to the Far East problem at the Geneva Conference and enabling the United Nations to fulfill its role as an organization for collective security (NATO Archives, RDC (54) 240).

On July 24 1954, the Soviet Union transmitted a second note to the Western powers, noting that alongside security, issues of economic and political cooperation could also be discussed and calling for a conference on collective security in Europe. The pact arising from such a meeting would include Eastern and Western Germany, would unite Germany, and would provide for the withdrawal of occupation forces. In an additional note of August 4 the Soviet Union proposed a four-power meeting for August or September to do the preliminary work for the security conference. The Western reply came on September 10. In it the three States agreed to a four-power meeting on the condition that the Soviet Union would sign the Austrian Treaty and would agree to free elections in Germany as preconditions (The Department of State Bulletin, 1954, pp. 397–402).

The Soviet Union responded with two further notes dated October 23, which proposed a four-power conference to be held in November to discuss German unity, the withdrawal of occupation forces, and the calling of an all-European security conference and a November 13 note which included invitations to a November 29 conference to discuss the creation of a European collective security system. The Western countries replied on November 29 rejecting their invitation to attend a Conference and again putting forth preconditions including the signing of the Austrian Treaty, a Soviet declaration on free elections for Germany, and a meeting of the four powers only after the Paris Agreements would be signed (The Department of State Bulletin, 1954, pp. 901–907).

### **3. The Bulganin Proposal - 1955**

#### **Background in which the proposal was unveiled:**

The European Defense Community (EDC), as proposed by the French Prime Minister Rene Plevin in 1950 was supposed to answer the US calls for the rearmament of West Germany in a

way that it would reinforce a European defense. The Pleven plan would also take care of the problem of the West German rearmament, by placing it under the European umbrella. The proposed EDC treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 by the six European countries, including West Germany but the ratification process had stalled, despite the US rigorous insistence that Europe move forward on the EDC. On August 30, 1954 Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France tried to proceed with the ratification process in the National Assembly; however, the treaty was rejected by the vote of 319 to 264 (Ruane, 2000, p. 102). In an effort to save the initiative, the British Prime Minister Eden proposed that the West Germany join the NATO – an initiative which was finally agreed at the London Conference in September-October 1954 (Ruane, 2000).

In response, the Moscow conference for European security took place from November 29 till December 2, 1954 and was attended by the Soviet Union and its Eastern satellites. The conference was filled with anti EDC, NATO and the Paris agreement rhetoric. Against the ongoing capitalist consolidation Molotov argued for a countermeasure and a need for self-defense.

The second conference was held from 11-14 May, 1955 in Warsaw, Poland. The Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania concluded a multilateral “Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance” giving birth to the Warsaw Pact organization. High-ranking Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese representatives were also invited as observers. Militarily, West Germany’s NATO membership did not immediately change the existing military balance in Europe. However, in the soviet strategy, political considerations were more dominant, as evidenced by entrusting the planning for the new alliance to the Soviet foreign ministry rather than the general staff (Byrne and Klotzbach, 2005, p. 3).

As Byrne and Klotzbach observe “the text of the Warsaw Treaty followed closely the model of NATO’s founding charter - the Washington Treaty of April 4, 1949” (2005, p. 4). This was done for the purpose of providing an incentive to start negotiating about the creation of a new European security system which in Soviet understanding should have replaced the existing military Alliances. At the Warsaw Pact’s inaugural session Soviet premier Nikolai A. Bulganin specifically pointed out that this was not the end of the campaign for an all-European security treaty (Byrne and Klotzbach, 2005, p. 4). Notably, the Warsaw Pact Treaty included an article, which stated that the organization would dissolve when the treaty on General security in Europe



would enter into force.

Despite such diplomatic maneuvering and tactics by the Soviet Union, the Western countries moved on with their own plans. In May 1955, the occupation regime in West Germany ended and the newly created Federal Republic of Germany became the fifteenth NATO member state on May 9, 1955. After that the Soviet Union could not show that it trusted “its Germans” any less than the West did, and soon enough the East Germany’s armed forces similarly to West Germany’s Bundeswehr, became incorporated into the alliance (Byrne and Klotzbach, 2005, p. 6).

Basically, the ratification of the Paris agreements, creation of the WPO and the entry of West Germany into NATO have cemented the bipolar post-World War II order. Yet, as promised by Bulganin, the quest for an all-European collective security order in Europe continued.

The final stage of the first historical episode under study - the Soviet campaign for European collective security - was unveiled anew with novel accents during the two multilateral Geneva events: the Geneva Summit (18-23 July 1955) and the Geneva Foreign Ministers’ Conference (26 October - 16 November 1955).

### **The Geneva Summit**

The Geneva Summit was a first meeting of the heads of States of war-time Allies since the Potsdam Conference at a time when people both in the East and in the West thought that a catastrophic nuclear war was inevitable. President Dwight D. Eisenhower headed the United States delegation to the Summit. Prime Minister Anthony Eden headed the United Kingdom’s delegation, Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin headed the Soviet delegation and Prime Minister Edgar Faure headed the French delegation. The four teams also included respective foreign ministers. The purpose was to diffuse tension and discuss matters of peaceful co-existence, including the German issue, the European collective security and disarmament (for detailed study of the Geneva Summit see Bischof and Dockrill, 2000).

All the leaders stressed the need to find solution beyond disagreement for the purpose of common peace in their opening statements. In his July 18 opening statement the US President stated:

“We can, perhaps, create a new spirit that will make possible future solutions of problems which are within our responsibilities. And equally important we can try to take here and now at Geneva the first steps on a new road to a just and durable peace” (Eisenhower, 1955b).

The Western leaders set the tone of their preferred negotiating starting points from the very beginning. For example, while underlining the ideological as well as philosophical differences between the East and the West, Eisenhower claimed that the precondition for working together on common issues was a standard that “none should attempt by force or trickery to make his beliefs prevail and thus to impose his system on the unwilling” (Eisenhower, 1955b).

From the outset, Eisenhower voiced problems, which were concerning the Western countries:

- the problem of unifying Germany and forming an all German government based on free elections;
- the problem of respecting the right of peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live;
- the problem of communication and human contacts as among our peoples;
- the problem of international communism;
- the overriding problem of armament (Eisenhower, 1955b).

Eisenhower called for subject-oriented discussion hoping that this new gathering would “start the kind of discussions which will inject a new spirit into our diplomacy; and to launch fresh negotiations under conditions of good augury” (Eisenhower, 1955b).

The British Prime Minister Eden similarly outlined the major problems concerning disarmament as well as the German question. Eden encouraged to move on with the solution and most importantly proposed to consider agreements on the level of forces and armaments as well as the demilitarized area between the East and the West:

“Is there some further reassurance we can give each other? There is one, which I certainly think should be considered. We should be ready to examine the possibility of a demilitarized area between East and West” (FRUS, Document 184, 1987).

In his opening speech Soviet Premier Bulganin responded to some of the points raised, mainly on disarmament. As for the German question, it was made clear that this was a matter of some distant future and contingent upon the creation of the system of European collective security:

“It must be admitted that the remilitarization of Western Germany and its integration into military groupings of the Western Powers now represent the main obstacles to its unification” (FRUS, Document 184, 1987).

The Soviet head of delegation stated that the solution to this situation lay in “a system of collective security with the participation of all European nations and the United States of America” (FRUS, Document 184, 1987).

On July 20, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Heads of Government, the Soviet Premier unveiled anew the draft of the “General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe” (FRUS, Document 251, 1987). The draft consisted of 15 articles and was similar to the spirit of the draft unveiled by Molotov a year earlier, with some language modifications and a number of new schemes.

Most importantly, despite previous acute opposition by the West, the Treaty included as article 7 the prohibition to participate in any coalitions or alliance or other agreements that would be contrary to the Treaty on Collective Security in Europe.

The innovation of the current proposal was article 12, which called for a two-stage approach to the dismantlement of the existing alliance systems in Europe and the introduction of the new Collective Security order:

“The States-parties to the Treaty agree that during the first period (two or three years) of the implementation of measures for the establishment of the system of collective security in Europe under the present Treaty they shall not be relieved of the obligations assumed by them under existing treaties and agreements” (FRUS, Document 251, 1987).

Article 14 stipulated precise terms:

“The States-parties to the Treaty agree that on the expiration of an agreed time-limit from the entry into force of the present Treaty, the Warsaw Treaty of May 14, 1955, the Paris Agreements of October 23, 1954, and the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, shall become ineffective” (FRUS, Document 251, 1987).

On the German question the position of two Germanys was maintained and both the GFR and the GDR were to become parties to the proposed Treaty, before the full resolution of the question on German unity on behalf of the Occupying power (FRUS, Document 251, 1987).

Another innovation offered in this new treaty was article 8 which called for broader economic and cultural cooperation among the four countries as well as other states through the development of trade and other economic relations as well as expansion of cultural ties (FRUS, Document 251, 1987).

The Summit yielded no results except for the agreement to meet at the foreign ministers level. The heads of delegations issued a Directive to the foreign ministers on July 23, 1955 to discuss European Security and Germany, disarmament and development of contacts between East-West (FRUS, Document 257, 1987).

As the delegations left Geneva it seemed that “the Spirit of Geneva” had brought a new atmosphere to East-West dialogue. The term was coined by President Eisenhower during his Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Geneva Conference:

“We realize that one ingredient has been missing from all past conferences. This is an honest intent to conciliate, to understand, to be tolerant, to try to see the other fellow’s viewpoint as well as we see our own. I say to you if we can change the spirit in which these conferences are conducted, we will have taken the greatest step toward peace, toward future prosperity and tranquility that has ever been taken in all the history of mankind” (Eisenhower, 1955c).

A month later, speaking in front of the American Bar Association Eisenhower framed the spirit of Geneva in more precise terms:

“The spirit of Geneva, if it is to provide a healthy atmosphere for the pursuit of peace, if it is to be genuine and not spurious, must inspire all to a correction of injustices, an observance of human rights and an end to subversion organized on a worldwide scale. Whether or not such a spirit as this will thrive through the combined intelligence and understanding of men, or will shrivel in the greed and ruthlessness of some, is for the future to tell. But one thing is certain. This spirit and the goals we seek could never have been achieved by violence or when men and nations confronted each other with hearts filled with fear and hatred. At Geneva we strove to help establish this spirit” (Eisenhower, 1955d).

This new spirit seems to have been shared by other delegations as well. Khrushchev in his memoirs assesses the Summit as “a failure” but “not totally useless:”

“the so-called spirit of Geneva arose at that time, and the peoples of the world breathed more easily. Everyone felt that the war on whose threshold we had stood was no longer imminent” (Khrushchev, 2007).

### **Geneva Foreign Ministers’ Conference – 1955**

The foreign ministers of the Four countries gathered in Geneva from 27 October through 16 November 1955 to discuss issues on the agenda as commanded by the heads of states.

In their opening addresses the three Western states stressed that without German unity, any system of European security would only be an illusion and that they would not join any collective security arrangement that did not envision German reunification. However, to remove the Soviet concerns as raised on numerous occasions previously, the three States put forward the “Outline of Terms of a Treaty of Assurance on the Reunification of Germany”. This treaty would comprise of undertaking to refrain from the use of force, to withhold aid from an aggressor, provisions for the limitation and the control of forces and armaments, and the obligation to react against aggression. The treaty would enter into force only in conjunction with the reunification of Germany under the Eden Plan. It would be carried out by stages and signature would be concurrent with the signature of the agreement on the Eden Plan (Department of State publication, 1955, pp. 27-28).

This was the first instance that the Western countries took seriously the Soviet calls for a general agreement on European security and proposed a compromise version of a Treaty which would ensure protection from unwarranted military aggression, uncontrolled armament and the collective defense mechanism, in conjunction with German unity. The only thing that the Western treaty did not take into consideration was the dismantlement of the pre-existing alliances and agreements.

In response, the Soviet foreign Minister Molotov welcomed the fact that the western powers proposed for discussion not only the German problem but also problem of European security and condoned that some of these proposals require further discussion and study. However, he criticized at length the linkage made by the West arguing that the issue of European security must come first. He also criticized the fact that the choice of a future unified Germany is already thought to be in favor of NATO and WEU. At the end, Molotov tabled anew the Bulganin proposal, which was first unveiled at the Geneva Summit (FRUS, Document 301, 1969).

Although now there were many similarities in Western and Soviet proposals, it emerged clearly during the proceedings at Geneva that without an agreement on the German question the sides would not be able to move forward. In November Molotov returned to Moscow for consultations. On November 6 he introduced a resolution on “European Security and Germany” to the Presidium, in which he proposed a return to the earlier Soviet position on the German question: all German elections and unification in exchange for German neutrality. This proposal was rejected outright primarily at Khrushchev’s behest (Roberts, 2008, pp. 57-58). Khrushchev’s remark during the sitting of the Presidium summed the Soviet position:

“The question of European security is a general question and it can be resolved with two Germanys. We want to preserve the system formed in the GDR – this should be said.”  
(Fursenko, 2006, cited in Roberts, 2008, p. 57).

Subsequently, Molotov returned to Geneva with a very narrow negotiating space – ruling out of all German elections for the foreseeable future and strict adherence to previous Soviet positions (Roberts, 2008, p. 56-58).

If prior to Molotov’s Moscow intermission the sides were enthusiastic about the fact that their positions are coming closer for the first time since the end of the War, after Molotov’s return it

emerged that all the similarities that seemed promising was just an illusion because the disagreement on the basic question had now become all-apparent. The Soviet delegation tried to maintain the semblance of cooperation and circulated on November 16 a resolution on the “concurrence of position with regard to a number of important questions pertaining to European security.” The November 16, 1955 State Department delegation telegram from Geneva, summarized Secretary Dulles’ position in this regard:

“Differences which subsequently emerged relating to Germany revealed considerable measure of disagreement as far as European security is concerned. Exchange of opinions indicated that if basic insecurity due to division of Germany could be eliminated other security aspects could perhaps be resolved. Soviet paper gives somewhat false impression because it does not adequately develop strong views of Western Powers that there cannot be security with continued division of Germany. Soviet draft resolution also fails to reflect value placed by Western Powers on NATO and WEU in relation to security” (FRUS, Document 381, 1987).

At the session the heads of French and UK delegations expressed their full support to this position. As such, the agenda item number 1 was closed as none of the four Foreign Ministers had anything more to add to the discussion (FRUS, Document 381, 1987).

After the commencement of the Geneva conference, both sides blamed each other for failing the “Spirit of Geneva”. The Soviet proposal on the general Collective Security treaty in Europe was silently placed in the arsenal of the Soviet diplomatic strategy, apparently, to be evoked again at the relevant period in the future.

### **Literature review of the first historical episode**

There is a vast body of literature on the Cold War, however, not many on this specific episode in history from this particular angle: what was the process and the outcome of the Soviet enterprise to build the new security order in Europe? For the purpose of this thesis, it is essential to peruse those few authors who have specifically researched Cold War super power relations from the prism of the Soviet proposals on the European collective security order.

Russian scholar, Natalia Yegorova proposes that the Soviet security policy and the proposal for

all-European collective security in 1954-1955 was not a mere propaganda but rather a search for new approaches to the resolution of Cold War standoffs. While not inferring the opposite picture of what would have happened if the West was more responsive, Yegorova expresses dismay at the fact that the process was exhausted without an adequate resonance (Yegorova, 2003).

Another Russian scholar, F. I. Novik looked at this historical period from a different angle, arguing that the German issue had a chance at solution up until May 1955. From that point onward the Soviet policy finally gave up on the question of possible German unity and strictly adopted the two Germanys strategy. In his research it is Molotov who is attributed with having favored a policy of *détente* with the West, contrary to the existing Cold War historiography, which attributes this policy to Khrushchev (Novik, 2001).

J. D. Larson does another important study on this issue, in her book “the Anatomy of Mistrust” (1997). Her main goal is to find answers whether it was possible to better manage relations between the Soviet Union and the United States during the early stages of the Cold War. Writer draws on the statement of various policy-makers that shows evidence that some policymakers wanted to resolve differences at that time or at least manage the ongoing competition. She argues that the Cold War period is laden with missed opportunities to control arms race and other crises. Larson maintains that:

“to make the case for missed opportunities entails showing that both sides wanted an agreement, that history need not be completely rewritten to end up with a different outcome – In other words, that a plausible sequence of events could have led to an agreement, and that US and Soviet leaders could have cooperated on many occasions if they had more effectively communicated their intentions” (1997, p. 3).

She provides evidence that the United States and the Soviet Union could not reach an agreement on security issues due to insurmountable mistrust between them. Her theoretical framework is unlike the traditional realist or rational choice view of the Cold War. Drawing on Social psychology, she argues, that failures happened because policymakers incorrectly interpret motives and intentions of others (1997, p. 4). Larson identified mutual mistrust based on ideological differences, historical baggage, and intuitive mental biases as the reason for failure (1997, p. 5).



Her finding, based on the study of the five historical cases (among them the 1953-55 period after Stalin's death) establishes that the trust was a necessary but not the sufficient condition. Larson argues, that the United States missed the opportunity to obtain German reunification in return for German neutralization and also missed the important disarmament opportunities (1997, Chapter two).

However, Larson sets the limit to her study. While the necessary conditions are sufficient to assume the counterfactual – that the cooperation was possible; she recognizes that trust is not sufficient. There could be other factors, such as strategic consideration, domestic public opinion, Soviet political instability, opposition from allies, the cognitive rigidity of policymakers etc. that might preclude cooperation (1997, pp. 36).

Geoffrey Roberts' research builds on this literature as well as the Russian archival data such as Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI) and Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI). He focuses on the Soviet peace proposals in the 1950's as a process, which could have resulted in a different, more peaceful turn of the Cold War, hence the title of his work "*A Chance for Peace? The Soviet Campaign to End the Cold War, 1953-1955*". Robert's main conclusion is that Molotov's diplomacy aimed to finalize the ongoing East-West negotiations through some concessions but these were undermined by Khrushchev's hawkish policies that have blocked any trade-off on the issue of German unity for pan-European collective security. Roberts assumes that a more forthcoming Western response to Moscow's proposals for European collective security could have weighed in favor of Molotov's arguments and denied Khrushchev his arguments, thus opening the window of opportunity on the settlement of the German question (2008, p. 8).

The limits of Larson's study are also indicative to the literature discussed above: similarly, Yegorova, Novik and Roberts mostly focus on "first image" causes to explain the Soviet - US interaction in the 1950's. While Larson's work provides for some prescriptive interpretations (it is important to cultivate trust for the cooperation to be realized), other authors' works discussed are mainly descriptive of the processes at the first and second level of analysis, thus give little grounds for aggregate considerations.

There are other authors who base their analysis heavily on such structural causes as fear, mistrust

and balance of power considerations. One of the most famous Cold War historians, John Luis Gaddis describes the Soviet and Western relations as that of mistrust, ideological and power based competition but also the one conditioned by the necessity, albeit diverse ones for each side, to survive in a Cold War environment. In explaining Stalin's post-war policies, Gaddis argues:

“The USSR needed peace, economic assistance, and the diplomatic acquiescence of its former allies. There was no choice for the moment, then but to continue to seek the cooperation of the Americans and the British: just as they had depended on Stalin to defeat Hitler, so Stalin now depended on continued Anglo-American goodwill if he was to obtain his postwar objectives at a reasonable cost. He therefore wanted neither a hot war nor a cold war. Whether he was skillful enough to avoid these alternatives, however, was quite a different matter” (2005, p. 12).

Number of authors maintain that in the aftermath of the World War and even before the war was over, Stalin's number one preoccupation was to maintain homeland security, which in its turn was a goal that demanded maintaining the grand Alliance. In the new strategic setting Stalin was suspicious of a capitalist threat, still fearful of German and Japanese resurgence and thus the creation of a zone of friendly periphery became a hallmark of his security policy, even before the war was over (Roberts, 2008, 118-253). As David Holloway put it, Stalin wanted “to consolidate Soviet territorial gains, establish a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe, and have a voice in the political fate of Germany and - if possible - of Japan” (1994, p.168).

Melvyn Leffler's work is profound, with emphasis on second and third image analysis in understanding the East-West relations and the underling causes of the Cold War. Besides structural causes (such as fear and mistrust), Leffler underscored the socio-economic antagonism as the main reason for mistrust and fear between the two camps. Just as the West viewed the socio-economic characteristics of the Soviet Union as a threat to the liberal-democratic capitalist order so was the expansion of capitalism perceived as a political threat by the USSR. The expansion of each other's socio-economic order was seen as a geopolitical challenge by each side (2008).

Leffler maintains that ideology shaped interpretation of each other's actions. Although after Stalin's death Eisenhower talked of a chance for peace, and Malenkov called for relaxing

international tensions “there could be no real détente or peace so long as ideological presuppositions shaped the two sides’ perceptions of threat and opportunity in a dynamic international system” (2008).

According to Leffler:

“The documentary record suggests that they believed, as Stalin had, in the fundamental hostility of the capitalist world. Communist ideology postulated a protracted struggle, and Malenkov and the others needed to be no less vigilant than their predecessor in rooting out enemies and thwarting emerging threats” (2008).

In a later research Richard Saull similarly suggested:

“The domestic politics and socio-economic systems of superpowers were not only different but mutually antagonistic in the sense that the domestic and international reproduction of each was threatened by the other, because the socio-economic properties of each were mutually antithetical. The international expansion of one system necessarily threatened the political security and social existence of the other and the social constituencies that benefited from each social system” (2007, p. 9).

Saull further maintained that the antagonism had deeper roots: although the post-1945 world was different, a form of Cold War could be seen to exist already after 1917 (2007, p. 17).

## **Chapter Summary and Conclusions**

### ***The Stalin Proposal***

The first sets of proposals were issued in 1952 in the form of four rounds of exchange of diplomatic notes. The Soviet side proposed conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany - as the guarantee for the elimination of the possibility of rebirth of German militarism and German aggression. Under initial Soviet proposal the occupying powers would withdraw forces within a year. Germany would be able to have defense forces, but would remain neutral.

The Soviet Union changed its initial proposal midway in response to the 1952 May 26 Bonn Agreement or the German Treaty. If at first the proposal mentioned direct participation of All-

German Government in the Treaty drafting process, in its last, August 23 note, the Soviet Union replaced that narrative and only gave limited role to both East and West German government to be present “during the discussion of relevant questions.”

The West rejected the proposal as in their understanding the proposal was divergent from the existing reality: before the creation of a unity government a free and fair election process should have taken place and Germany, once made sovereign again, should not have been denied the right to choose its own Alliances. On a more constructive note the Western powers asked the Soviet Union to engage in the discussion and practical acts and allow for the UN monitored election process in Germany.

The initiatives were introduced in the atmosphere of complete lack of trust and ideological rivalry. It was known to Western states that the Soviet leader’s true intentions were to build a belt of pro-Russian states in Eastern Europe, squeeze out the Western powers from Germany and establish a unified Germany as part of a Soviet orbit (Miller, 2000, pp. 5-6). As such, the first round of the Soviet Peace campaign concluded with a complete deadlock in the overall atmosphere of renewed hostility and fears of a new all-out nuclear war.

### ***The Molotov Proposal***

After Stalin’s death both the East and the West were under pressure to bring about peaceful change, an opportunity the respective governments undertook to explore. This new drive dubbed “a chance for peace” by the West and as an idea of a “peaceful co-existence” in the East, resulted in the Berlin Foreign Ministerial Conference. In his opening remarks at the 1954 Berlin Ministerial, Molotov warned against dividing Europe and creating anti-Soviet bloc as well as dangerousness of the EDC with little benefits for Europe as opposed to its Collective Security needs.

The Soviet Side firmly linked any solution of the German and the Austrian question to the conclusion of the “General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe.” Article 1 of the proposed draft Treaty proclaimed that all European states would be eligible to become part including two Germanys. Article 2 was a declaration of non-aggression and non-use of force. Article 3 proclaimed collective defense. Article 4 determined the mechanism of collective defense. Article 5 specified joint procedures under which the Parties, in the event of a collective defense, would provide assistance, including a military one. Article 6 specified the right of self-

defence or of maintaining peace and security in Europe. Then there was article 7, which called on the parties not to enter in any coalition or alliance that would be contrary to the purpose of the Treaty on Collective Security in Europe. Article 8 described the Treaty implementing organs: special conference, permanent consultative political committee and a military consultative organ. Article 9 proposed special concessions to the other non-European permanent five states - the United States and the Chinese People's Republic to participate as observers. Each Treaty signatory would also undertake a responsibility that each of their international agreements and obligations would be in conformity with this treaty (Article 10) and that the treaty would last for 50 years - Article 11 (FRUS, Document 517, 1986).

Hence, per 1954 Soviet proposal there would be a collective security type order in Europe with the participation of exclusively European states. Such an order would preclude the need for or the legality of any other alliance, especially that of NATO and the EDC while it would not condition the necessity to dissolve those bilateral international treaties that the Soviet Union had already concluded with number of Eastern European states. Double safeguards would downgrade the US preeminence: the US would be excluded from the new collective security mechanism and any US involvement would be matched by CPR's involvement; basically, the outside powers would balance themselves out.

The Western reading of the security situation in Europe was quite the opposite: Western decision to create defence alliance was conditioned due to Soviet actions. Accusations were biased as the East, including East Germany did not wait for collective security arrangements before military rearmament. It was all too clear that the only Soviet goal was the abandonment of EDC and NATO and exclusion of the US from Europe. The proposal required European States to give up the right of association in non-aggressive alliances (Article 7) but did not deprive the USSR its association with Eastern European states via existing network of bilateral agreements (Article 10). On the question of dividing Europe, European States and the US reminded the Soviet side that division of Europe had started in 1939 with its annexation of Baltic States and continued and forceful absorption of other Eastern European States into the Soviet Orbit. As for the US presence in Europe it was at behest of Western European states and they were not ready to give up that freedom for a Treaty whose major principles were already enshrined in the UN Charter.

The objections that were raised by the Western countries at the Berlin Conference were then countered with a famous March 31 1954 Soviet Note in which the Soviet side again stressed the

need for a general European Security Treaty, left the German and Austrian questions open and most importantly expressed its desire to become part of NATO. It was alleged that this would ensure that NATO becomes a truly defensive alliance and that Germany would not become part of a military organization.

The West went on with its own plans – concluded the Bonn Paris agreements, ending the occupation of Western Germany, followed by its membership of NATO on May 9, 1955. The Soviet Union moved on with its own plan, giving birth to the NATO counter balance – the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Hence, the second set of Soviet proposals also ended with deadlock and no concrete outcome.

### ***The Bulganin Proposal***

A third set of the Soviet proposal was unveiled during the Geneva Summit in 1955 and the Geneva Conference. Both Geneva events were permeated with a hope that a breakthrough could occur.

The Summit had been convened in hope to diffuse tensions and discuss matters of peaceful co-existence, including the German issue, the European collective security and disarmament. For the Westerners, major issues of concern were with the unification of Germany, right of people to choose their own governments, already prevalent problem of human contacts, international communism and the armaments.

However, after plenary deliberation it emerged that there was little common ground. On the German question it was made clear by the Soviets that this was a matter of some distant future and contingent upon the creation of the system of European collective security with the participation of all European nations and the United States of America”. Notably, after the Berlin Conference the objective for the US isolation was dropped.

The slightly modified of the “General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe” (FRUS, Document 251, 1987) consisted of 15 articles. The innovation of the current proposal was article 12, which called for a two-stage approach to the dismantlement of the existing alliance systems in Europe and the introduction of the new Collective Security order. Basically, in two-three years’ time the Warsaw Treaty of May 14, 1955, the Paris Agreements of October

23, 1954, and the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949 would become ineffective (FRUS, Document 251, 1987).

Not unexpectedly, the Summit yielded no results except for the agreement to meet at the foreign ministers level. The only new proposal at the Ministerial was the three Western States' proposed "Outline of Terms of a Treaty of Assurance on the Reunification of Germany" aimed at lessening Soviet fears of German resurgence. This treaty provided for refrain from the use of force, withholding aid from an aggressor, provisions for the limitation and the control of forces and armaments, and the obligation to react against aggression. The Soviet Union, at Khrushchev's behest never compromised claiming that the question of European security was a general question that could be resolved with two Germanys and that the Soviet Union intended to maintain the system it had formed in the GDR (Fursenko, 2006, Roberts, 2008). It had emerged that reaching an agreement was an illusion because the disagreement on the basic questions had now become all too apparent.

In the existing security environment, whereas the Soviet side implemented aggressive proselytizing policy in its neighborhood, was blatantly clear about its sphere of influence and from time to time questioned the prospect of peaceful co-existence, this initiative resembled more of a wish list of foreign policy than realistic policy options.

The truthfulness of these observations was made clear by Western positions, reviewed above, in regards to the Soviet proposals. On none of these proposals did the two sides meet eye to eye and it was always clear that such tectonic changes to the existing security architecture in Europe could not have been possible to be achieved around a conference table and sealed with signatures. On this unusual diplomatic exchange between the superpowers of the day, Byrne and Klotzbach noted:

"It is hardly surprising that the West declined to entertain such a bad deal; what is surprising that the authors of the proposal apparently assumed that it might. Khrushchev acted as if he believed his capitalist adversaries could somehow be maneuvered into a situation from which they would see no way out but to acquiesce, regardless of their better judgment, in the "collective" security arrangement he wanted. A true believer in the irresistible advance of "socialism" and the Soviet system's ability to outperform its capitalist rival in a peaceful competition, he was confident that he could afford to reduce

Soviet dependence on military power and rely instead on the system's other assets. It was an innovative and coherent, if flawed, strategy" (2005, p. 5)."

Clearly, as described the initiatives bore no results in the 1950's and more than anything were branded as flawed, incomprehensible and even laughable. It is then interesting to see if these proposals have their analogies in the later days of the Cold War and what were its outcomes.

## **Chapter 2 Conclusions**

This Chapter has focus on the description of a historical episode in the 1950's from the angle of Russian diplomacy for Collective security order in Europe (from 1952 to 1955) in order to pinpoint major factors and characteristics of the chosen research area, the collected data was hence summarized and provides following answers with respect to posed research sub-questions:

### **What are the concrete initiatives of the Soviet Union *vis a vis* the preferred way of organization of the European Security?**

- In the identified period (1952-1954) that represents one set of a single case study, the Soviet Union has proposed three proposals in regards to the overall organization of the European security. These are the initiatives, which we collectively term as the Stalin proposals, the Molotov proposals and the Bulganin proposals.

### **What are major Soviet preferences *vis a vis* European Security architecture across the identified historical episode?**

- Soviet Union's major preference towards the security organization in Europe was spelled out in a "General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe" (first proposed in 1954 and updated in 1955). Based on the detailed study of the Treaty text and the ensued discourse (which unfolded during the Berlin Conference of 1954 and Geneva Summit and Ministerial Conference of 1955) the Soviet Union was:
  - o Against any security Alliance (even the defensive one) in Europe it was not part of, irrespective of the fact that its own actions represented a source of threat that European and Euro-Atlantic states wanted to be defended against. The final draft directly called for the annulment of the Warsaw Treaty of 1955, the Paris Agreements 1954, and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.



- Initially, the Soviet Union aspired to exclude the USA from Europe's security affairs. Later, under overwhelming pressure conceded for its participation but along with CPR.
- In exchange of these treaties, the Soviet Union proposed a loose collective security order (underpinned by non-use of force and collective defense principles) undertaken by a special Conference and two permanent consultative bodies.
- Main demand under the Article 7 was that no state or group of states could enter in any other coalition or alliance.

### **What were the Soviet/Russian end goals when proposing these initiatives?**

- The treaty's legal language did not provide an added value in terms of organization of security as the collective security and non-use of force principles had already been put in place with the UN Charter. In exchange, the treaty sought concrete goals: the abandonment of EDC and NATO and exclusion or balancing of the US role from European security affairs.
- It can be discerned from the study of the first historical episode that the initiatives stemmed directly from Stalinist ideological and security approach to form the buffer zones, preserve the sphere of Soviet influence and keep the platform for possible future enlargements.
- From the Soviet perspective the German question could only be settled under the condition of German neutrality. In the case of both policy outcomes: the unified or the two separate Germanys, the Soviet Union was intent on maintaining its preferred form of government and ideology in East Germany.
- The proposed collective security order in Europe would cement Soviet sphere of privileged influence in Eastern Europe, including Eastern Germany, provide for the guarantees of military non-intervention in its sphere of influence as well as provide for a more leveled security competition for spreading its influence in the future.

### **What are the factors that resulted in failure of cooperation over the proposed initiative?**

#### **Failure of Stalin proposals**

- The 1952 Stalin proposals to the Western countries on the unification of Germanys and Union's possible NATO membership failed due to several reasons. In the first

place, the proposals were unveiled in the situation of acute and opposition of views on European security further exacerbated by ideological differences.

- Notably, as early as in 1944 Staling demanded formation of “independent, anti-Nazi, pro-Russian states” (Miller, 2000, p. 5) with Germany as part of this intended buffer zone. From 1946 Stalin had been preaching about “capitalist encirclement” and “inevitable conflict” between capitalism and socialism. The Communist takeovers in Europe exacerbated the “Iron Curtain” perceptions of fear and the need for countenance in the West. The climax of the ensued confrontation was Stalin’s order to blockade the access to Berlin to the three Western countries on June 24, 1948. These considerations have led the Western countries to form a defensive Alliance in April 1949. That same year in September it emerged that the Union had tested its own nuclear bomb while its role in the North Korean emancipation and the ensued invasion of South Korea in 1950’s blackened any prospect for joint security outlook for East and West.

#### **Failure of the Post-Stalin proposals**

- Although Stalin’s death and the relaxation of his hard-line policies in relations with Israel, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Korean issue as well as rhetorical switch in favour for “peaceful co-existence” lessened the sense of inevitable clash, the concrete initiatives were not in line enough to result in security cooperation.
- The year 1954-55 was filled with anti EDC, NATO and the Paris agreement rhetoric while already in May, 1955 the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact Organization. A general European peace treaty could not have been based on issues that have remained reciprocally opposite since the Stalin period. Namely, Khrushchev’s avoidance of the consideration of German unification, free elections and allowance of their free choice did not allow for meaningful rapprochement. Also, the Soviet side failed to reflect the value the West attached to NATO and the WEU and refused to tolerate their existence even though it was stressed innumerate times that these were only the defensive Alliances.

#### **What are the factors that contributed to certain outcomes as a result of these initiatives?**

- There were no observable cooperative outcomes in the first historical episode in terms of creation of a common, overarching security architecture for Europe.

## References:

- Applebaum, A., 2012. *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-1956*, New York: Doubleday.
- Bischof, G. and Dockrill, S. eds., 2000. *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Byrne, M. and Klotzbach, M., 2005. *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of The Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991*, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press.
- Churchil W., and Churchill, R. S., 1948. *The sinews of peace; post-war speeches*. London: Cassell.
- Churchill, W., 1953. Foreign Affairs, House of Commons Debates.  
[online] Available at:  
<[http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1953/may/11/foreign-affairs#S5CV0515P0\\_19530511\\_HOC\\_220](http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1953/may/11/foreign-affairs#S5CV0515P0_19530511_HOC_220)> [Accessed 15 September, 2014].
- Department of State Bulletin, *Report on Berlin: Address by Secretary Dulles, 8 March 1954*.
- Duignan, P., 2000. *NATO: its past, present, and future*. Stanford, Calif, Hoover Institution Press.
- Eisenhower D. D., 1953a. The Chance for Peace, Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. [online] Available at:  
<<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9819>> [Accessed 15 September, 2014].
- Eisenhower D. D., 1955b. *Opening Statement at the Geneva Conference*. [online] Available at:  
<<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10304>>. [Accessed 14 September, 2014].
- Eisenhower D. D., 1955c. *Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Geneva Conference*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10316>>. [Accessed 15 September, 2014].
- Eisenhower D. D., 1955d. *Address at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, Philadelphia*, [online] Available at: <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10356>>. [Accessed 15 September, 2014].
- Fursenko, A. A. ed., 2006. *Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954-1964, Vol. 2, Postanovleniya, 1954-1958*, Moscow: Rosspen. [online] Available at: <<http://sovdoc.rusarchives.ru/elib/prezidium-ck-kpss-1954-1964-volume2/index.html#5/z>> [Accessed 10 September, 2014].
- Gaddis, J. L., 2006. *The Cold War: A New History*, City of Westminster: Penguin Books.
- Gellately, R., 2013. *Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War*. New York: Knopf.
- Giangreco, D. M. and Griffin, R. E., 1998. *Airbridge to Berlin: The Berlin Crisis of 1948, Its Origins and Aftermath*, Novato, Calif: Presidio Press.

- Holloway, D., 1994. *Stalin and the Bomb*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Joffe, J., 2009. "NATO: Soldiering On". Time. [online] Available at: <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1886470,00.html> [Accessed 12 December, 2013].
- K Vystupleniu Prezidenta Eizenkhauera*, Pravda, 25 April 1953
- Khrushchev, S. ed., 2007. *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964*, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Kramer, M., 2009. *Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1944–53*. in Tismaneanu, V., ed., 2009. *Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-central Europe*. Central European University Press.
- Larson, D.W., 1997. *Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Leffler, M. P., 2008. *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*, New York: Hill and Wang.
- Malenkov funeral oration in Pravda, 10 March 1953
- Miller R. G., 2000. *To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949*. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University.
- Molotov. V., 1954. *The Berlin Conference*, Supplement to New Times, no. 10.
- Novik, F.I., 2001. "Ottepel'" i Inertsiya Khlodnoi Voiny. *Germanskaya Politika SSSR v 1953-1955gg*. Moscow: Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii.
- Roberts, G., 2008. *A Chance for Peace? The Soviet Campaign to End the Cold War, 1953-1955*, Cold War International History Project: Working Paper No. 57, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Roberts, G., 2008. *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Roberts, G., n.d. Malenkov on the German Question, 2 June 1953, Cold War International History Project: e-Dossier no. 15, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Ruane, K., 2000. *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950-55*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
- Saull, R., 2007. *The Cold War and after: capitalism, revolution and superpower politics*. London: Pluto Press.

Sewell, M., 2002. *The Cold War, Cambridge Perspectives in History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slany, W. Z. ed., 1986. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Germany and Austria. Vol. VII, Part 1, II. Exchanges of Notes with the Soviet Union Concerning a German Peace Treaty, German Unity, and All-German Elections, March 10–September 23, 1952*. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. [online] Available at: <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v07p1/ch2> [Accessed 10 September, 2014].

Slany, W. Z. ed., 1986. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Germany and Austria. Vol. VII, Part 1, IV. The Berlin Conference, January 25–February 18, 1954*. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. [online] Available at: <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v07p1> [Accessed 13 September, 2014].

Slany, W. Z. ed., U.S. 1987. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V*. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. [online] Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v05> [Accessed 15 September, 2014].

Milestones: 1945–1952, The Truman Doctrine, 1947, Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. [online] Available at: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-plan> [Accessed 15 January, 2014].

Soviet Note of March 31, 1954, NATO Archives, Executive Secretariat, 1952-1970 [online] Available at: [http://www.nato.int/history/doc/5-Soviet-Union-s-request-to-join%20NATO/RDC\(54\)215-BIL.pdf](http://www.nato.int/history/doc/5-Soviet-Union-s-request-to-join%20NATO/RDC(54)215-BIL.pdf) [Accessed 20 September, 2014].

Stalin, J. V., 1950. *Speech delivered by J. V. Stalin at a meeting of voters of the Stalin electoral district, Moscow, February 9, 1946*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. [online] Available at: <http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SS46.html> > [Accessed 9 September, 2014].

The Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1954

The Department of State Bulletin, September 20, 1954

The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27–November 16, 1955, Department of State publication 6156, pp. 27-28

Tripartite Reply to Soviet Note of 31st March, 1954, RDC (54) 240, NATO Archives, Executive Secretariat, 1952-1970. [online] Available at: [http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/3/7/37279/RDC\\_54\\_240\\_ENG.pdf](http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/3/7/37279/RDC_54_240_ENG.pdf) [Accessed 20 September, 2014].

- Vojtech, M., 2002. *NATO in the Beholder's Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56*, Cold War International History Project: Working Paper No. 35, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Weathersby, K., 1993. *Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–50: New Evidence From the Russian Archives*, Cold War International History Project: Working Paper No. 8, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Weathersby, K., 2002. “Should We Fear This?” *Stalin and the Danger of War with America*, Cold War International History Project: Working Paper No. 39, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Yegorova, N. I., 2003. *Evropeiskaya Bezopasnost', 1954-1955 gg: Poiski Novykh Podkhodov*. In: Yegorova N.I. and Chubaryan, A. O. eds., 2003. *Kholodnaya Voyna, 1945-1963gg: Istoricheskaya Retrospektiva*, Olma-Press: Moscow. [online] Available at: <[http://allconspirology.org/books/Kollektiv-avtorov\\_KHolodnaya-voyna--1945-1963-gg--Istoricheskaya-retrospektiva/](http://allconspirology.org/books/Kollektiv-avtorov_KHolodnaya-voyna--1945-1963-gg--Istoricheskaya-retrospektiva/)> [Accessed 1 October, 2014].
- Zubok, V. M., 2007. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- , , 31 1954 , , .06, .13, .2, .9, .88-97. [online] Available at: <[http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/dip\\_vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717c733c32567370042ee43/ab7166b0b3a95220c3256aa20025b87e!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/dip_vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717c733c32567370042ee43/ab7166b0b3a95220c3256aa20025b87e!OpenDocument)> [Accessed 12 September, 2014].
- , , 7 1954 , , .0129, .38, .273, .3, .11—17, [online] Available at: <[http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/dip\\_vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717c733c32567370042ee43/ab7166b0b3a95220c3256aa20025b87e!OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/dip_vest.nsf/99b2ddc4f717c733c32567370042ee43/ab7166b0b3a95220c3256aa20025b87e!OpenDocument)> [Accessed 20 September, 2014].

## **CHAPTER 3: The Soviet and the Warsaw Pact campaign for the European Security Conference (1966-1973)**

### **Introduction**

After the failed Geneva Conference in 1955, the pan-European security initiative at Soviet Union's behest was propagated anew in the 60's by the member states of the Warsaw Pact. Since then the Eastern bloc carried out a continuous campaign, while certain aspects of the proposals were modified in connection with changing environment in Europe. Notably, at an initial stage the United States continued to give a cold shoulder to Soviet appeals but with Khrushchev's departure, dawning of the détente and greater possibility of issue linkages as well as the need to keep the Alliance cohesion, conditioned the US cooperative engagement, finally resulting in the landmark diplomatic achievement and one of the most important historical documents in terms of European Security – the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

The current chapter examines the Soviet proposals put forth and the US as well as European attitudes and counter-proposals based largely on the primary sources such as historical official documents, speeches and articles. The chapter aims to provide both the historical context in which the proposals were made as well as the following interaction, security and other considerations and the outcomes. The second historical episode under study spans the period from July 1966 to August 1975 when the Final Act was signed. This historical episode is divided into two campaign phases, first from 1966 till 1968 and second from 1969 to 1973. The USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia serves as a watershed event between these two periods, which put the Soviets in defensive and made them less rigid.

### **1. Renewed campaign (1966-1968)**

#### **Background in which the 'Budapest Declaration' was unveiled:**

Since his ascendance to power Khrushchev had resolved that the new Great Powers' talks should be about disarmament and the development of contacts between the blocs rather than anything else. In

defiance to Molotov's Stalinist line, which persisted in the first historical episode under study, he concluded that "the question of European Security... can be resolved if both Germanys exist as well" (RGANI, 1958, cited in Fursenko and Naftali, 2006, p. 54). At the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference (1955) and onwards Moscow formally and openly acknowledged that it was renouncing the idea of a united Germany. As Khrushchev stated they would preserve "socialist achievements" in GDR, but on the other hand economically imperfect Union wanted to expand trade relations with the West Germany (McCauley, 2008).

Khrushchev's ascendance to power happened in stages. After the twentieth party congress speech in February 1956 he became the most powerful man in the Union and finally in March 1958 became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers until he was ousted in 1964. He departed from the Stalin/Molotov policy line on ESC but otherwise took an extremely active role in Soviet foreign policy. To paraphrase Roberts, his tenure was highlighted with number of diplomatic and political crises: the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the tense Berlin crisis of 1958-1961, the Sino-Soviet split and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. These crises were of course accompanied by the confrontation with the West and foremost with the United States but at the same time these were also the result of an on-going intra-socialist problems within the Soviet bloc (Roberts, 1999, pp. 42-43). After the peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis or the 'Caribbean Crisis' as Soviets called it, international tensions subsided and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in August 1963. According to Roberts, from the Soviet point of view this was a 'mini-détente' - a resumption of the stabilising and depolarising course followed in the early 1950's (1999, p. 43).

In terms of policy, Khrushchev remained faithful to the longstanding Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, however his tenure was rather marked with 'competitive coexistence', which envisioned: 1. Competition with the West in the economic sphere; 2. Marxist-Leninist idea that war was inevitable due to the existing Imperialism was replaced by the idea of the 'peace process' by communists, socialists and progressivists; 3. Peaceful transition to socialism; 4. Development of a new force by supporting the non-aligned movement of post-colonial nations (Roberts, 1999, 44-45).

After his ouster, a new type of dual leadership emerged in the Soviet Union with Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary and Alexei Kosygin as a Prime Minister. According to McCauley, the new



leadership criticised Khrushchev not for the direction of his foreign policy but for the means he had used while executing them (2008, p. 61). In the beginning, Premier Kosygin was more concentrated on domestic economy and was cautious on the foreign front. Relations with China became calmer, short of renewal of friendship. In 1965 Kosygin visited Hanoi, preaching for negotiated settlement when witnessing the first American bombing. After that, Soviets stepped up the arms deliveries to the North Vietnam. With the beginning of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 the two superpowers found each other in the opposite camps, once again.

Another feature that characterizes the security environment in which the subject of this thesis has unfolded was a nuclear posture. After the failure of Khrushchev's nuclear adventurism, the new leadership changed the concept of nuclear deterrence from 'massive retaliation' and 'balance of terror' to 'nuclear parity'. In 1960's Soviets started a massive nuclear build-up acquiring over 1000 ICBMs and hundreds of short and medium range nuclear missiles. Finally, a nuclear gap with the United States had been closed (McCauley, 2008, pp. 59-60). Fursenko and Naftali point out that after the ouster, Kremlin set aside Khrushchev's complex strategy for reshaping the Cold War and concentrated on accumulating more strategic weapons. Only with the deepening of Sino-Soviet tensions Kremlin got back to the known formula: "cooperation on the strategic plane, competition in the developing world" (2006, p. 540).

Hence, the early period of Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership towards the West was characterized by an effort to improve relations with Western Europe, with the notable exception of the Federal Republic of Germany. The strategy was built on the exploitation of the new window of opportunity created by the vulnerability of the United States on the issue of the Vietnam War.

Starting from 1966 Soviet line towards Berlin grew extremely rigid, especially *vis a vis* Erhard government's active work for reconciliation voiced in his 'Peace Note' of March 25, 1966 (Wolfe, 1969, p. 68). At first Brezhnev, in his opening speech at the 23<sup>rd</sup> Party Congress practically rejected Bonn's proposals saying - "the FRG intends to continue its aggressive and revenge-seeking policy" (Brezhnev, 1966 cited in Wolfe, 1969, p. 69). Despite, Bonn's Peace Note received some success in Eastern Europe conditioning the Soviet Union to reflect on this situation in its formal answer to the Peace note dated May 18, 1966. In this reply, the USSR linked the German issue with the call for a

Conference to take up “the proposals of the Socialist and other states of Europe on questions of European security and to bring about a German peace settlement, reflecting the real situation in Europe” (Pravda, 1966 cited in Wolfe, 1969, p. 70).

In contrast to its increasingly hard line towards West Germany the Soviet Union displayed a growing interest in closer bilateral relations with France. According to Wolfe, these steps included the renewal in January 1965 of the standing Soviet invitation to de Gaulle to visit Moscow, the appointment in March of a new and more prestigious Soviet ambassador to Paris, and the conclusion later the same month of a television agreement committing the Soviet Union to adopt the French system of color television. In April, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko paid a visit to de Gaulle, and by the summer of 1965 it had become apparent that, while Soviet-French differences remained on a number of questions, the two countries were moving toward a collaborative relationship which promised benefits to both (Wolfe, 1969, pp. 73-74).

The period between 1964 and 1965 seemed to provide the opportunity for de Gaulle’s concept of “European Europe”. On the one hand, de Gaulle effectively killed the U.S. proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) project out of fear of emerging Germany and at the same time succumbed to Soviet tactics (for detailed accounts see Brogi, 2011, Bozo and Emanuel, 2002). On January 25, 1965 De Gaulle told Soviet Ambassador in Paris, Vinogradov that “France would not recognize the GDR or allow itself to be drafted into an anti-American coalition, but Paris was ready to discuss with Moscow a European solution to the German problem” (cited in Soutou, 2007, Ludlow et al. 2007, p. 18). De Gaulle’s idea was to see the USSR and Eastern Europe freed from communist totalitarianism, which would allow for European cooperation from Atlantic to the Urals. Although, on the record, there are his private talks in which he also contemplated a European security system without the US participation (Ibid., p. 18).

According to Wolfe, Soviet approval of the course of French policy in Europe became noticeably friendlier in early 1966, as de Gaulle decided to withdraw French forces from NATO integrated military commands and demanded that the U.S. military facilities in France be renegotiated. The Soviet Union promptly commended de Gaulle on the “realism” of this initiative to restore “French sovereignty.” At the same time, the Soviet commentary incriminated Britain and West Germany as

the “loyal partners” to the United States in NATO, who were trying “to frighten the French government by threatening it with isolation if it should not rescind its intention to remove its troops from NATO control” (Wolfe, 1969, p. 74).

As an apogee of this transatlantic rift, De Gaulle visited Moscow in July 1966 against the backdrop of seriously declining French-US relations. The most important issues discussed were the German question and the American participation in a European Security Conference. During the visit De Gaulle went beyond previous French position: discussions hovered around a two-pillar system under French–USSR dominance, which envisaged the European security system without American presence and strongly controlled Germany with a distant prospect of reunification. De Gaulle hoped that France with its nuclear capacity and leadership in Western Europe would balance Russia, which would be contained on one side by China and the other by peripheral US power (Soutou, in Ludlow et al., 2007, p. 20). With this idea of a new ‘European Order’ De Gaulle visited Poland in 1967, however, Gomulka made it clear that Poland’s alliance with the USSR, the treaties with Warsaw Pact countries and the GDR, represented a lynchpin of Polish foreign policy (Soutou, in Ludlow et al., 2007, p. 21). Clearly, De Gaulle’s view was showing that it was quite unrealistic.

However, the Soviet persistence to woo the Western European countries eventually led to concrete results. The first official rallying to the plan was achieved with the Italian–Soviet communiqué after a visit by Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko to Rome in April 1966, and it was confirmed a few months later, in January 1967, during a visit to Italy by President Nikolai Podgorny.

Basically, the new leadership in Kremlin sought closer economic, technical, and political relations with West European countries, fostered anew the pan-European security idea as a panacea for settling the “German problem” and an alternative to NATO just prior to 1969 when, according to some understandings, the Allies would have to decide whether to keep the Alliance or to dissolve it.

Besides these official channels, the USSR engaged in extensive public diplomacy efforts to rally the Western opinion for the ESC. In this regards, the famous World Council for Peace and the young International Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe (ICSCE, created in 1963)

organized grandiose forums and congresses in order to stimulate Western opinion on the matter. ICSCCE was a network of national committees for Security and Cooperation that were dominated by Communists (Rose, 1988, cited in Wenger et al., 2008, p. 67).

From the early 1970's the USSR started to pay huge importance to redefining its geopolitical identity. According to Ray, between 1971 and 1975, number of events was organized to voice the idea that the USSR was part of European continent and that the Soviets had legitimate interests in Europe. For example, in his speech at the 1971 ICSCCE meeting Aleksei Surkov, the deputy in the Supreme Soviet used the expression "among us, in Europe" on numerous occasions, underscoring the fact that the USSR was part of a European culture (Surkov, 1971, cited in Wenger et al., 2008, p. 67).

It seemed that the Soviet Union was aiming earnestly at a formula, which would do away with NATO and undermine US stance in Europe by orchestrating a necessary public opinion with an active public diplomacy efforts. It is in this geopolitical and ideological setting that the Warsaw Pact first renewed the call for the ESC.

### **Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe - Bucharest, 5 July 1966**

As stated earlier, already in the 1950's the member states of the Warsaw Pact revived the call for a conference to discuss collective security issues in Europe. However, the renewal of the campaign on a bigger scale and at Soviet behest came on July 5, 1966, when the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact issued a Declaration. The meeting did not reach the goals concerning the reform of the Warsaw Pact so desired by several Eastern European countries but it did produce an unanimity on the Vietnam issue and the issue of European security.

The joint "Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe," was perceived by the USSR to be the groundbreaking initiative on the urgent problems of the European security (Kosygin, 1966, cited in 1969, 100) and dubbed by USSR's major newspaper Izvestiia "as the most comprehensive and realistic plan for European security ever offered to the people of Europe (Izvestiia editorial,

1966, cited in Wolfe, 1969, 100).<sup>3</sup> In its essence the document followed closely the eight-point reply of the Soviet Union (May 1966) to Bonn's "Peace Note" (Wolfe, 1969,100).

The Bucharest declaration called for settlement of a broad range of European issues, noting that

"Two decades after the end of World War II, its consequences in Europe have not yet been eliminated; there is no German peace treaty, and centers of tension, abnormal situations in the relations between states, continue to exist" (Bucharest Declaration, 1966)

The declaration strongly denounced the US "imperialist" policy in Europe which was "all the more dangerous for the European peoples because of being increasingly based on collusion with the militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany" (Bucharest Declaration, 1966). The declaration concluded with the seven points, summing up the Bloc's agreed modus operandi for the European Security:

**Point one** called for good neighborly relations between European countries and the development of close economic, technical and cultural contacts. **Point two** conveyed a call on both pacts and the people who do not participate in any military alliances to advance the cause of European security by dissolving both Alliances and replace it by a European security system:

"The governments of our States have more than once pointed out that in case of the *discontinuance of the operation of the North Atlantic Alliance, the Warsaw Treaty would become invalid, and that their place ought to be taken by a European security system. They now solemnly reaffirm their readiness for the simultaneous abolition of these alliances*" (Bucharest Declaration, 1966).

In addition, the declaration suggested that if the North Atlantic bloc was not prepared for this step, *the military organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact might be abolished, with the alliances themselves temporarily remaining.*

---

<sup>3</sup> After the July 1966 Bucharest Declaration, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact resumed a series of proposals and counter-proposals on the ESC, which eventually led to the so-called Helsinki process.

**The third point** of the declaration listed “partial measures towards military relaxation on the European continent”:

- the abolition of foreign war bases;
- the withdrawal of all forces from foreign territories to within their national frontiers;
- the reduction, on an agreed scale and at agreed deadlines, of the numerical strength of the armed forces of both German States;
- measures aimed at the elimination of the danger of a nuclear conflict : the setting up of nuclear-free zones;
- and the assumption of the commitment by the nuclear powers not to use these weapons against the States which are parties to such zones, etc.;
- the ending of flights by foreign planes carrying atom or hydrogen bombs over the territories of European;
- States and of the entry of foreign submarines and surface ships with nuclear arms on board into the ports of such States.

**Point four** concentrated on the dangers posed by nuclear claims of the Federal Republic of Germany and called on all the States to exclude the possibility of access of the FRG to nuclear weapons in any form. “The way this problem is resolved will largely determine the future of the peoples of Europe, and not only the peoples of Europe. On this question, too, half-hearted decisions are impermissible.”

**Point five** called for “the immutability of frontiers” in Europe as the precondition for lasting peace.

“The interests of the normalisation of the situation in Europe demand that all States, both in Europe and outside the European continent, proceed in their foreign political actions from recognition of the frontiers that really exist between European States, frontiers which took shape after the most devastating war in the history of mankind, including the Polish frontier on the Oder-Neisse line and the frontiers between the two German States.”

**Point six** touched on the German question:

“A constructive approach to this question, just as to other aspects of security in Europe, is only possible if it *proceeds from reality, above all, from recognition of the fact of the existence of two German States - the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany*. At the same time, such a settlement requires recognition of the existing frontiers and the refusal of both German States to possess nuclear weapons”.

On the question of reunification there was no concrete proposal, no mention of the need to hold an election but the accent was put again on

“the relaxation of tension, through a gradual *rapprochement* between the two sovereign German States and agreements between them, through agreements on disarmament in Germany and Europe, and on the basis of the principle that when Germany is reunited, the united German State would be truly peaceful and democratic and would never again be a danger to its neighbours or to peace in Europe.”

**The final point** of the Declaration called for a “general European conference” and for organizing a “general European co-operation”. The declaration did not provide for concrete measures nor did it account for the problems on the European security agenda. It only stated that the outcome of the conference could be:

“...for example, in the form of a general European declaration on cooperation for the maintenance and strengthening of European security. Such a declaration could provide for an undertaking by the signatories to be guided in their relations by the interests of peace, to settle disputes by peaceful means only, to hold consultations and exchange information on questions of mutual interest and to contribute to the all-round development of economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations. The declaration should be open to all interested States to join” (Bucharest Declaration, 1966).

The declaration stipulated that such a Conference would contribute to a system of collective security in Europe and that the Warsaw pact members were ready to sit down around the Conference table any time with “*both members of the North Atlantic Treaty and neutrals.*” Since declaration did

not elaborate on the issue of membership it was left as vague as it was before. Further, the declaration called for a wide-scale commencement of contacts on the wide range of issues (among these issues, the declaration listed: non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the prohibition of the use of force or the threat of force in international relations, disarmament, the prohibition of the use of nuclear Weapons and other important measures aimed at eliminating the danger of a nuclear conflict, the final abolition of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, the abolition of foreign military bases, and the development of international economic co-operation on the basis of equality) concerning European security via any means with the participation of the willing states (Bucharest Declaration, 1966).

Basically, this refreshed campaign on the ESC marked a new Eastern approach: Acknowledgement of the two Germanys, renewed emphasis for the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, ambiguity regarding the United States and Canada's participation in the proposed conference and the emphasis on the inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in internal affairs principles.

The question of dissolution of the blocs seemed on the surface to be of peace-loving character aimed at removing military competition, however, it was all too apparent to the Western governments that this move warranted cementing the status quo in Europe and giving strategic advantage to the USSR as the West would lose its integrated defense system, while the Soviet Union had a range of bilateral agreements with the Eastern European states which had been renewed just prior to the Bucharest declaration.

According to Palmer, this was such a utopian proposal that it has not been pressed on in official appeals on this topic since 1969, however, had been floated on various occasions by Warsaw Pact diplomats as well as by Mr. Brezhnev in his address to the Soviet Communist Party Congress in April of 1971 (1971, p. 12).

**Statement by the European Communist and Workers' Parties on security in Europe  
(Karlovy Vary, 26 April 1967)**



In less than a year, the next loud endorsement of the USSR's security vision for the whole of Europe was voiced from Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, where most of the ruling and non-ruling European Communist parties gathered (with the exception of the Romanian and Yugoslav Parties). Karlovy Vary statement endorsed the previous Bucharest Declaration.

The Communist parties issued a lengthy statement, consisting of three parts. The Karlovy Vary statement reverberated the overarching message of the Bucharest declaration on the need to hold a security conference: "*We fully support the proposal for holding a conference of all European countries on questions of security and peaceful co-operation in Europe*" (1966).

According to Johnson, in the Karlovy Vary statement the language on West Germany was harsher, albeit reinforced by three specific developments, French withdrawal from NATO military command, opportunity to undermine NATO and Romania's establishment of diplomatic ties with West Germany (1970, p. 12-14). The statement was adamant about the "recognition of the existence of two sovereign and equal German States" and the "recognition of the invalidity of the Munich Treaty from the very beginning." These were presented as the fundament for "a program of action aiming at the establishment of a system of collective security." The statement demanded all the European countries to respect the post-war European frontiers, including and especially those on the Oder and the Neisse, as well as the frontiers between the two German States.

Next in line towards a collective security in Europe was "renunciation of the use of force or the threat of force and interference in internal affairs, an agreement which would ensure the settlement of all disputes exclusively by peaceful means..." Finally, statement endorsed the idea that the year 1969 would provide the opportunity for an "alternative solution of Europe without military blocs" and expressed support for "the immediate conclusion of an agreement on the liquidation of the military organizations of the Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Pact." The Statement repeated the calls for relaxation of tensions and called for "The removal of artificially erected barriers in the economic relations between the socialist and capitalist countries" (Karlovy Vary Statement, 1967).

The statement was still vague on the mechanisms of how could Collective Security system emerge and did not provide any concrete solution on how to surpass existing differences except for to offer organizing a security Conference.

## **2. Second phase of the campaign for ESC (1969-1973)**

### **Background in which the second phase unfolded:**

In December 1967, the “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance”, also known as the Harmel Report was issued by the Allies. The much-awaited Report was introduced in a time when the existence of the Alliance was put under question due to such interpretation of the Article 13 of the Atlantic Charter that it would allow for peaceful dissolution of the Alliance at the hand of its own members.

To the contrary, the Allies recognized the changed international environment since 1949, but reaffirmed the aims and purpose of NATO and set out a dual-track policy: the promotion of political détente while maintaining an adequate defence.

In terms of political dimension, the report underscored the need for balanced force reductions as well as a solution to the underlying political problems dividing Europe first and foremost the German question. For the military dimension, the Report spoke of examining “exposed areas”, citing in particular the Mediterranean (The Harmel Report, NATO, 2014).

Report conveyed the following political and security vision:

“The Allies are resolved to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further a détente in East-West relations. The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees” (The Future Tasks of the Alliance, Report of the Council, 1967).

On the Eastern front, the attempted Soviet policy to dissolve NATO, weaken West European ties with the USA and create an image of a threat from West Germany persisted as the main strategy. However, this met an objective obstacle due to Soviet inability to control the burgeoning reformist processes in Eastern Europe without the resort to brute force. At first it was Yugoslavia, then Albania, and from the early 60's Romania that started to distance from the USSR and now Dubcek's movement towards reformed communism (the so called 'Prague spring' program) was challenging Moscow's ideological as well as leadership dominance. After abandoning attempts at political solution of the Czechoslovak question, the Soviet politburo decided on August 17 to 'restore order' with the use of force. On August 20-21 a combined force of twenty divisions from five Warsaw countries (Bulgaria, GDR, Hungary, Poland and the USSR) crossed into Czechoslovakia. After bloodbath that resulted in hundreds of deaths and following attempts at normalization, Dubcek was replaced in April 1969 by a hard liner, Gustav Husak. Husak increased the speed of 'normalization' which included as a necessary measure the purges of up to half a million members of the communist party identified as supporters of the Prague spring (Roberts, 1999, pp. 71-72).

After the invasion Soviet popularity declined while the old apprehension about the Soviet military threat to Europe increased, in turn breathing a new life into NATO. According to Wolfe, at that time:

“The image of a Soviet Union progressing toward moderation, stability, and traditional norms of international behavior under an essentially prudent and pragmatic collective leadership had come to be widely accepted in the West during the tenure of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. This image, together with many of the assumptions about Soviet conduct upon which it rested, was a conspicuous casualty of the adventure in Czechoslovakia, from which the Soviet leaders emerged with a new reputation for unpredictable and irresponsible behavior” (1969, p. 231).

It was after this reputational setback, that the Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers renewed the call for ESC in 1969.

The defining feature of the historical period in which the second phase of the ESC campaign unfolded was the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) between the U.S. and the USSR. Already by 1960 the United States learned that the Soviets were developing massive Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) build-up to reach parity with the United States while at the same time beginning to develop first Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system around Moscow that would provide for the first strike advantage to the Soviet Union. In 1967 President L. Johnson called for the SALT talks as the Defence Department supported the view that it would be harmful to engage in such an arms race and that limiting both offensive and defensive strategic systems was a better way to go forward. Although R. Nixon succeeded Johnson in 1969, his administration also pursued SALT, starting formal talks with the Soviet Union already in November 1969, in Helsinki, Finland (FRUS, n.d.).

In conjunction with the SALT talks, and the new found purpose for NATO expressed in the Harmel Report, another big area for possible cooperation between the East and the West was the subject of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). While this topic was being discussed even ten years prior, it was officially proposed at the NATO Reykjavik Ministerial in June 1968 and was an outcome of a much-desired progress by the member states, in the spirit of détente, in disarmament and arms control. The declaration “affirmed the need for the Alliance to maintain an effective military capability and to assure a balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact” and called on Ministers to intensify work towards these principles:

- a. “Mutual force reduction should be reciprocal and balanced in scope and timing.
- b. Mutual reductions should represent a substantial and significant step, which will serve to maintain the present degree of security at reduced cost, but should not be such as to risk de-stabilizing the situation in Europe.
- c. Mutual reductions should be consonant with the aim of creating confidence in Europe generally and in the case of each party concerned.
- d. To this end, any new arrangement regarding forces should be consistent with the vital security interests of all parties and capable of being carried out effectively” (NAC Reykjavik Declaration, 1968).

Since then H. Kissinger, the President's National Security Advisor at that time had assigned the Verification Panel (VP) of the National Security Council (NSC) to examine and prepare U.S. MBFR alternatives. The need for MBFR appeared in each NATO document on the subject of European security and was a sphere of high interest for the United States. While the MBFR issue was not progressing, under considerable pressure from the U.S. Congress, President Nixon made a compromise deal with his Soviet counterpart, L. Brezhnev at their SALT signing summit (26 May, 1972, Moscow) to hold both European security and MBFR conferences (Clark, 1976).<sup>4</sup>

The coalescence of the above stated factors contributed to marginal success of the goals sought by the Soviet Union.

### **Message from the Warsaw Pact States to all European Countries - Budapest 'Appeal', Budapest, March 1969**

The Budapest 'Appeal' on European security called all European states to unite their efforts for the consolidation of European peace and security stating that "there are no weighty reasons whatsoever for postponing the convocation of a general European conference" (Message from the Warsaw Pact... 1969). Notably, the appeal listed basic prerequisites of European security:

"One of the main preconditions for safeguarding European security is the inviolability of the frontiers existing in Europe, including the frontiers on the Oder and Neisse and also the frontiers between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, recognition of the existence of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, renunciation by the Federal Republic of Germany of its claims to represent the entire German people, and renunciation of the possession of nuclear weapons in any form. West Berlin has a special status and does not belong to West Germany" (Message from the Warsaw Pact... 1969).

---

<sup>4</sup> According to FRUS "For the first time during the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union had agreed to limit the number of nuclear missiles in their arsenals. SALT I is considered the crowning achievement of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente. The ABM Treaty limited strategic missile defenses to 200 interceptors each and allowed each side to construct two missile defense sites, one to protect the national capital, the other to protect one ICBM field (For financial and strategic reasons, the United States stopped construction of each by the end of the decade)."

As the détente and the on-going SALT talks advanced, in conjunction with Soviet active diplomacy to win the hearts of key West European countries, receptivity of the proposed general security conference advanced and deepened.

The FRUS archives of the United States Department of State make huge volume of official documents and memoranda available online on the subject. From this materials it emerges that in the run up to the upcoming NATO ministerial set for April 10, the Soviet government instructed its Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Dobrynin to deliver the Budapest appeal with an accompanying note to H. Kissinger (at that time the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs) before the note would be presented to the State Department. Kissinger wrote a memorandum about his meeting with Soviet Ambassador to President Nixon on April 3rd. Among other issues Kissinger specifically noted that according to Dobrynin, Moscow had no intention of prescribing the membership and that if one of our allies proposed United States participation, Moscow would agree. In Kissinger's opinion, this represented a major change in Soviet policy (FRUS, 2008, Document 1).

The same issue was at the forefront of Dobrynin's discussion with Undersecretary Richardson on April 4, 1969. Soviet Ambassador repeated the message that if European countries believed US participation was necessary then the Soviet side would not object. Undersecretary Richardson inquired about Canadian participation to which Dobrynin replied that "he was not sure whether this would be a main concern of the participants or whether the Canadians themselves wished to take part in a security conference. At this point he could only say that he frankly didn't know whether Canada would be included or excluded from such a meeting" (FRUS, 2008, Document 1). Other questions that were raised by the US concerned the possibility of discussing problematic issues such as the question of the two Germanys or the access to Berlin, to which Ambassador had a forthcoming attitude - "any questions could be raised and that the agenda would no doubt be broad-ranging." At the end of the meeting the US side promised - "the Appeal no doubt would be discussed at the forthcoming NATO Ministerial meeting and that the Appeal would also be discussed between our Western allies themselves" (FRUS, 2008, Document 1).

Immediately after State Department received a message, Henry Kissinger, then President's Assistant for National Security Affairs sent another memorandum to President Nixon on April 4, 1969 in which he spelled out recommendations for the US actions *vis a vis* Soviet call for a Conference, granted the fact that "The appeal has aroused interest in the West because it almost completely is devoid of the polemical attacks on the US and the Federal Republic which normally appear in Communist declarations of this sort " (FRUS, 2008, Document 2).

In this Memorandum Kissinger explained that there were number of speculations about the timing and the reasons behind the "appeal":

"The timing may be connected with the impending NATO meeting: the Soviets may hope that the trend toward better cohesion in NATO after Czechoslovakia and as a result of your European visit can be halted or reversed by a conciliatory proposition from them. Beyond this tactical motivation, the Soviets may in fact be interested in restoring some of the east-west contacts, including economic ones that were disrupted by their invasion of Czechoslovakia. Since the document makes a number of demands on the FRG – including recognition of East Germany, the Oder-Neisse Line and the "special status" of West Berlin, as well as renunciation of nuclear weapons – the Soviets may have wanted to lay the groundwork for renewed political contacts with Bonn. The obverse side of that coin is, as it always has been, an effort to isolate the Federal Republic by picturing it as the main obstacle to a European settlement if it fails to meet Communist demands. Another motivation that may have played a role relates to Soviet efforts to consolidate the Warsaw Pact: this is the first major document in some time that all the East Europeans, including Romania, have been willing to sign" (FRUS, 2008, Document 2).

Despite such considerations, Kissinger advised the US president that the U.S. need not give a negative response, but rather show a constructive approach based on two underpinnings:

(1) In our view a real settlement in Europe is incompatible with gross intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and

(2) Cannot be based on discrimination against Germany, since this would undermine any settlement from the beginning (FRUS, 2008, Document 2).

Undeniably, the conciliatory tone of the Budapest appeal, the subsequent public opinion as well as push from number of European allies conditioned the US constructive stance. However, the Soviet government note of April 9, which again attacked NATO, the US and West Germany in particular put off any forthcoming progress on part of the Allies. Therefore, unlike previously envisioned disposition, **the 1969 NATO Washington communiqué** avoided any mention of a European Security Conference, only making a commitment that:

“The Allies propose, while remaining in close consultation, to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution. Consequently, they instructed the Council to draft a list of these issues” (NATO Washington communiqué, 1969).

In the background, the Soviet Union continued to rally the European states for the matter of arranging the European Security Conference and for holding a special preparatory meeting. In response, **the Finnish Government issued an Aide-memoire in May, 1969**, stressing its neutral position on the German question, claiming its good relations with all the concerned States and expressing its readiness to “act as the host for the security conference as well as for the preparatory meeting provided that the Governments concerned consider this as appropriate” (Aide-memoire of the Finnish Government, 1969). Two weeks after, on May 20-21, the deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact states convened in East Berlin and after the session each pact member sent a written reply to Helsinki, welcoming its readiness and asking for the speedy convention of the preparatory conference (Johnson, 1970, p. 24).

### **Communiqué published by the Warsaw Pact, Prague, October 1969**

The Pact accelerated the process by proposing, for the first time, agenda items for consideration. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States acting on instructions of their governments proposed following issues for the agenda of the all-European Conference:



1. The ensuring of European security and renunciation of the use of force or threat of its use in the mutual relations among States in Europe;
2. Expansion of trade, economic, scientific, and technical relations on the principle of equal rights aimed at the development of political co-operation among European States (Prague Communiqué, 1969).

The State Department's position on the subject can be inferred from the Memorandum sent to President Nixon by Secretary of State Rogers, on October 31, 1969. The idea was expressed that in the run up to the November Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting and the Ministerial meeting in December major question would be to form an Allied response to the Budapest appeal. According to this Memorandum, Secretary Rogers seemed to have had a concrete opinion about the underpinnings behind the Soviet proposal:

“We also know that the ultimate Soviet aim in putting this proposal in play with the West is to *place a seal of legitimacy upon the division of Germany and Europe, while we would hope for the opposite result from any process of European security negotiations*. Moreover the mere convening of a European Security Conference with East German participation would, of itself, go far toward achieving this Soviet goal – which means that West German views on the matter will merit particular attention” (FRUS, 2008, Document 10).

But it seemed that granted high public opinion favorability in Western Europe towards a new East-West dialogue warranted the necessity for a coherent and forthcoming Allied response. In this view, Secretary Rogers suggested common Western response to be comprised of five major points:

1. Balanced force reductions – a renewed and stronger signal of Allied willingness to negotiate.
2. Reference to a Joint Declaration on the Principles of European Security.
3. Berlin-Germany – support for the tripartite probe and the Federal Republic of Germany's initiatives on inner-German relations.
4. Hortatory statements on enhanced East-West economic, technical and cultural exchanges, which some of the Allies – notably the Italians – will insist upon.

5. Statement of willingness to consider an eventual European Security Conference provided it is properly prepared in advance and includes the United States and Canada from the outset. (FRUS, 2008, Document 2).

Reflecting this state of affairs, **the Brussels Declaration by the North Atlantic Council from December 1969** outlined in a very concrete manner those basic principles, which in the understanding of the Alliance were needed to resolve the longstanding East-West disagreements. The declaration stated:

“Peace and security in Europe must rest upon universal respect for the principles of sovereign equality, political independence, and the territorial integrity of each European State; the right of its peoples to shape their own destinies; the peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in the internal affairs of any State by any other State, whatever their political or social system; and the renunciation of the use or the threat of force against any State. Past experience has shown that there is, as yet, no common interpretation of these principles. The fundamental problems in Europe can be solved only on the basis of these principles and any real and lasting improvement of east—west relations presupposes respect for them without any conditions or reservations” (NATO Brussels Declaration, 1969).

The Allies expressed interest “in arms control and disarmament and recalled the Declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions adopted at Reykjavik in 1968 and reaffirmed in Washington in 1969” (NATO Brussels Declaration, 1969). It was stressed that mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) under adequate verification and control “would be another concrete step in advancing “along the road of ending the arms race and of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament” (NATO Brussels Declaration, 1969).

In the Declaration Allies reaffirmed that “A just and lasting peace settlement for Germany must be based on the free decision of the German people and on the interests of European security” in the meanwhile, Allies welcomed efforts by the Federal Republic of Germany and bilateral

exchange of declarations non-use of force or the threat of use of force (NATO Brussels Declaration, 1969).

In May **1970, at the Rome NATO Ministerial**, NATO foreign ministers stated that they would be ready to explore the possibility of holding the ESC under conditions if sufficient progress were recorded in discussions between two Germanys, Negotiations between the FRG, the Soviet Union and Poland, the Strategic Arms Limitations talks (SALT) and the four-power talks. At the same time Allies accepted the suggested agenda items from Prague with changes in the emphasis made. From the Alliance perspective, among the subjects to be explored, affecting security and co-operation in Europe, were:

- a. the principles which should govern relations between states, including the renunciation of force;
- b. the development of international relations with a view to contributing to the freer movement of people, ideas and information and to developing co-operation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well as in the field of human environment (North Atlantic Council Declaration, 1970).

In addition, Ministers stressed their interest in the possibility of mutual and balanced force reductions and issued a separate declaration on this subject titled North Atlantic Council Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, 1970.

In June **1970 the Warsaw Pact** Ministries and heads of states, meeting in Budapest, issued a respective **Communiqué and the Memorandum**, in which welcomed the positive attitudes towards an all-European conference and the Prague proposals. As a forthcoming step, the Memorandum finally clarified the issue of participation:

“Participation is open to all European States, including the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on an equal footing with each other and with rights equal to those of other European States, and also to the United States of America and Canada” (Budapest Memorandum, 1970).

In addition, **the Budapest Memorandum** reflected the December NATO Declaration's agenda only adding one more item for the consideration of a future all-European conference:

- The ensuring of European security and the renunciation of the use or threat of force in the mutual relations of European States;
- The expansion of commercial, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations on a basis of equal rights, for the purpose of developing political co-operation between European States;
- The establishment at the all-European conference of an organ for questions of security and co-operation in Europe (The Budapest Memorandum, 1970).

On August 12, 1970 Renunciation of Force treaty signed between the FRG and the Soviet Union and the same treaty signed between the FRG and Poland largely met the previous NATO preconditions.<sup>5</sup> However, without a tangible progress on Berlin, NATO's stance remained abstinent in **the Brussels December 1970 Ministerial Statement**. The Allies compounded the preconditions for ESC not just by the requirement of progress but of "satisfactory outcome" to the four-power talks on Berlin, SALT and the dialogue between the two Germanys (North Atlantic Council Final Communiqué, December 1970).

In **September 1971 a quadripartite Agreement on Berlin** was concluded. While reconfirming the four Power responsibilities, the document laid foundations for various East-West agreements and promoted the re-establishment of ties between the two parts of the city including the improvement of travel and communications.

Although apprehension and mistrust regarding the usefulness of the ESC still persisted, the opportunities were also assessed, resulting in the significant intensification of East-West contacts denoted by at least 120 recorded bilateral meetings between the period from the 1970 Rome

---

<sup>5</sup> The Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970 stressed the principle of the renunciation of force and recognized Europe's postwar borders. On the occasion of the signing of this treaty, the FRG Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel conveyed a letter to the Soviet side noting the following: "the government of the Federal Republic of Germany has the honor of declaring that this treaty does not stand in contradiction to the political aim of the Federal Republic of Germany to work toward a state of peace in Europe, in which the German people regain their unity in free self-determination" (German History Documents and Images, n. d. [online] Available at: <<http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Chapter8Doc7intro.pdf>>

Summit and February 1971, advancing the prospects for holding such a conference (Palmer, 1971, p. 16).

In **September 1971 a quadripartite Agreement on Berlin** was concluded. While reconfirming the four Power responsibilities, the document laid foundations for various East-West agreements and promoted the re-establishment of ties between the two parts of the city including the improvement of travel and communications.

Although apprehension and mistrust regarding the usefulness of the ESC still persisted, the opportunities were also assessed, resulting in the significant intensification of East-West contacts denoted by at least 120 recorded bilateral meetings between the period from the 1970 Rome Summit and February 1971, advancing the prospects for holding such a conference (Palmer, 1971, p. 16).

### **The MPT and the Helsinki Process**

The Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT) that preceded the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was opened in November 1972 in Dipoli Conference hall in Espoo, outside of Helsinki. The talks lasted till 8 June 1973 and were divided into four rounds, drafting an agenda, structure and the rules of procedure for the actual conference. These were spelled out in a twenty page long Helsinki Final Recommendations or the so-called 'Blue Book'. Everything in the recommendations could be discussed at the future Conference but nothing that was not included in those recommendations (Hakkarainen, 2011, pp. 213-214). The blue book produced the four main areas or "baskets" of the CSCE:

- I. Questions relating to security in Europe, encompassing both ten basic principles guiding relations between the participating States and a number of confidence-building measures;
- II. Co-operation in the fields of economics, of science and technology and of the environments;
- III. Co-operation in humanitarian and other fields;
- IV. Follow-up to the conference (Bloed, 1990, p. 3).

As for the membership of the CSCE, these were 34 MPT states plus Monaco. Albania remained as the only European state, which abstained from the Conference. Part of the Blue Book was also devoted to the rules of procedure of the Conference. It was endorsed that all States would participate as “sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality”. It was made specific that the Conference would take place “outside military alliance” and the principles of consensus would govern the decision making process of the CSCE coupled with a rotating chairmanship (Bloed, 1990, p. 4).

The conference itself was held in three stages starting from July 1973 in Helsinki, second stage in Geneva and the final stage again in Helsinki. Preparation in Dipoli was a burdensome diplomatic endeavour but the Conference itself was especially arduous. For example, the Second stage in Geneva took five rounds and lasted for nearly two years, until 21 July 1975.

As noted by Hakkarainen, whereas negotiations lasted long, the international Western framework surrounding CSCE underwent dramatic changes, starting from Kissinger’s controversial ‘Year of Europe’ speech in April 1973 to drafting a new Atlantic Charter. The energy crisis and the escalation of situation in the Middle East all contributed to tensions in transatlantic relations. Meanwhile, European policy coordination picked up speed with the declared goal of creating a European Union in 1980. There was also a complete change in personalities: none of the Western signatories to the Final Act had been in office when the Geneva negotiations began so the work had been heroically pushed forward by participating civil servants (2011, p. 214-215).

Apart from the lengthy and arduous multilateral negotiations, many difficult issues were also decided during the high level bilateral meetings, among them: meeting in 1974 between Secretary of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev and US President Richard Nixon, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, British Prime Minister Wilson and French President Pompidou. Most notably, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met twice in 1975 and worked out compromises on human dimension part of the conference.

The Helsinki Final Act was signed on August 1, 1975. At the Summit all 35 participating heads of state and government spoke in a solemn pronouncement of the achievement<sup>6</sup>.

Notably, Brezhnev's speech was imbued with pride at the achievement and was more of a solemn character. He pronounced that:

“Its results may be beneficial beyond the borders of Europe, as well as in Europe. The outcome of the prolonged negotiations is such that there are neither victors nor vanquished, neither winners nor losers. It has been a victory of reason. Everyone has won: the countries of East and West, the peoples of socialist and capitalist States, whether parties to alliances or neutral, whether large or small. It has been a gain for all who cherish peace and security on our plane” (Brezhnev, 1975).

In terms of a concrete policy outlook, Brezhnev reverberated the understanding that was reached with the United States on the need for military détente, namely a successful conclusion of the MBFR. In this regard, he underlined:

“The Soviet Union has consistently supported the idea that the Conference should be followed by a further development of military detente. One of the priority goals in this regard is to find ways to reduce armed forces and armaments in Central Europe without diminishing the security of any side. On the contrary, it could be to the benefit of all” (Brezhnev, 1975).

The speech given by U.S. President G. Ford was less symbolic and more future oriented. On numerous occasions he underscored that the Helsinki Final Act was only the beginning of the future cooperation on some of the most important principles enshrined in the document.

“the last 30 years that peace is a process requiring mutual restraint and practical arrangements. This Conference is a part of that process – a challenge, not a conclusion. We face unresolved problems of military security in Europe; we face them with very real

---

<sup>6</sup> An illustrative summary of some of the key testimonies at the Helsinki Summit can be found in A. Romano, 2009.

differences in values and in aims. But if we deal with them with careful preparation, if we focus on concrete issues, if we maintain forward movement, we have the right to expect real progress” (Ford, 1975).

He summarized in his speech all the unresolved issues on the European security agenda, such as the German question, strategic arms limitations, security and stability in Europe and underscored that:

“... the success of detente, of the process of detente, depends on new behaviour patterns that give life to all our solemn declarations. The goals we are stating today are the yardstick by which our performance will be measured...”; “...History will judge this Conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow – not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep” (Ford, 1975).

G. Ford’s business like speech at this solemn event was of course influenced by the disposition of U.S. Senate and majority of public opinion, which opposed the President’s participation in the Helsinki. The Senate proposed a resolution that demanded the settlement of all the unresolved issues before the signing of the final agreement. Of particular concern was the belief that with the signing of this document the U.S. would accept Soviet domination of Eastern Europe as well as would overlook the fact of the Baltic States’ incorporation into the Soviet Union. The apprehension *vis a vis* onset of a serious détente with the USSR was augmented by the citizens of the U.S. with the Eastern European descent. Ford conducted considerable internal campaign to receive domestic legitimacy but the public opinion was largely against with major American newspapers appealing that he stays at home.<sup>7</sup> After the signing, the U.S. Senate proposed another resolution stating that the Final Act did not change the U.S. policy of non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States.

The Act also provided for the follow-up meetings in order to preserve the momentum generated by this historical diplomatic effort. According to the text, the aim of the future meetings would be to exchange views “both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks

---

<sup>7</sup> For example: Article published in Wall Street Journal on July 23, 1975, titled “Jerry Don’t Go.” Also, Rudy Abramson, “Ford Attempts to Soothe Critics of Europe Pact,” Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1975.



defined by the Conference.” The Act also charged states with the necessity to discuss “the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe, and the development of the process of détente in the future.”

The first Follow-up Meeting to the CSCE was held in Belgrade (4 October 1977 to 8 March 1978) and the further meetings were held in Madrid (11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983) and Vienna (4 November 1986 to 19 January 1989).

With the end of the Cold War the process of institutionalization of the CSCE began, starting from the Summit of Heads of States in Paris in November 1990. With the decision taken at the December 1994 Budapest Summit, the CSCE was renamed into an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 1 January 1995. OSCE continued to exist as a foremost security organization with a crucial, if not always successful, role to prevent and resolve conflicts as well as to aid with post-conflict rehabilitation.

### **Literature Review on the motives for convening a European Security Conference**

In order to analyse further the motives for proposing the ESC on behalf of the USSR and the subsequent and evolving Western approach to the proposal, it would be useful to review existing literature on the issue.

Michael Morgan notes that prior to holding the preparatory talks the US visions of détente focused on disarmament, but the Europeans were more interested in an ESC itself than separately in MBFR (in Wenger et al. ed, 2008, p. 28). Kissinger worried about alliance cohesion, but not his interest in the ESC. Hence, the US did not take a leading role in the Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT). Whereas the Canadians and Western Europeans had been carefully planning their policies for months, by the time Stage II opened in Geneva, the US delegation arrived with neither written instructions nor a list of general objectives (Morgan in Wenger et al. ed, 2008, p. 30).

NATO members were keen on pressing the East on Basket III issues and with the hard work of the Europeans and the Canadians the results of the MPT clearly appealed the United States as the outcome detailed the agenda for each basket, finally giving something concrete to discuss at the

conference.

After months of protracted negotiations, “Kissinger’s attitude had changed because of a combination of allied pressure, domestic US opinion, and the recognition that the CSCE might advance US interests against the Soviets (Morgan in Wenger et al. ed, 2008, p. 28). The 1974 Jackson–Vanik amendment and the Soviet expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn focused the US public’s attention on Moscow’s dreadful human rights record. As early as July 1974, Kissinger began to push Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to “cooperate a little bit on Basket III” proposals for human rights (Suri in Wenger et al., 2008, p.54). Kissinger followed this up in later months by pressing the Kremlin to accept language about peaceful border changes in the CSCE negotiations and to accept the final deal by the end of the summer or jeopardize the entire process (Suri in Wenger et al., 2008, pp. 56-57). Hence, by 1975, Kissinger was standing alongside the Europeans in demanding Soviet concessions (Morgan, in Wenger et al., 2008, pp. 31-32).

In Suri’s assessment, “The Helsinki Final Act added some clarity to this vision of what later would become a “common European home,” but it still remained obscure. The document was, in fact, filled with contradictions that reflected the uncertainty of various compromises between East and West, as well as within the Western alliance itself. It argued for frontier revisions “by peaceful means” and affirmed the “inviolability of frontiers.” It declared the “universal significance of human rights” and protected the right of each state “to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.” Most significantly, the Helsinki Final Act claimed to speak for the diverse “peoples” of Europe, but was really an agreement hammered out in arcane negotiations by elite diplomats (in Wenger et al., 2008, p. 60).

According to Marie-Pierre Rey the Soviet Union had four major goals for the ESC. First was largely symbolic and stemmed from Brezhnev’s desire to appear as a man of peace, if not as a potential candidate for the Nobel Prize (in Wenger et al. ed, 2008, p. 68). Second, and most importantly the Conference would serve as way to perpetuate the territorial status quo resulting from World War II, the division of Europe, and the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe (Wenger et al. ed, 2008, p. 68). For this very purpose, on 29 March 1973, the Soviet representative on the working group devoted to questions of security firmly opposed the possibility of any changes to the European map, including

change of a peaceful nature (Wenger et al. ed, 2008, p. 68). On 25 October, during the first session of the conference, Anatoly Kovalev, the head of the Soviet delegation, defended an identical position (in Wenger et al. ed, 2008, p. 68).

The third reason that governed Soviet desire was the rules of European conduct for the future, as listed in a March 1, 1973 document with six principles: the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, the independence and sovereignty of European states, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and peaceful settlement of conflicts (in Wenger et al. ed, 2008, p. 69). The last point in Soviet agenda was a creation of a European body charged with questions of security and cooperation. The Soviets believed that the US tenants would have to be evicted from the “common European home.” (in Wenger et al., 2008, p. 69).

According to Ray, Soviets were also motivated by economic factors. In the first half of 1960's the annual growth rate of the GNP had decreased from 6 percent to 5 percent. Between 1966 and 1970, a slight upturn in growth occurred, with an annual average of 5.5 percent, but by 1971, the decline resumed, with an annual average of only 3.7 percent (in Wenger et al. ed, 2008, p. 69). With the institutionalization of the European Economic Community (EEC) the Soviet Union had acknowledged, by the early 1970's the need and the desire for establishing economic ties between the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

Besides the opportunities, Ray also speaks of significant risks of the possible outcomes of the proposed ESC to the USSR. Among the possible perils were the facts that creating such a forum with all-around European participation would embolden some of its satellite States towards greater freedom of action. As early as 1970, Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu in his meeting with French President Georges Pompidou stressed his desire to use the CSCE as a tool to defend and promote national independence and national sovereignty (in Wenger et al., 2008, p. 70).

In terms of ideology, the openness was also risky. As Nikolai Polianski attests:

Détente with the West became necessary for economic reasons. But the Soviet ideologues understood perfectly the threat that détente posed: neither more or less than a crumbling of the Soviet system. Contact with the material and spiritual riches of Western countries – the

abundance of goods and freedom of information – would immediately reveal to the Soviet citizen his material and spiritual misery (Polianski, 1984, p. 169 cited in Ray, 2008, p. 71).

Besides, internally, there was no homogeneous support for the ESC. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) with the new generation of the so called “*zapadniki*” supported the idea unwaveringly, but some Party institutions were acutely reluctant for such opening as the Party’s idea of international relations was based on the ideological antagonism and establishment of superiority (for this discussion see Ray, pp. 71 – 74).

Along with foreign public relations measures the USSR implemented multifaceted actions inside the country including strengthening political and security cooperation inside the Pact. For example, COMECON decided in July 1972 to create 20 new coordinating committees to improve coordination. The ideological and cultural cohesion was also boosted by various means. Along with strict warnings against centrifugal moves, the tendencies to substitute national cultures with Socialist culture intensified, resulting in “weeks of Socialist friendship” and “months of Socialist culture” (Ray, in Wenger et al., 2008, p. 75). The counter measures against political and religious dissidents became severe, including clamping down on the *Chronicle of Current Events as well as* arrests of Vladimir Bukovsky, Petr Yakir, and Leonid Plyushch, while testing new forms of repression: imprisonment in psychiatric hospitals. Other attempts to stop the “ideological contamination” were condemning campaigns in Soviet Newspapers against Western music and fashion (Ray, in Wenger et al., 2008, pp. 75-76).

Furthermore, in her study Ray shows clearly that even during negotiations the Soviet leader was strongly preoccupied with Western insistence on the idea of information exchange and people to people contacts. In March 1974, Brezhnev complained to Georges Pompidou:

“I am beginning to doubt the purposes of certain countries when they advance unrealistic ideas. What are they more interested in? I have just learned, for example, that the Italians propose to establish on our territory an independent theatre, with its own police and personnel, a sort of concession. I was informed yesterday – I don’t know if you are aware of this – that France, too, is not shunning such ideas: it proposes to create cultural centres,

independent libraries, and cinemas with their own administration. None of that is essential for Europe. We were dreaming of something quite different” (*tet a tet* talk between Georges Pompidou and Leonid Brezhnev, 1974, cited in Ray, p. 77).

Similarly, the Soviet delegation was resistant to the idea of human rights being discussed at length, wanting to place it within the scope of the cultural dimension.

To summarize the Soviet tactics prior and during the Helsinki process, it emerges that they were lucidly aware of the possible risks but conceded for the higher goal: consolidation of a status quo in Europe and relaxation of economic contacts to breathe in a new life into waning Soviet.

Writing in 1971, Michael Palmer, a prominent civil servant and European affairs commentator, summarized the motives behind holding such conference for the main stakeholders. Although the focus of this thesis is on the USSR and its initiative, and the motives behind it, it would be still relevant to summarize the key motives of other actors as these coalesced and finally contributed to the outcome.

According to Palmer, major Soviet arguments for holding the ESC included: a) the multilateral recognition of the status quo and the Soviet position in Eastern Europe; b) the division of NATO’s members, particularly the North American from the European; c) the securing of the European flank of the USSR at a time of crisis with China; d) the diversion of Western European countries from moves to closer political or defence co-operation or integration and towards some vague kind of ‘all-European co-operation; e) an attempt to lull Western Europe into relaxing its political cohesion and military vigilance; f) the acceleration of U.S. disengagement from Western Europe (1971, p. 18). There are additional marginal motives that played their part in the finalization of the outcomes: the need to achieve higher international visibility and recognition for the GDR; attempt to obtain Western economic aid; assuaging those members of the Pact who became afraid of the Western defence integration efforts and to respond to the increased calls for the holding of a conference. Of course, after 1968 the need to get back on the peace offensive and divert attention from the tarnished image provided a renewed impetus.

In the West, there was no clarity of purpose for convening a multilateral conference on security. Most of the questions on the security agenda were either of bilateral or of quadrilateral nature. However, Western position evolved from cold discount of the idea to compromise and issue linkage strategy. In the meanwhile, at least two dominant perceptions existed. There were acute fears that with this initiative the Soviets were tricking the West into strategic misbalance and eventually a collective security system dominated by the USSR. As late into the ESC campaign as November 1970, NATO Secretary General M. Brosio has addressed WEU Assembly, saying:

“A new system of security, truly pan-European, from which the North American countries would be excluded, either at once or gradually... The consequence of this new system of security in Europe would... be the political, military, and economic domination of the Soviet Union in Europe” (Brosio, 1970, cited in Palmer, 1971, p. 23).

Since the 1950's it had been the American position that the Conference had no essence. The general provisions proposed by the USSR had already been enshrined in the United Nations Charter. However, after the 1956 invasion of Hungary and 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, opinions emerged that additional measures would not be extra to limit future big-power freedom of military action.

Overall, the Western preferences for holding the Conference were the inverted list of Eastern preferences. First of all, European NATO allies favoured the idea of human dimension and bridge building, including various cultural and ideological projects. Second, it was the possibility to use the conference for discussing security problems including the possibility of serious arms limitations, which would save up defence spending money to European states.

## **Chapter Summary**

The current chapter reviews the second historical episode dated from July 1966 to August 1975 when the Final Act was signed. I have chosen to divide this historical episode into two campaign phases for the ESC. First from 1966 till 1968 and second from 1969 all the way to 1975 with the USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia serving as a watershed event between these two periods.

In this historical period first loud and visible renewed call for the ESC campaign came on July 5, 1966, when the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact issued a Declaration. The Kosygin-Brezhnev tandem in charge in the Soviet Union perceived this initiative as the groundbreaking one on the European security issue.

Besides the call for the Conference, the declaration included the seven points, summing up the Bloc's agreed modus operandi for the European Security. Among these, the point two called for the *discontinuance of the operation of the North Atlantic Alliance after which the Warsaw Treaty would also become invalid, and that their place would be taken by a European security system*. Point six underscored that the new reality must be recognized that the two German States exist. The final point called for a "general European conference" and for organizing a "general European co-operation".

Notably, the declaration did not elaborate on the issue of membership. It was intentionally left as vague as it was before. Most importantly, the declaration did not elaborate on how the collective security and a corresponding mechanism would be borne out or how could real problems in Europe be solved with this conference.

A year after this proposal, the Karlovy Vary Statement from April 1967 underscored the Bucharest memorandum. The language on West Germany was harsher, reinforced by three specific developments, French withdrawal from NATO military command, opportunity to undermine NATO with the onset of a 1969 period and Romania's establishment of diplomatic ties with West Germany. The statement was adamant about the "recognition of the existence of two sovereign and equal German States" and the "recognition of the invalidity of the Munich Treaty from the very beginning." These were presented as the fundament for "a program of action aiming at the establishment of a system of collective security." The statement demanded all the European countries to respect the post-war European frontiers, including and especially those on the Oder and the Neisse, as well as the frontiers between the two German States. "Renunciation of the use of force or the threat of force and interference in internal affairs, an agreement which would ensure the settlement of all disputes exclusively by peaceful means..." Finally, statement

endorsed the idea that the year 1969 would provide the opportunity for an “alternative solution of Europe without military blocs” and expressed support for “the immediate conclusion of an agreement on the liquidation of the military organizations of the Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Pact.” The Karlovy Vary Statement repeated the calls for relaxation of tensions and called for “The removal of artificially erected barriers in the economic relations between the socialist and capitalist countries” (Karlovy Vary Statement, 1967).

The statement was still vague on the mechanisms of how could Collective Security system emerge and did not provide any concrete solution on how to surpass existing differences except for to offer organizing a security Conference.

After the Czechoslovak invasion the USSR it took time for normalization and from March 1969 continued to appeal to its partners to unite their efforts for the consolidation of European peace and security stating that “there are no weighty reasons whatsoever for postponing the convocation of a general European conference”. After some official and public diplomacy works, the Prague Declaration of October 1969 finally put forth two issues for the agenda of a possible security conference:

In June 1970 the Warsaw Pact Ministries and heads of states, meeting in Budapest, issued a respective Communiqué and the Memorandum, in which welcomed the positive attitudes towards an all-European conference and the Prague proposals. As a forthcoming step, the Memorandum finally clarified the issue of participation, which would include both Germanys, the USA and Canada.

In addition, the Budapest Memorandum reflected both the Prague and the December NATO Declaration agenda only adding one more item for the consideration of a future all-European conference:

- The ensuring of European security and the renunciation of the use or threat of force in the mutual relations of European States;
- The expansion of commercial, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations on a basis of equal rights, for the purpose of developing political co-operation between European States;



- The establishment at the all-European conference of an organ for questions of security and co-operation in Europe (The Budapest Memorandum, 1970).

On August 12, 1970 Renunciation of Force treaty signed between the FRG and the Soviet Union and the same treaty signed between the FRG and Poland largely met the previous NATO preconditions. The September 1971 quadripartite Agreement on Berlin as well as the commitment to under the MBFR talks in parallel to the ESC conference finally gave the push to the idea commencing the Helsinki Final Act, a non-binding political document between the 35 participating States.

### **Chapter 3 Conclusions**

In the identified period (1966-1973) that represents one set of a single case study, the Soviet Union's renewed campaign can be divided into two distinct phases with the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia serving as a watershed event.

#### **What are the concrete initiatives of the Soviet Union *vis a vis* the preferred way of organization of the European Security?**

- The first phase of the campaign (1966-1967) was confined to the appeals issued by the Warsaw Pact. The Political Consultative Committee issued the first public renewed call. The document was titled - The joint "Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe," the so-called **Bucharest Declaration**, dated Bucharest, 5 July 1966. Second was the Statement by the European Communist and Workers' Parties on security in Europe, the so-called **Karlovy Vary Statement** from 26 April 1967.
- After the initial reactions and emotions were settled post 1968 invasion of Prague, the Union renewed the activity, which we may call a second phase. **The Budapest 'Appeal'** on European security was issued in 1969 and listed anew the basic goals: inviolability of frontiers in Europe (including on the Oder and Neisse and between the two Germanys, their recognition as two separate states.

- Next was **the Prague Communiqué** issued by the Warsaw Pact in October 1969, which called for renunciation of the use of force or threat of its use in the mutual relations among States in Europe and expansion of trade, economic, scientific, and technical relations on the principle of equal rights aimed at the development of political co-operation among European States.
- The 1970 the Warsaw Pact Ministries and heads of states, issued **Budapest Communiqué and the Memorandum**. It clarified that membership was open to all European states plus the United States of America and Canada. The Memorandum accepted the December NATO Declaration agenda only adding the establishment at the all-European conference of an organ for questions of security and co-operation in Europe.

**What were major Soviet preferences *vis a vis* European Security architecture across the identified historical episode?**

- Called for the simultaneous abolition of the existing alliances. The Bucharest declaration suggested that if the North Atlantic bloc was not prepared for this step, the *military organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact might be abolished, with the alliances themselves temporarily remaining*.
- “The immutability of frontiers” in Europe as the precondition for lasting peace. On the German question the longstanding Soviet stance had hardened and the two Germanys had become a part of “a reality.” No concrete vision on possible reunification was presented.
- Unlike the 1950’s, this time the Warsaw Pact did not circulate any draft Treaty but called for a “general European conference” in order to organize a system of collective security in Europe. The discussion at the Conference was open to “*both members of the North Atlantic Treaty and neutrals*.”
- On the question of membership, Bucharest declaration was vague calling for “all interested States to join” (Bucharest Declaration, 1966) it was not until 1970 that the issue of membership was clarified and accepted the USA and Canada participation.

**What were the Soviet/Russian end goals when proposing these initiatives?**

- Recognition of the status quo and the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, including division of Germany and recognition of GDR.
- Loosening NATO cohesion by diverting Western European countries from close cooperation within NATO as well as attempting to block the US active role in the proposed new system;
- The ultimate dissolution of the Alliances and reorientation of European security towards vague ‘all-European co-operation’ under a loose conference type collective security system.
- Acquiring strategic advantage, as the West would lose its integrated defense system, while the Soviet Union had a range of recently renewed bilateral agreements with the Eastern European states.
- The need to get back on the peace offensive and divert attention from the tarnished image after the 1968 military campaign.
- The need for higher economic and technological cooperation with the West.

**What were the factors that resulted in failure of cooperation over the proposed initiative?**

- As a result of the first phase of the campaign there were no observable cooperative outcomes. Cooperation failed because the initial setting in which the campaign unfolded was incriminated with ideological rivalry (characterized as ‘competitive coexistence’) and acutely adversarial events such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the tense Berlin crisis of 1958-1961, the Sino-Soviet split and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The Soviet arms deliveries to the North Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 further widened the security perceptions. Rigidity towards the German question (especially after 1966) and the ongoing nuclear competition decreased the possibility of any rapprochement on overall European security themes.
- In parallel the Soviet Union exerted much pressure to weaken West European ties with the USA (its French and Italian politics served the purpose) and create an image of a threat from West Germany. However, these efforts were offset first by strong Allied Unity as expressed by the Harmel Report of 1967, which offered, “a realistic measures designed to further a détente in East-West relations”. Second, the plans were offset by the Soviet Union had difficulties maintaining “order” in Eastern Europe without the resort to harsh force. Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania started to distance from the USSR. Dubcek’s movement

towards reformed communism in Prague triggered Soviet invasion in 1968. The overall Soviet popularity and progressive image from the Brezhnev-Kosygin time all but disappeared and the Soviet leaders emerged with a new reputation for unpredictable and irresponsible partner.

**What are the factors that contributed to certain outcomes as a result of these initiatives?**

- During the Second phase of the campaign number of factors contributed to receptivity towards the agreement on holding a general European conference in Helsinki, which resulted in Helsinki Final Act of 1975.
- First factor was that from the 1970's the USSR engaged in extensive public diplomacy efforts to rally the Western opinion for the ESC. That included the redefinition of its geopolitical identity and re-branding the Union as a European country (Ray, in Wenger et al. ed, 2008) while calling for the removal of economic barriers between the socialist and capitalist camps.
- Second major factor was the US pursuit of SALT talks from November 1969 and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) theme which was officially proposed at the NATO Reykjavik Ministerial in June 1968. The study of primary source from FRUS suggest that even Henry Kissinger was impressed by the fact that the Budapest appeal “has aroused interest in the West because it almost completely is devoid of the polemical attacks on the US and the Federal Republic which normally appear in Communist declarations of this sort ” (FRUS, 2008, Document 2) and recommended moderation to President Nixon *vis a vis* Soviet call for a Conference, because of other vested interests such as disarmament. In the end, it was in at the 1972 SALT Summit in Moscow that President Nixon made a compromise with Brezhnev to hold both European security and MBFR conferences (Clark, 1976).

In conclusion of this chapter it can be stated that nearly 30 years of Soviet campaign to organize an all-European conference in Europe materialized: there was a Summit of 35 heads of States and Government which created a regular format of Conference, underscored the fundamental principles of conduct between the participating member states including the non-use of force and inviolability

of state frontiers. However, as it emerged later such an outcome was less than satisfactory for the USSR and its legal successor Russian Federation. The USSR remained locked on the importance of its grand goals: the dissolution of military alliances, creation of an exclusively European conference without U.S. and Canadian participation and a corresponding loose security body charged with European collective security issues. Hence, despite a complete overhaul of political and security environment in the next decade, the USSR's basic security goals remained the same as they were at the height of the Cold War.

## References

- Aide-memoire of the Finnish Government, Helsinki, May 1969 Palmer, M. 1971. *The Prospects for European Security Conference*, PEP, European Series No. 18. London: Chatham House.
- Bloed, A., 1990. *From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process*, Volume 2, Brill Archive.
- Bozo, F., and Emanuel, S., 2002. *Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Brogi, A., 2011. *Confronting America: The Cold War Between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Brosio, M., 1970. *Statement to the WEU Assembly*, Paris.
- Clark, D. L., 1976. *What's an MBFR?* Air University Review. [online] Available at: <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1976/jul-aug/clark.html>> [Accessed 29 June, 2015]
- Editorial, *The Mighty Strength of Unity*, Izvestiia, July 12, 1966.
- Extracts from “Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe”, Bucharest, July 1966 in Palmer, M. 1971. *The Prospects for European Security Conference*, PEP, European Series No. 18. London: Chatham House.
- Extracts from “Statement on European Security”, Karlovy Vary, April 1967 Palmer, M. 1971. *The Prospects for European Security Conference*, PEP, European Series No. 18. London: Chatham House.
- Extracts from Communiqué published by the Warsaw Pact, Prague, October 1969 Palmer, M. 1971. *The Prospects for European Security Conference*, PEP, European Series No. 18. London: Chatham House.
- Extracts from Memorandum published by the Warsaw Pact, Budapest, June 1970 Palmer, M. 1971. *The Prospects for European Security Conference*, PEP, European Series No. 18. London: Chatham House.
- Foreign Relations of the United States, Milestones: 1969-1976, Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II. [online] Available at: <<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt>> [Accessed 29 June, 2015].
- Fursenko, A. A. and Naftali, T., 2006. *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary*, New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
- Hakkarainen, P., 2011. *A State of Peace in Europe: West Germany and the CSCE, 1966-1975*, Volume 10, Contemporary European History, Berghahn Books

- Johnson, A. R., 1970. *The Warsaw Pact Campaign for "European Security"*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Kosygin speech of October 13, 1966, Pravda. October 14, 1966.
- McCauley, M., 2008. *Russia, America and the Cold War: 1949-1991*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. London: Routledge.
- Morgan, M. C., 2008. North America, Atlanticism, and the making of the Helsinki Final Act in Wenger, A., Matsny, M. and Nuenlist, C. eds. *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75*, CSS Studies in Security and International Relations series, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. London: Routledge. Ch. 2.
- North Atlantic Council, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, Declaration adopted by Foreign Ministers and Representatives of Countries participating in the NATO Defence Program, Reykjavik, 24th-25<sup>th</sup> June, 1968. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c680624b.htm>> [Accessed 10 June, 2015].
- North Atlantic Council Final Communiqué, Washington, 10th-11th April, 1969. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c690410a.htm>> [Accessed 15 June, 2015].
- North Atlantic Council Declaration, Brussels, December 1969. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c691204b.htm>> [Accessed 15 June, 2015].
- North Atlantic Council Declaration, Rome, 26th-27th May, 1970. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c700526a.htm>> [Accessed 15 June, 2015].
- North Atlantic Council Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, 26th-27th May, 1970. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c700526b.htm>> [Accessed 15 June, 2015].
- North Atlantic Council Final Communiqué, Brussels, 3rd-4th, December 1970. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c701203a.htm>> [Accessed 10 June, 2015].
- Palmer, M. 1971. *The Prospects for European Security Conference*, PEP, European Series No. 18. London: Chatham House.
- Polianski, N., 1984. Testimony in *MID*, Détente with the West was *required* for economic reasons. *Douze ans dans les services diplomatiques du Kremlin*. Paris: Belfond. p. 169.
- Protocol 68, November 6, 1958, RGANI
- Rey, M., 2008. The USSR and the Helsinki process, 1969–75, Optimism, doubt, or defiance? in Wenger, A., Matsny, M. and Nuenlist, C. eds. *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75*, CSS Studies in Security and International Relations series, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. London: Routledge. Ch. 4.

- Roberts, G., 1999. *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, London: Routledge.
- Romano, A., 2009. *From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE*, Volume 44, Euroclio Series, Issue 44 of Euroclio Etudetes et documents, Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang.
- Rose, C., 1988. *The Soviet Propaganda Network: A Directory of Organizations Serving Soviet Foreign Policy*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Selvage, D. E., ed., 2008. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXXIX, European Security*, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of the Historian. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. [online] Available at: <<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v39/comp1>> [Accessed 15 June, 2015].
- Soutou, G. H., 2007. *The Linkages between European integration and détente: the contrasting approaches of the de Gaulle and Pompidou, 1965 to 1974* in Ludlow N. P., ed. 2007. *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973*, Taylor & Francis.
- Suri, J., 2008. Henry Kissinger and the reconceptualization of European security, 1969–75 in Wenger, A., Matsny, M. and Nuenlist, C. eds. *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75*, CSS Studies in Security and International Relations series, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. London: Routledge. Ch. 3.
- Surkov, A., 1971. *Speech at the session of the Soviet Committee for Security in Europe*, Moscow: Soviet Committee for Security in Europe
- Talk between Georges Pompidou and Leonid Brezhnev, tête-à-tête meeting, Pitsunda, 13 March 1974, in Archives of the Presidency of the French Republic, 5 AG 2, advisers' files, box no. 1,019.
- To Make the European Situation Healthier, To Strengthen the Peace and Security of Peoples*, Pravda, May 19, 1966.
- Wolfe, T. W., 1972. *Soviet Attitudes Toward MBFR and the USSR's Military Presence in Europe*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Wolfe, T. W., 1975. *Military Power and Soviet Policy*, Rand Paper P-5388, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.



## **CHAPTER 4: Gorbachev's Common European Home proposal (1985-1990)**

### **Introduction**

The aim of this chapter is to study a third historical episode, the environment in which the Common European Home (CEH) concept unfolded and evolved from 1985 till 1990. Chapter also explores the 1990 CSCE Paris Summit, which adopted another fundamental politically binding document for the CSCE participating states – the Paris Charter for A New Europe as a relative outcome of the CEH concept.

This Chapter shows that the third historical episode under study bears clearly discernible resemblance in the goals aspired by the Soviet governing elites towards the organization of European security despite the time lapse, change of leadership and even governing ideology. The study is based on reconstructing the narrative via primary sources, namely Gorbachev's speeches and interviews as well as important secondary materials of the historians and researchers of this epoch in the Cold War history.

### **The Emergence of the Common European Home (CEH) concept**

#### **Historical background in which the proposal unfolded**

Similar to other Post-WWII proposals, the Common European Home (CEH) concept also unfolded amid significant historical events. The aftermath of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and rise in the activities of number of Helsinki groups across the Soviet expanse, the heavy burden of military race and the ailing economy of the Soviet Union prompted the beginning of the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet bloc. This particular proposal was an integral part of Gorbachev's perestroika and the 'new thinking.'

The setting that gave birth to 'the new thinking' was not very favorable to the Soviet Union. While Reagan Administration's military buildup was already well under way in response to earlier Soviet military buildup in Europe<sup>8</sup>, in March 1983 Reagan made his Strategic Defense

---

<sup>8</sup> In the mid-1970's the Soviet Union achieved rough strategic parity with the United States and began replacing older intermediate-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with a new intermediate-range missile, the SS-20. On November 12, 1979, the NATO ministers adopted a "dual track" strategy to counter Soviet SS-20 deployments. One track called for arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce INF forces to the lowest possible level; the second track called for deployment in Western Europe, beginning in December 1983, of

Initiative (SDI) speech, which posed a threat of a start of a new and more intense technological arms race. By the autumn NATO had begun to deploy ground launched cruise missiles and Pershing 2 ballistic missiles in Western Europe. The invasion of Afghanistan had resulted in an incapacitating war for the Soviet Union rather than in a political control of that country. While the East-West relations were hitting a new low, relations with the Eastern neighbors were not exemplary either: with China, despite some normalization, the “three obstacles” still remained insurmountable and relations with Japan were habitually chilly. Furthermore, the ongoing competition for arms supply to proxies in Africa and Asia was proving quite burdensome (see Holloway, 1988/89, p. 69; Gorbachev, 1999, p. 171).

Prior to Gorbachev’s ascension, during his brief term in office as the General Secretary of the CPSU Y. Andropov withdrew from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) after NATO began its INF deployment. Till the end of Andropov’s term in office relations with the U.S. remained tense and only in January 1985, after his death it was possible, under his predecessor K. Chernenko, to resume nuclear arms control talks in Geneva.<sup>9</sup>

Notably, In his memoirs, Gorbachev specifically underlined the issue of military spending as a burden:

“The race for military supremacy relative to any possible opponent (and that was the orientation) resulted in military spending that in some years reached 25–30 percent of our gross national product—that is, five or six times greater than analogous military spending in the United States and the European NATO countries” (1999, p. 172).

When Gorbachev was appointed as the General Secretary of the Communist Party in March 1985, he inherited a failed détente, with East-West relations at an all time low (Holloway, 1988/89, p.70).

---

464 single-warhead U.S. ground-launched cruise (GLCM) missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles. Source: *Department of State*, Bureau of arms control, verification and compliance. [Online] Available at: <<http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm>>[Accessed on July 11, 2015].

<sup>9</sup> In January 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko agreed to separate but parallel negotiations on INF, strategic arms (START), and defense and space issues as part of a new bilateral forum called the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). Negotiations would be conducted by a single delegation from each side, divided into three groups – one for defense and space, one for START, and one for INF. Formal talks resumed in March 1985 in all three areas. Source: *Ibid.*

According to Gorbachev, the problem with this type of picture lay in the dogmatic world outlook held by the USSR at that time:

“The problem was not so much Soviet foreign policy itself or the actions of Soviet diplomats as it was the concepts on which they were based. These concepts rested on a dogmatic world outlook, not on reality, not on a sober analysis of the situation nor on meeting the real and vital interests of our country and our people. Rather, our foreign policy was oriented toward harsh confrontation with the entire outside world...” (1999, p. 172).

In such a way, Gorbachev started to reconsider the Leninist principle of peaceful co-existence and retracted from Brezhnev’s doctrine that such a co-existence meant a specific form of class struggle. Already from 1984 and onwards, Gorbachev’s numerous speeches dwelt on the idea of common values of human kind, common threats and indivisibility of European security because of increasing interdependence of agendas of the European states. Such re-conceptualized and differently worded appeals were made on number of occasions, starting from 1984 and were more coherently presented as the so-called “new thinking” in February 1986 during the 27<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU.

This New Thinking in foreign policy was based on several key ideas, such as “the fear of nuclear danger shared by all peoples, the interdependence of the problems faced by the humanity, the deideologization of international relations and the end of the class struggle principle in foreign policy” (Rey, 2004, 37). Basically, the new thinking mean mutual security, interdependence, and reasonable sufficiency. It meant that war was not an acceptable tool of Soviet foreign policy, that the military should not dominate decision-making rather diplomacy should be the principal instrument. Hence, on the foreign policy arena Gorbachev started to shift focus from bilateral confrontation and competition towards collective issues, asserting that - “national security can only be secured through general security” (Gorbachev, 1985, p. 1).

Such underling circumstances have led to actions that were revolutionary and in stark contrast to the usual brinkmanship policies of the later days of the Cold War. Faced with the imminent loss of capacity to pay the high costs of maintaining the military superiority, Gorbachev actively sought to cut a deal with the USA on reducing nuclear tensions. Gorbachev, on behalf of the

USSR announced in April 1985 and again in 1986 a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing as well as proposed a series of concrete measures aimed at arms reduction. In November 1985 Gorbachev met US President Reagan at the first summit in a decade in Geneva, and in October 1986 at the Reykjavik summit, where they discussed and almost finalized the agreement on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. The agreement called the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) was reached a bit later, on December 8, 1987<sup>10</sup>. Moreover, the Soviet army was pulled out of Afghanistan. In another move Gorbachev renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had declared the right of the Soviet Union to interfere in countries in the Warsaw Pact to maintain their socialist systems. Moreover, Soviet troops did not interfere when various Eastern European countries preceded to takeover their communist governments (Glad, 1996, p. 3).

As Gill and Markwick observe, these sorts of measures in the international arena were designed to revivify Soviet foreign policy and decrease hostility in the wake of the decline of détente. In particular the American commitment to outspend the ailing Soviet economy in the defense area heightened the need for Moscow to reduce its commitments in this area of activity. Gorbachev saw this, and aided by the replacement as foreign minister of the veteran Andrei Gromyko by his ally Eduard Shevardnadze in July 1985, he was able to press ahead with initiatives in foreign policy designed to achieve this end (2000, p. 36).

In parallel, Gorbachev also sought to shift the Soviet focus away from its concentration on the USA by emphasizing new initiatives elsewhere on the globe first and foremost in Europe but also in Asia. For example, in July 1986 he launched his Vladivostok initiative, which involved the projection of the USSR into the Pacific region in a peaceful and positive capacity, a region he also referred to as “the Pacific, our common home” (detailed discussion in Goldstein and Freeman, 1990, pp. 122-127).

---

<sup>10</sup> Agreement to begin formal talks on INF was reached on September 23, 1981. On November 18, President Reagan announced a negotiating proposal in which the United States would agree to eliminate its Pershing IIs and GLCMs if the Soviet Union would dismantle all of its SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s. This proposal became known as the “zero-zero offer.” The U.S. approach to the negotiations, developed through extensive consultations within NATO, required that any INF agreement must: (1) provide for equality both in limits and rights between the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) be strictly bilateral and thus exclude British and French systems; (3) limit systems on a global basis; (4) not adversely affect NATO’s conventional defense capability; and (5) be effectively verifiable. *Source:* Department of State, Bureau of arms control, verification and compliance. [online] Available at: <<http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm>>[Accessed on July 11, 2015].

It is in this historic environment that Gorbachev unveiled and then cultivated his ambitious initiative – the ‘Common European Home’ (CEH).

### **Common European Home (CEH) initiative – 1984-85**

In his memoirs Gorbachev recalls that the metaphor “a common European Home” was born out of profound considerations of the fate of Europe as well as his numerous discussions with European officials and experts (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 201). Once it got out on the pages of the newspapers, people started paying attention. One of the very first times when Gorbachev used the phrase “Europe is our Common Home” was during his trip to the UK in 1984 where he headed the USSR’s Parliamentary Delegation. In a fairly long speech Gorbachev summarized all the steps the Soviet Union was proposing to diffuse tensions between the East and the West and in that context stated – “Whatever is dividing us, we live on the same planet and Europe is our common home, a home, not a theatre of military operations” (Original Russian version can be found in Gorbachev, 1987, p. 114; also, quoted in Rey, 2004, p. 34.).

### **For a peaceful future of Europe and of all mankind, speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, France, October 2-5, 1985.**

The October 1985 visit to Paris, France was Gorbachev’s first official visit in the capacity of a party General Secretary. During the official meeting a specific metaphor “Common European Home” never emerged, except for a brief mention during the televised interview on October 1<sup>st</sup>. However, Gorbachev’s long speech was a first unified and clear message to the West that the Soviet Union was changing its philosophy across a full spectrum of political, security and economic agenda of the day. Basically, in his speech Gorbachev announced that the USSR had reduced its SS 20 deployments to the level of June 1984 (in total 243 missiles); complete withdrawal of the SS 5 missiles and an ongoing decomposition of SS 4 missiles. He also voiced his suggestions to President Reagan, spelled out in a letter, that the Soviet Union was proposing a complete abolition of offensive space weapons as well as a decrease by 50 percent of the strategic offensive weapons that have the capacity to reach each others’ territories. Knowing the interest by the European states, Gorbachev proposed to work towards an agreement limiting intermediate-range nuclear missiles besides the ongoing negotiations on space and strategic arms (Gorbachev, 1987, pp. 462-463).

This overhaul in the USSR’s security policy was wrapped in a moralizing discourse about the

inevitability of catastrophe in a nuclear war, which will have no winners. Along these lines, Gorbachev also proposed a complete abolition of chemical weapons and stockpiles and underscored that the Soviet side was participating actively within the Geneva disarmament conference to work out a corresponding convention (Gorbachev, 1987, pp. 464).

Building on these peaceful proposals, Gorbachev demanded a change in the relations between Europe and the USSR stating that the political climate depends largely on the development of economic relations between the East and the West and called for a more “business like” relations between the CMEA and EEC. Gorbachev also underscored that the Soviet Union accords a serious importance to the issue of Human Rights, warning however that this cannot be a sphere of hypocrisy and speculation and a tool for interference in the internal affairs of other countries (Gorbachev, 1987, pp. 466-467).

At the end of the speech Gorbachev addressed the ongoing deliberation that this new Soviet discourse was aimed at sawing a Transatlantic discord and alienating the U.S. and Canada from European affairs:

“We are not conducting a Metternichian ‘balance of power’ policy, setting one state against another, knocking together blocs and counter-blocs, ... but a policy of global detente, strengthening world security and developing international cooperation everywhere. On the other hand we are realists and understand, how strong are the bonds of historic, political and economic connections between the Western Europe and the U.S.” (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 468).

This was the first major pronouncement of the new Soviet thinking and was met with profound interest in France as well as across Europe.

At first, in the West the concept resembled highly to Brezhnev’s tactics – trying to cause a discord inside NATO at times of superpower tension in the hope of exerting some kind of balancing influence on American positions. According to Rey, Common European Home had three main functions: First, the function of public relations to influence Western political thought and public opinion; second, CEH served the function of explaining to American and West European leaders that Soviet Union was searching for new interlocutors. And third, to show to

the West that USSR was keen on finding a solution to the European missile question and the notion of wider European security order was negotiable (Rey, 2004, p. 36).

Initial reactions of the West to the idea of Common European Home can be characterized as “suspicious, sceptical, and even hostile” (Rey, 2004, p. 49). One of the reasons was the fact that the initiative was ambiguous in nature and reminded Western European leaders the Molotovian collective security concept. Moreover, the concept was initially seen as propaganda tool addressed to the US, and not the Western powers, so Western states, particularly Germany and France did not feel necessity to respond to the idea. Most importantly, since the concept did not focus on the human rights, it was destined to “remain a myth, a fictitious image, as long as USSR did not show any concrete signs of improvement” in the field of human rights protection (Rey, 2004, p. 52).

Therefore, although the proposal had been put on the table, as Malcolm observes, relations throughout the 1985-86 period revolved around superpower relationship. The focus of attention was more on preserving Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, on securing progress in the Geneva negotiations on strategic arms reduction and in the Stockholm talks on confidence-building and disarmament, and on creating a suitable climate inside NATO for the Soviet-American summit planned for the autumn (Malcolm, 1989, p. 663).

The Concept was still vague and with little substance. It was also notoriously vague on the issue of participants and the institutional structure. However, unlike in the previous two historical episodes, in public speeches Gorbachev never specifically outlawed the U.S. and Canada but in rather put emphasis that they were outsiders and Europeans were kind enough to have them as their club member. In Gorbachev’s own words:

“Our idea of a ‘common European home’ certainly does not involve shutting the doors to anybody. True, we would not like to see anyone kick in the doors of the European home and take the head of the table at somebody else’s apartment. But then, that is the concern of the owner of the apartment. In the past the socialist countries responded positively to the participation of the United States and Canada in the Helsinki process” (M. Gorbachev, 1987. qtd in Malcolm, 1989, p. 665).

However, as the arms reduction negotiations progressed and the USSR was becoming increasingly dependent on the US and Western European states' support, the proposal was modified and toned-down already in 1987.

**“For a ‘common European home’, for a new way of thinking,” speech by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Prague, 1987**

From 1987 Soviet Union stepped up its campaign for Western European diplomacy, which in the words of Malcolm had three fundamental concerns: first to facilitate US-Soviet talks on removing ground-based medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe, second to respond to West European fears of possible weakening of American security guarantees due to US-Soviet talks and third, East-West discussion on economic cooperation launched in 1985 (Malcolm, 1989, p. 664).

A new version of the Common European Home Concept was unveiled on April 10, 1987. Within the frames of an official visit Gorbachev spoke at the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Meeting. However, this metaphor was not a major topic of a nearly 18 pages long speech; it was based on the ‘new thinking’, and perestroika, which were an imperative for breathing in a new life to the socialist society. The imperatives of the new foreign policy stemmed out of these considerations and envisaged security, overcoming of nuclear catastrophe and creation of normal external environment for peaceful labor.

Gorbachev stressed that the goal of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe necessitated the effort of all European states as well as of the U.S. and Canada. Although a number of negotiations in this regards were underway he underscored the importance of a wide scale talks of the CSCE foreign ministers for the purpose of radical downsizing of tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 484). He spoke of nuclear and chemical weapons free zones and corridors in Central Europe and readiness to comply with such an agreement (1987, pp. 484-485).

He then stated, towards the end of his long speech that in light of such new thinking, he proposed the concept of a ‘common European home’, which he stressed was not a beautiful phantasy but a necessity conditioned by the dense and intertwined populations and urbanization of Europe, existence of nearly 3 million armed soldiers, armaments with increasing destructive capacity and



nuclear plants and technologies, which would make any type of military confrontation a catastrophe for Europe. He then suggested that its time to think about the future integrative processes in both parts of Europe and spoke of the need of economic and cultural interrelationships (1987, p. 487).

Leaving most of the essence of this European Home unexplained, Gorbachev vaguely stated that the idea of a home does not mean the intent to shut the doors in front of anyone (1987, p. 488). In the end, he enumerated number of issues, such as terrorism, organized crime, AIDS, environmental problems among those that are quickly becoming global and require joint efforts.

Basically, the real positive shift towards the idea of Common European Home occurred among the Western leaders once it became obvious that in principle the Soviet Union would agree to enhancing the concept of security beyond hard security and would include not only human rights issues, but also cooperation in the economic and technical fields.

From 1988 France and Germany both took up the roles of turning the Gorbachev proposal into a more inclusive process in which everyone could have a stake. During their November 1988 meeting Francois Mitterrand stressed “the need to give the Common European Home the more pragmatic, a more concrete approach of possible cooperation between the European states, based on the exploration of the fields which, by nature, transcend the frontiers between West and East” (Rey, 2004, 54). Concrete proposal by Mitterrand focused on a joint programme on audiovisual, environmental and technological projects (Rey, 2004, p. 54).

The shift in Gorbachev’s thinking on European issues, including the German question, NATO and the U.S. role, is well evident throughout the informal Soviet-German meetings from 1987 and 1988. During the early 1988 meeting sponsored by the Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis<sup>11</sup> before Kohl’s visit to Moscow, several Soviet officials said that United States could not be a legitimate member of Gorbachev’s “common European home.” The German participants, including Volker Ruhe and Egon Bahr, insisted on the United States and Canada being as members. One of the participants, the head of the International Department of the Central Committee Valentin Falin unequivocally rejected such a “special role” for the United States in Europe. He said that the Germans had to choose between Gorbachev’s new European home and their old home,

---

<sup>11</sup> “Political discussion table” founded by German founder and businessman Kurt A. Korber in 1961.

suggesting that Gorbachev's pan-European concept was incompatible with West Germany's role in the transatlantic security system and in NATO. One Russian participant even suggested an independent European defense system, inviting the Germans to withdraw from NATO. At later meetings Germans succeeded in convincing Gorbachev of the need to think in transatlantic terms. As Smyser contends, Kohl had helped change the Soviet position. Gorbachev accepted a place for the United States and Canada in the "common European home" (Smyser, 1999, pp. 315-16).

**"Europe as a Common Home", Address given by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 6 July 1989)**

The year 1989 marked the next stage of intensification in Soviet relations with the West, especially as the talks on the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty was underway. Soviet Union was also alarmed by the approaching deadline for the 'single market' and looked for ways to make venues for continent wide cooperation in trade as well as other forms of economic cooperation. Given this background, the fullest statement of the new European policy was spelled out in a speech to the Council of Europe on July 6, 1989. One of the major themes of the speech, similarly to his ground-breaking UN GA speech from 1988<sup>12</sup> was the topic of 'freedom of choice' and subsequent renouncement of the Brezhnev doctrine:

"The social and political order in some particular countries did change in the past, and it can change in the future as well. But this is exclusively a matter for the peoples themselves and of their choice. Any interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit the sovereignty of states – whether of friends and allies or anybody else – are inadmissible" (Gorbachev, 1989).

---

<sup>12</sup> The Time magazine's Walter Isaacson provides a comprehensive analysis of Gorbachev's ground-breaking address to the United Nations in the article "the Gorbachev Challenge", subtitled "He came, he spoke, he conquered". The article reflected the apprehension of the West about this new rhetoric, which was perceived as a trap that would "lure the West toward complacency" and "woo Western Europe into neutered neutralism." The article however positively assessed Gorbachev's renunciation of heavy ideology and commitment to the non-use of force, troop cuts in Eastern Europe and compliance with the ABM treaty. However, this was seen as the shifting of resources from military to domestic needs; a dwindling of security alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and, an inevitable move toward European integration. The author recommended that Bush counter Gorbachev's "common home" rhetoric with the idea of "common ideals," turning an alliance of necessity into one of shared values (Isaacson, 1988).

Far from having a ready-made blueprint of a home, he stressed the importance of security issues calling for re-evaluation of threats, noting that:

“...A common European home rules out the probability of an armed clash and the very possibility of the use or threat of force, above all military force, by an alliance against another alliance, inside alliances or wherever it may be” (Gorbachev, 1989).

Along with spelling out Soviet Union’s preferences in security sphere (nuclear disarmament, force reductions etc.) Gorbachev made references to developing a network of all European institutions in economic, environmental, humanitarian and cultural spheres, as well as the development of a common European legal base, at first in the humanitarian sphere.

Gorbachev called for the transformation of international relations in the spirit of humanism, equality and justice and by setting an example of democracy and social achievements in its own countries. He stressed that the groundwork of the better European future was laid down in Helsinki and the Vienna and Stockholm meetings, while the best possible way to continue this process was the idea of a common European home. If the Security issues were named as the foundation of this home, the “all-round co-operation” was named as “its bearing frame” (1989).

In terms of cooperation, economic sphere was highlighted and expressed interest in “the emergence of a vast economic space from the Atlantic to the Urals where Eastern and Western parts would be strongly interlocked” based on the relations between Western regional organisations — the European Community, EFTA, and the CMEA...”

As a way to advance cooperation and “contemplate future stages of progress towards a European Community of the twenty-first century” Gorbachev called for a second Helsinki type meeting in the next one or two years, with the US and Canadian participation.

Gorbachev’s concession by 1989 was a result of his realization of the fact that there would be a certain apprehension about Soviet Union being admitted as part of Europe without having a counterbalance. He clearly acknowledged that the US was an inseparable part of European politics.

Ray sums up the content of the ‘Common European Home’ based on April 1987 Prague, March 1988 Belgrade and July 1989 Strasbourg speeches by Gorbachev:

“The Helsinki geopolitical order would serve as the foundations, including compliance with the territorial borders confirmed in 1975 (particularly the Oder-Neisse boundary). The first storey of the house would be built on collective security and based on the widest possible disarmament (nuclear, chemical and conventional) and, in the long-term, on the disappearance of military blocs and alliances. The second storey related to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The upper two stories concerned a pan-European economic and trade cooperation and finally, real European cultural community, which would be the supreme achievement of the common home” (Ray, 2004, p. 39).

### **German unification and its connection to CEH**

The unification of the two Germany continued to be a prominent issue throughout the campaign on CEH and the more dominant processes of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. During the early days of his career, Gorbachev’s idea was to effectively spread Soviet sphere of influence to West Germany as well. He has been saying that the West Germany and the Soviet Union should build the European home together, and he spoke of the possibility of “two German apartments with lots of doors between them” in that home. He traveled widely around Germany, visiting high-technology centers like Stuttgart and industrial cities like Dortmund as well as Bonn. Everywhere, he spoke in glowing terms of future Soviet-German economic and political cooperation, and he invited Germans to invest in the Soviet Union (Smyser, 1999, p. 315).

However, at the insistence of West Germany as well as the United States the unification issue was advanced as a goal without any alternatives. Gorbachev started to look at the unified Germany as a guarantor for a stable Europe, a rhetoric that also emanated from the US president George Bush. In Gorbachev’s understanding a united Germany would have to contribute to stability. Gorbachev would not tolerate having a revanchist German government begin a new march to the East. Gorbachev believed that the European alliance systems formed a part of European stability with Germany divided between them. If Germany was to be united, some equally stable system had to be devised. Any other arrangement would force the Soviet Union to build another military barrier. Gorbachev did not have a ready-made formula, but his preferences were clear – draw Germany out of NATO and create another arrangement. He had maintained that the Soviet Union would not accept a united Germany in NATO (Smyser, 1999).

Gorbachev more often appeared to be playing with the “united and neutral” formula that

Moscow has been advancing from time to time during and after the 1950s. To give substance to his stance Gorbachev asked Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev to develop plans for pulling Soviet forces out of Germany in conjunction with the withdrawal of all foreign forces (Smyser, 1999, p. 367).

As Smyser observes, the West German government also had trouble coordinating its positions, for Kohl and Genscher had different approaches. Kohl wanted united Germany to be completely in NATO and wanted German forces to be able to operate throughout all of Germany. At first, Genscher did not insist on a united Germany in NATO, hinting on occasion that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be dissolved in favor of an all-European collective security system. However, this was not a proposal Bush, Thatcher and Mitterrand or other NATO members would accept. White House officials have even reacted with particular concern to Genscher's statements. They noted that he did not mention NATO in speeches that he made in March of 1990, speaking only of German unification in the context of the European Community, the CSCE and the "common European home," or in what he alternately called "a pan-European peaceful order" or a "peaceful European order from the Atlantic to the Urals." They felt that he stressed Europe as a security arena separate from the Atlantic alliance and that he often spoke of "new peace structures" in ways that suggested that he wanted to abolish such older structures as NATO. Genscher spoke about Germany as a NATO member only when he came to the United States in April (1999).

Genscher believed that German unification had to pass through a very narrow window that might close at any moment. He feared for Gorbachev's future and wanted to arrange the earliest possible compromise to get through the window and to help protect Gorbachev. Kohl also saw the narrow window but felt that he could help Gorbachev on the economic front without making concessions on Germany's alliance systems (Smyser, 1999, p. 380).

The Soviet leader believed he achieved his goal - ensuring that the chancellor became a supporter of Gorbachev's perestroika and his idea of bringing the Soviet Union into a "common European home." In return, he took a very tolerant stand when Kohl suggested joint interference in the affairs of the GDR in order to remove Honecker and encourage changes. A Russian historian and Gorbachev's principal foreign policy advisor Chernyaev contends that the joint FRG-USSR declaration deliberately singled out from the principles and norms of international rights to be observed, the "respect for the right of national self-determination." It was a hint that the Soviet Union would not oppose by force changes in East Germany. At the same time, Kohl

assured Gorbachev that he and his government did not want any destabilization of the GDR. This informal understanding was crucial for the subsequent peaceful reunification of Germany (Zubok, 2007, pp. 324-25).

Gorbachev was initially very much against the united Germany entering NATO. In May 1990 discussions at the Politburo, it was decided that under no circumstances should the Soviet Union agree to Germany's NATO membership. In fact, it is widely known that at the meeting Gorbachev had a very tough position even bursting out that "we will not let Germans into NATO and that is the end of it. I will even risk the collapse of the [CFE] negotiations in Vienna and START but will not allow this" (Adomeit, 2006, p. 10).

Despite such an entrenched position Gorbachev soon changed his attitude. The civil unrest caught up with the on-going diplomatic efforts. In 1989 after several weeks of civil unrest, GDR announced on 9 November 1989 that its citizens could visit West Germany and West Berlin. With that announcement the citizens of East Germany crossed and climbed onto the wall, joined by West Germans on the other side. Besides the huge symbolic and practical importance of the fall of the Berlin wall, another diplomatic breakthrough on the issue occurred at the Soviet-American Summit in Malta, in December 1989. In an interview by Adomeit, Chernyaev confirmed that the main reason behind the changed position was Baker's "**nine points**" and the personal diplomacy of George Bush (Adomeit, 2006, p. 11).

Baker's nine points otherwise referred to by Baker as "nine assurances" (Adomeit, 2006, p. 11) guaranteed USSR's security in terms of arms limitation as well as in distribution of forces, plus pledged enhanced economic cooperation. Notably, point 8 reflected in certain respects the Soviet calls for a Helsinki two conference:

"Enhancement of functions of the CSCE to ensure a significant role for the Soviet Union in Europe and linkage of a summit meeting of that organization with the finalization of a CFE treaty, both to take place at the end of 1990" (reprinted in Baker, 1995, pp. 250-251).

As Zubok observes, there was a rare harmony between Bush and Gorbachev in Malta in December 1989. One-to-one and almost effortlessly they agreed on all the main issues at their first official summit. Bush startled Gorbachev by beginning the discussion with the issue of the

“export of revolution” and the Soviet presence in Central America, instead of with Europe. The Americans were relieved when Gorbachev assured them that the Soviet Union “has no plans regarding spheres of influence in Latin America.” When the two leaders began to discuss the German Question, Gorbachev had an excellent opportunity to set the terms for the reunification of Germany and demand from Bush, in exchange for support for reunification, a firm commitment to the construction of “a common European home” with the simultaneous dissolution of the two military-political blocs as part of a new security structure. Instead, he just came down hard on Kohl’s “ten points” plan<sup>13</sup>, seeing in it a move by the West German chancellor to swallow the GDR. Final equation to which Gorbachev agreed was that it could not agree to Germany joining the NATO, but would agree to give the right to Germany to choose its own alliance:

“There are two German states, so history ordered. And let history now decide how the process should evolve and where it should lead to in the context of a new Europe and the new world” (Zubok, 2007, p. 329).

Final consent was given to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl during his visit to the USSR in July 1990. The so-called 8 points announced in Zheleznovodsk included the right of unified Germany to “decide freely and by itself which alliance it wants to belong to” and the non-extension of the NATO structures to the Eastern Germany as long as Soviet troops remained on its territory pending the full withdrawal (Adomeit, 2006, p. 16).

On November 9, Gorbachev visited Bonn to sign the new German-Soviet treaty with Kohl. That treaty became the first international agreement to be signed by the new united Germany. On June 17, 1991, Germany and Poland signed a treaty of “good neighborhood and friendly cooperation.” That treaty, signed fifty-two years after Hitler’s invasion of Poland and fifty years after his invasion of the Soviet Union, completed the series of agreements formally ending World War II and the Cold War (Smyser, 1999, p. 396).

As Asmus writes, there were four main reasons why Germany could not have agreed being unified but not being a member of NATO. First, USSR would have remained a major power and

---

<sup>13</sup> The document can be found from German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), German Historical Institute, Washington, DC. Available at:  
<[http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub\\_document.cfm?document\\_id=223](http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=223)>

the risk of future Governments attacking Germany could not have been excluded. Secondly, USSR was a nuclear power and unaligned, or neutral Germany could not have balanced nuclear threat without being a member of a strong Western alliance. Third, membership of NATO and close relations with the West was a guarantee of German democracy and, fourth, all other non-NATO alternative was rather costly for Germany and its neighbours (Asmus, 1990, p. 68).

The Atlantic Alliance started its reform process as early as 1990. At a meeting in London in July 1990, the NATO heads of state and of government announced that the alliance would adapt to the changed realities of the international system and at the same time they also declared that they would strive to build new partnerships with all the European nations. They wished to 'reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship'. They also emphasized the defensive nature of the alliance and announced that nuclear arms would be relegated to weapons of last resort. This reorientation also helped to make it possible for President Mikhail Gorbachev to acquiesce in NATO membership for a united Germany (Ganzle and Sens, 2007, p. 164).

Gorbachev displayed political courage when he realized that there was no chance of avoiding German membership in NATO. He therefore made up his mind to make the concession soon and on voluntary basis rather than being eventually forced to do so later (Wettig, 1993, p. 171).

Tuomas Forsberg argues that there are several explanations why Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had to acquiesce to the German membership of NATO. These explanations focus around the power, interests and trust. First argument is that USSR agreed due to the power politics and realpolitik calculations, as it had no power to swim against the tide. Second explanation would proceed from the notion of interests, i.e. USSR was interested in having stable and strong Germany as its crucial ally, in order to maintain its control of the processes in Europe. And finally, the main argument of Forsberg is that USSR simply trusted the Western leaders that unified Germany and membership of NATO was not to the detriment of Soviet interests (Forsberg, 1999, pp. 609-610).

There is also an argument among the scholars that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze agreed to German membership of NATO because they could not convince the Western states that not having Germany member of NATO would improve European Security. Some scholars even



argue that Gorbachev agreed to this during the meeting with Bush, when Bush directly asked him whether Germany had a right to choose its own alliance (Forsberg, 1999, p. 618).

### **The effects of ‘the new thinking’ and the Charter of Paris**

Gorbachev’s initiative caught the imagination of a whole continent and helped ignite East Europe’s far bolder initiative in demanding its own freedom. The outcome was that the Soviet Union was clipped of its East European buffer and alliance, which it had gained for its victory in World War II (Rosenfeld, 1990). As a result, at the end of 1989 Gorbachev’s dream to see in Eastern Europe the emergence of socialism with a human face had been largely compromised. In fact, Central and Eastern European states chose to join the family of European nations not through carrying forward with the Socialist model, but by adopting western model. Instead of patiently waiting for the Soviets and the West to construct “the common European home,” the GDR, along with all the countries of Central Europe, “hurled itself through the Berlin Wall” to join the West (Zubok, 2007, p. 326). In a similar way first Hungary and then Czechoslovakia opted for leaving the military structures of the Warsaw Pact (Rey, 2004, p. 56).

Archie Brown, a prominent historian and a principal researcher of Gorbachev’s era, concluded that it was hardly surprising that Gorbachev’s rhetoric caused the East European states to seek independence.<sup>14</sup> Although in the beginning Gorbachev mesmerized the whole world with his new vision and dictated the agenda of European politics, from 1988 he was no longer in charge of the unfolding events:

“...While Gorbachev’s words in 1988 had unintended consequences - at that time he still hoped to see reformist Communists with a similar outlook to his own come out on top in Eastern Europe - he had not in that year lost control, but was, on the contrary, making things happen. His decisions in 1988, in both domestic and foreign policy, were of decisive importance and a crucial stimulus to further change, whereas a year or two later he was increasingly responding to events...” (Brown, 1996, p. 225).

By the late 1989 the idea of Common European Home was largely exhausted, because of the political changes that had occurred in Eastern Europe and the inevitable reunification of

---

<sup>14</sup> Notably, Brown’s the Gorbachev Factor has no single mention of the CEH concept.

Germany. Last chance was given to the idea on the last day of 1989, when in a TV speech to French nation Francois Mitterrand put forward an idea of *European Confederation*. Mitterrand offered the union of all European states, including the Soviet Union into a common structure that would be based on the Helsinki Charter. Initial idea behind the Mitterrand's concept was to have an institutional architecture of a second sort outside of the European Communities, since not all states of Europe could join the EC. In February 1990, Mitterrand specified the architecture by pointing out the necessity to have "council of heads of states or governments, forming common institutions such as permanent secretary, a representative assembly, a European Court of Human Rights and a charter of minorities, coupled with mediation process for conflict resolution" (Rey, 2004, p. 58).

It can be stated that the entire Gorbachev campaign on Common European Home never materialized in the form intended. Gorbachev's idea of 'socialism with human face' in Eastern Europe did not happen as in the spring of 1990 Hungary and then Czechoslovakia and Poland left the Warsaw Pact. Already in January 1991, Visegrad States (where Soviet era dissidents had already come to power) plus Romania and Bulgaria, called for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Already on July 1, 1991 Vaclav Havel presided over the final dissolution of the Pact. At the meeting the Soviet Vice President Gennady Yanayev called for NATO to follow and dissolve itself. However, final communiqué simply called for a "transition to all-European structures." In May 1992, prominent European leaders: V. Havel, L. Walesa and J. Antall had officially bid for NATO membership and by the end of the year, all three countries had this goal already put into their National Security Strategies (Detailed discussion can be found in Asmus, 2002).

What came out as intended was another Helsinki type meeting, which unfolded in an already changed environment. This was of course Gorbachev's idea to call for such a conference. The call was then taken up by Western states as well, first and foremost by France, resulting in the Summit of the Heads of States held in Paris on 19–21 November 1990 which adopted *the Charter of Paris for a New Europe*.

The Charter stated that "the era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended... relations will be founded on respect and co-operation" and that "the Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe." The Charter was the first document, which enumerated the politically binding commitments and principles for the member states of the OSCE (Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 1990).

The participating States decided that political consultations at the level of Heads of State (Summits) would be held every two years, and that Ministerial-level councils would meet at least once a year. They agreed that high officials would meet occasionally as a Committee of Senior Officials. Charter of Paris also establishing the main bodies of the Organization - The Council of Ministers (known today as OSCE Ministerial), Conflict Prevention Center (today part of a Secretariat), a Committee of Senior Officials (currently the standing body of the OSCE - Permanent Council), Office of Free Elections (currently - Organization for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights - ODIHR) (Charter of Paris, OSCE official website, n.d.).

On November 19<sup>th</sup> another very important CSCE process, which started as the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting (1986 - 1989), was finalized. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed by 22 states (after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and partition of Czechoslovakia and dissolution of Yugoslavia it was eventually ratified by 30 states). The treaty established a military balance between the two groups of States by providing equal ceilings for major weapons and equipment systems, in the whole area from the Atlantic to the Urals (Detailed discussion of the CFE can be seen in Falkenrath, 1995 and Dunay, 1991).

It was believed in the academic circles and policy makers of Europe in the 1980's that the CSCE was the "only adequate geopolitical framework for restoring European unity" (Bogdan, 1989, 62). Soviet participation was essential for continued peace and stability in Europe. Therefore, it was not surprising that Mitterrand and other European leaders routed Gorbachev's idea. Initially, if Gorbachev and his team of policymakers sought to utilize the historic opportunity for ensuring continuous Soviet involvement and influence in European affairs, the US and European states have modified and molded the proposal to better reflect Europe's security concerns. As an outcome, the Paris Charter included principles that were deemed essential from the Western point of view: the principle of self-determination, the inviolability of borders, protection of the rights of individuals as well as peoples and particularly of minorities. The Western powers also made sure that a politically binding document was put in place that would serve as a guide for managing potential sub-state conflict situations in Europe (Flynn and Farell, 1999, 507).

### **Literature Review on the motives for the Common European Home**

Although the Soviet proposal for creating a common European home sounded like a futuristic idea infused with noble intentions, some of the existing literature suggests that Grobachev's

ideas were grounded in pragmatic Soviet considerations and interests.

It is widely asserted in the literature that it was the domestic factors that prompted Gorbachev's thinking on foreign policy and largely domestic processes within the USSR led to the change of international and particularly European security order in the end of the 1980s. In that context, Soviet power base was shrinking, demanding more realistic and manageable foreign agenda.

Bunce argues that "First, the reform process in the Soviet Union - that is, the decision to reform and the approach to reform - was heavily shaped by the interaction between domestic and international pressures and possibilities. Second, the Soviet reform process - mainly by design, but also in part by accident - has been the principal driving force behind the collapse of the post-war international order. Finally, the historical experience of the Soviet Union and, before that, of Russia, provides a clue to what seems to be driving this intense interaction between reform at home in the Soviet Union and transformation of the international system abroad. What seems to be crucial, to put the matter succinctly, is geographical location" (Bunce, 1991, p. 222).

Probably, it must go to Gorbachev's credit that he was quick and resolute in understanding the consequences of the decay of the Soviet bloc on the one hand and the parallel process of the economic integration of the West on the other. As Hoagland argues, he has advanced the "Common European Home" as a device to put Soviet relations with both halves of Europe on a new basis, to reduce the Soviet Union's burdens and risks in the East while increasing its access to capital and technology in the West. It is unknown if he intended all along to lessen the Soviet control in the East or whether events forced him onto this course. What is clear is that Gorbachev has consciously accepted a smaller and changed Soviet role in Europe in hopes of consolidating an eroding position at home (Hoagland, 1989/90, 36).

Gorbachev spoke of creating a 'common European home' for East and West, where all European countries could peacefully live in their adjacent rooms. Because he saw that the Soviet Union couldn't stop the national partitioning of the big ballroom in Eastern Europe, he hoped to influence the construction of the new house covering all of Europe. According to Lutikhuis, the calculation was that the moral authority as a reformer would bring Gorbachev and his country increasing influence in Western Europe, in exchange for the loss of influence in the East (Lutikhuis, n.d.).

Black argues that the overall objective at the heart of Moscow's European policy since the 1940's however, remained, to safeguard the territorial and political gains attained at such enormous cost in the final phase of World War II and to secure admission to, and influence in, the remainder of Europe. Confronted with a cohesive community of Western states able to arrest the advance of Soviet power beyond the line that came to demark the continent's division, the Soviets were forced to settle for their first objective - hegemony in the East to the long-term detriment of their second and institutionalized role in the West (1990/91, 89).

The fact that consolidating whatever power the Soviet Union had was not the least on Gorbachev's policy agenda is confirmed by the fact that he continually returned to the theme of the international standing and prestige of the Soviet Union in his speeches. For example, he has told the Twentieth Congress of the Komsomol youth league in April 1987 that the fundamental task for the Soviet Union was to enter the twenty-first century as a "mighty and thriving power" (Sherlock 2007, p. 32).

According to Graham Allison, Gorbachev understood pragmatically that the stagnating economy, ever increasing military expenditures and USSR's failure to have technologic progress would prevent the USSR to enter 21<sup>st</sup> century as a global power (Allison, 1988, p. 20). It is in this structural context that Gorbachev was entrusted to ensure that the Eurasian empire could remain a superpower in the twenty-first century (Burke, 1993, p. 156).

This was not an easy task as many factors played in determining the suitable foreign policy options for the ailing Union. First of all, Gorbachev needed a strong and supportive Europe and access to Western capital to deal successfully with the crises facing the Soviet Union (Bunce, 1991, 232). Second, USSR's geography and its proximity to Europe, its vast border with the Eastern Europe prompted it to react to the European issues, but obviously taking into account the processes that have been going on internally within the USSR (Bunce, 1991, 240).

It was not the first time of course Soviet or Russian leaders faced the challenge of maintaining their national security and interests. However, Gorbachev, many believe, played his hand in a different, almost radical way. It seemed that ideas and conceived notions were the major driving force behind his decision-making. Indeed, the role of ideas in the changing Soviet international behavior was great as Gorbachev took ideas too seriously. Zubok believes that ideas played an excessive role in his behavior. They took precedence not only over the immediate demands of

the negotiating process but also over the protection of state interests (Zubok, 2007, p. 309).

His style was different from his predecessor acting at such historical junctions. For example, unlike Stalin, Gorbachev preferred to talk about principles on which a new global order and a “common European home” should be based rather than to discuss the practicalities of a German settlement. Comparing the record of the Malta summit with the records of Stalin’s negotiations from 1939 to 1945 would make this difference much too evident (Zubok, 2007, p. 329). Authors are criticizing Gorbachev that his ‘new thinking’ became a goal in itself, a substitute for a ‘normal’ strategy of statesmanship. Gorbachev believed that his romantic schemes of common interests, nonuse of force, and the “common European home” amounted to a ticket for him and the USSR to join the community of “civilized nations” (Zubok, 2007, p. 331).

Ideas – the concepts and intellectual frameworks of Soviet academic specialists – mattered tremendously in the development of the “Gorbachev revolution”. He has managed to inject his own concepts, such as ‘international economic security’, ‘the common European home’, ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘national reconciliation’ into the lexicon of international discourse (Miller, 1991, p. 164).

Checkel for example, identifies the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in the USSR as crucial in developing the thinking and ideas behind Gorbachev’s foreign policy vision. Checkel argues that it was not the existing environment that fostered the new ideology, but rather the existing environment created opportunities in which these ideas found a way to the daylight. “The appearance of a new ideology in international affairs in Soviet policy under Gorbachev was in no way preordained by a changing international system or domestic modernization processes. Rather, a changing external environment and the advent of a reformist general secretary created a series of policy windows through which aspiring policy entrepreneurs jumped. These purveyors of new concepts and ideologies - individual academic specialists and heads of research institutes-did not, however, operate in a vacuum. They acted within institutional and political settings that at different times either constrained or enhanced their ability to influence policy” (Checkel, 1993, 273).

Miller believes that Gorbachev’s incessant trumpeting of the virtues of the ‘common European home’ was designed to prepare the psychological climate for upcoming change in the pattern of Soviet and American relations with the continent. There were three underlining reasons as to why the relations would change and the Union would not be able to keep up with the old

superpower rivalry. First, the threat of aggression from the West was virtually non-existent and was probably even exaggerated in the past. Second, there was a general acceptance of the proposition that a lowering of defense expenditures would be of substantial benefit to the struggling economies of all the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) countries, first and foremost among them the Soviet Union itself. Third, there was a growing appreciation in Moscow of the opportunities for the enhancement of Soviet economic and political influence in a substantially disarmed Europe with a correspondingly diminished American presence (Miller, 1991, 132-33).

There are also works, which makes a point that Gorbachev was not after ideals. Rather, the concept was presented as a diplomatic tool for driving a wedge between the United States and other NATO countries in 1985-86, then it was turned into rhetoric about Russian “return to Europe” and the rejection of Stalinist closed society. Basically, this literature upholds the idea that Gorbachev molded his concepts to the existing structural reality trying to get as much as he best could granted the existing constrains and the power balance in the world.

Hoagland maintains that Gorbachev had come to the strategic conclusion that the exercise of Soviet military power abroad including its armed interventions in Eastern Europe has led directly to the political and economic disasters afflicting the USSR. New interventions abroad would make it impossible to concentrate Soviet energies, including those of the military, on the difficult task of resuscitating the Soviet state and economy (Hoagland, 1989/90, 36).

However, the leading and urgent factor promoting change in Moscow’s European policy was the steep decline of the Soviet economy. The cost of maintaining the largest military establishment in the world, including 31 combat-ready divisions in eastern Europe equipped with the most modern weapons the Soviet system was capable of producing, was an enormous drain on the country’s industrial and technological resources (Blacker, 1990/91, 95). Unless the leadership was prepared to continue indefinitely the de facto military occupation of Eastern Europe, some modification of the existing relationship was essential. Compelling the region’s allegiance at gunpoint was enormously expensive, both politically and materially (Blacker, 1990/91, 98).

Gorbachev even referred to this situation in his Strasbourg Speech:

“We also realized that the colossal burden of armaments and the atmosphere of confrontation did not just obstruct Europe’s normal development, but at the same time

prevented our country - economically, politically and psychologically - from being integrated into the European process and had a deforming impact on our own development....” (Gorbachev,1989).

European leaders have found the formula intriguing and attractive although they did not know all its implications. He had told them that he wanted true “peaceful coexistence,” not merely a new form of class struggle, and had hinted that he wanted to negotiate real cuts in military arsenals. This approach had worked, as Thatcher had told Reagan that she liked Gorbachev and that one could do business with him (Smyser, 1999, p. 305).

To prove that his intentions were true, Gorbachev had some real changes to make. He withdrew Soviet forces from Afghanistan starting in mid-1988 as well as started withdrawing Soviet forces from Europe. At the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1988, he announced that the Soviet Union by 1991 would unilaterally withdraw and disband six tank divisions in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Moscow would withdraw such offensive personnel and equipment as assault-landing troops and bridging equipment, leaving in place only purely defensive units and equipment. It would remove a total of 50,000 troops, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft from all Warsaw Pact countries and from the contiguous areas of the Soviet Union. Those who might have worried that the INF treaty would permit Soviet forces to overrun Europe could see Soviet military superiority melt before their eyes (Smyser, 1999, p. 308). Moreover, Shevardnadze was convinced that that it would be “catastrophic” to use Soviet forces to try to reestablish control over East Germany and that the Soviet Union could not afford to continue foreign and defense policies that cost 25 percent of its gross domestic product (Smyser , 1999, p. 390).

Besides the difficulties of maintaining the military presence, Gorbachev was faced with a souring people’s resentment of the Soviet presence and objection to the political and economic systems imposed on them. He as a leader was faced with a dilemma “how to make this volatile and fervently nationalist region stable without tolerating genuine autonomy; how to permit movement toward autonomy and hence stability without losing control. No Soviet leader has found a magic formula to reconcile such incompatible goals” (Gati, 1987, 969). As Bialer and Afferica noted in 1985, “although Soviet leaders know there will be no retreat from the domination of Eastern Europe, they have yet to determine the objectives and sequence of specific policies, for indeed there are no clear and safe choices“ (Bialer and Afferica, 1985, p.



629). Economic problems started to soar. The growth of Eastern Europe's gross national product fell below that of the Soviet Union, while the standard of living declined in three Eastern European countries and stagnated in two others for several years in a row (Bialer and Afferica, 1985, p. 629).

Hence, the Soviet initiative was seen by many scholars as an attempt to solve accumulating problems. Asmus noted that "Gorbachev's vision of a Common European Home was predicated on the belief that reform in Eastern Europe could be controlled and that reformist communist parties would continue to play an important role in their countries' politics, including in the G.D.R" (Asmus, 1990, p. 70).

Basically, Gorbachev had understood that the Red Army could hold the land but could not hold the people. And holding the land had become prohibitively expensive. For this reason he made clear that he would accept change in the Soviet satellite system. In September 1986, the Soviet Union signed the Stockholm agreement promising to refrain from the threat or use of force in its relations with any state, regardless of that state's political system. Gorbachev made his point even more clear in his Strasbourg speech in July 1989, when he said that the social and political order of European countries was "entirely a matter for the peoples themselves and of their choosing." He excluded the possibility of using force within the "common European home," either "by one alliance against another, within alliances, or anywhere else." In effect, he told the leaders of the satellite regimes to make their peace with their own people for the Red Army would not keep them in power. Gorbachev did not want to keep the Brezhnev Doctrine. Kremlin spokesman Gennady Gerasimov called this philosophy "the Sinatra Doctrine," after Frank Sinatra's song "I Did It My Way" (Smyser, 1999, 327-328).

This policy line was strengthened by Soviet foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze who in his address to the 28<sup>th</sup> CPSU congress stated that the Soviet Union had lost eastern Europe not when it had launched Perestroika but when it had destroyed support for its own cause with the invasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979 (Smyser, 1999, p. 390).

Shevardnadze's acknowledgement of the right of Warsaw Pact Organization members to political independence, the condemnation of Soviet invasions and Gorbachev's rhetoric about the 'common European home' definitely stimulated the erosion of communist rule. By the end of the year, established communist governments had been replaced throughout most of the region. The

psychological impact of this on the broad Soviet elite was profound, further undermining their confidence by calling into question the survivability of a Soviet style political structure, while the position Gorbachev adopted internationally of supporting the right of countries to determine their own futures gave impetus to nationalist sentiments within the USSR (Gill and Markwick, 2000, p. 76).

Besides the need for military cooperation and political affiliation with Europe, the main thrust of Soviet economic policy toward Western Europe and the European Economic Community (EEC) was the potential for binding economic linkages and the eventual political leverage that was expected to flow for the long-term Soviet interests.

Undoubtedly a major factor was the nearing of the year 1992, when a major threshold of integration of the European Community would have been achieved. Gorbachev sought to conclude arrangement through the 'common European home' idea before it would be too late and all dealings with upcoming European Community (EC) would have to be conducted en bloc, through a supranational EC bureaucracy (Miller, 1991, p. 72).

As a first offer, Gorbachev called for a complete pan-European integration that would eventually replace the existing economic groups, through a step-by-step union between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and EEC (Rey, 2004, p. 40). Gorbachev wished, as expressed in his speeches discussed above, to have COMECON and the EC negotiate en bloc and develop cooperative networks. However, the dramatic events starting from autumn of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the complete dissolution of the Soviet bloc from 1991 have buried the envisioned opportunity

There is a price to be paid for Western Europe's acceptance of his bid for tenancy, or 'co-ownership', as Francois Mitterand has called it, of the 'common European home', and Gorbachev is evidently prepared to go a considerable way towards paying it, although both sides are still obviously dickering over the precise terms and conditions of cohabitation (Miller, 1991, p. 89)

As Lukyanov observes, Moscow's ambitions were split along opposing paths. Russia either could become a competitor to Europe in the global arena — as the Soviet Union essentially was along with its Warsaw Pact allies — or else become a full-fledged member of Europe on an equal basis with Brussels — a second power center within a common European house. It seemed

that Gorbachev contemplated the second option, but the collapse of the Soviet Union buried those hopes (Lukyanov, 2010).

## **Chapter Summary**

This chapter aimed to explore the third historical episode – the Gorbachev CEH concept, the environment and the relationships in which the concept was introduced and the subsequent outcome. The goal was to flesh out two important tendencies: First, that the named third historical episode was similar to the first two historical episodes (the 1950's the Stalin/Molotov proposals and the 60's and 70's Soviet/Warsaw Pact proposals) in several clearly discernible ways and second – the pattern of similarity and hence the continuity occurred despite the change of leadership, their foreign policy methods and most importantly the governing ideology.

The chapter traced the historical period from 1985, when Gorbachev was appointed as the General Secretary of the Communist Party. The research showed that he inherited an ailing Soviet economy, a failed détente with extremely tense East-West relations and the world at the brink of a nuclear standoff. The research showed that from the beginning of assuming power Gorbachev had been resolute that the problem lay in the dogmatic approach held by the USSR and desired to change that.

In such a way, Gorbachev started to reconsider many ideological linchpins of the Soviet foreign Policy such as the Leninist principle of peaceful co-existence and retracted from Brezhnev's doctrine. Already from 1984 and onwards, Gorbachev's numerous speeches dwelt on the idea of common values of human kind, common threats and indivisibility of European security because of increasing interdependence of agendas of the European states. Such re-conceptualized and differently worded appeals were presented as the so-called "new thinking" in February 1986 during the 27<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU. The CEH concept was a part and parcel of this new policy.

First major preview and the philosophical underpinnings of the CEH concept came in October 1985. Gorbachev's long speech in Paris was a first unified and clear message to the West that the Soviet Union was changing its philosophy across a full spectrum of its political, security and economic agenda. However, the proposed overhaul in the USSR's security policy was contingent

upon such milieu goal the need to avoid the catastrophe of a nuclear war, which demanded vigorous cooperation in the security sphere.

Building on the good image he had created from proposing concessions in the security sector, Gorbachev demanded a change in the relations between Europe and the USSR, stating that the political climate largely depended on the development of economic relations between the East and the West and called for a more “business like” relations between the CMEA and the EEC.

Already in 1988 Gorbachev called for a new world order from the UN General Assembly rostrum which would be based on the ‘freedom of choice’ of nations – a concept completely alien to the previous Soviet leadership. A more fleshed out version of the CEH was presented during Gorbachev’s speech before the Council of Europe in 1989 in which a major theme was ‘freedom of choice’ and subsequent renouncement of the Brezhnev doctrine by Gorbachev. In terms of the essence Soviet leader named security issues as the foundation of the European home and the “all-round co-operation” as “its bearing frame” (Gorbachev, 1989). In terms of cooperation, economic sphere was highlighted and expressed interest in “the emergence of a vast economic space from the Atlantic to the Urals where Eastern and Western parts would be strongly interlocked” based on the relations between Western regional organisations — the European Community, EFTA, and the CMEA...” (*Ibid.*). In order to “contemplate future stages of progress towards a European Community of the twenty-first century” Gorbachev called for a second Helsinki type meeting in the next one or two years, with the US and Canadian participation.

Although the proposal had been put on the table relations throughout the 1985-86 period revolved around superpower relationship and the European states showed no interest for the proposed concept. The concept itself evolved in conjunction with other security, political and economic diplomatic efforts that had key importance for the West. Namely:

Gorbachev, pressed by internal challenges, announced in April 1985 and again in 1986 a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing as well as proposed a series of concrete measures aimed at arms reduction. In November 1985 Gorbachev met US President Reagan in Geneva, and in October 1986 at the Reykjavik summit, where the sides almost finalized the agreement on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. The INF agreement was reached in December 1987. In 1988 Soviet army started to pull out of Afghanistan. In another

move Gorbachev explicitly renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine. Moreover, the Soviet troops did not interfere when various Eastern European countries preceded to takeover their communist governments.

The year 1989 marked the next stage of intensification in Soviet campaign, especially as the talks on the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty was underway. Soviet Union was also alarmed by the approaching deadline for the 'single market' and looked for ways to make venues for continent wide cooperation in trade as well as other forms of economic cooperation.

In that setting, the German unification issue was advanced as a goal without any alternatives by the Western countries. Gorbachev was initially against the united Germany entering NATO. However, the new thinking had caused social upheaval, which coupled with strong diplomatic efforts from the GFR and the U.S. caused Gorbachev to change his attitude. After the fall of the Berlin wall German reunification took place on October 3 1990. It is a widely held scholarly opinion that Gorbachev displayed a political courage when he realized that there was no chance of avoiding German membership in NATO. He therefore made up his mind to make the concession soon and on voluntary basis rather than being eventually forced to do so later.

Basically, the real positive shift towards the idea of Common European Home occurred among the Western leaders once it became obvious that in principle the Soviet Union would agree to enhancing the concept of security beyond hard security and would include not only human rights issues, but also cooperation in the economic and technical fields.

It can be stated that the entire Gorbachev campaign on Common European Home never materialized in the form intended. Gorbachev's idea of 'socialism with human face' in Eastern Europe did not happen as in the spring of 1990 Hungary and then Czechoslovakia and Poland left the Warsaw Pact. Soon the Pact dissolved and shortly after the former Pact members called for their membership in NATO.

What came out in the spirit of Gorbachev's appeal was another Helsinki type meeting in Paris in 1990, however, the content of this conference was different from what had Gorbachev intended. In spite of the goal sought by the Soviet Union, which was to ensure continuous Soviet involvement and influence in European affairs, the US and European states have modified and molded the proposal to better reflect the existing historical environment and security needs. As

an outcome, the Paris Charter included principles that were deemed essential for entire Euro-Atlantic area: the principle of self-determination, the inviolability of borders, protection of the rights of individuals as well as peoples and particularly of minorities.

Hereby, it would be relevant to address the issue of similarity between the covered historical episodes. Like the previous two instances, with the CEH concept the Soviet Union aimed to lessen its own internal problems (economic and social); maintain its existing sphere of influence and in addition acquire representation in the European institutions without the need to change the founding principles and values of the organization of its society and politics. The proposal in all three cases was to initiate this groundbreaking changes through a new and overarching security order in Europe, introduced by a major security conference.

A notable difference between the third and first two historical episodes under study is the considerable short time span in which the concept of CEH was introduced and evolved; however, this does not diminish the evidence presented by this thesis – the aims of all three historical campaigns were strikingly similar and had similar goals, as described above.

Apart from having similar goals, there were three issues that were at stake in the course of these proposals throughout the three historical episodes:

1. The question of the U.S. and Canadian participation in the proposed new European order;
2. The question of dissolution of the military blocs and
3. The German question.

All three cases display a similar pattern: at an initial stage the Soviet Union had tried to either outright exclude or attempt to alienate the U.S. and Canadian participation from its proposed new order. Only after meeting a strict resistance from the European States the Soviet leadership in all three cases retracted its initial position and welcomed U.S. and Canadian participation in the Conference. In regards to the second question an initial call in all three instance was to dissolve the military blocs, however, after meeting resistance or being labeled as utopian, the initiative in each case evolved into similarly impracticable suggestions of closer cooperation between the two blocs (security as well as economic) with competing ideologies and social order. In Terms of the German question as well, the initial Soviet reaction was to maintain its

dominance in Eastern Germany and attempt to spread the influence in West Germany or compete and try to show the superiority of the social order in the East.

Throughout each historical episode, the pattern is that the Soviet Union advances, at a time of its own internal security, political and economic weakness, an overarching proposals aimed at creating an ideal type security order in Europe, reinforced by a binding security treaty (The CEH concept never developed at such details albeit due to parallel process of unraveling of the Eastern bloc and eventually the Soviet Union). The outcome was reached only after major Soviet concessions, after which Euro-Atlantic states were willing to sit around a table and hammer out principles which were vital to the stability and security of the Transatlantic area: the principle of self-determination, the inviolability of borders, non-use of force and protection of human rights.

Most importantly, this thesis finds that the governing Soviet elite, always supported and inspired by the country's foreign ministry, proposed a similar concept regarding the European Security order despite huge changes in the security and political landscape: The first proposal was made at a time of severe antagonism with the West (Stalin/Molotov proposals); at time of détente (during the late 60's and 70's) and at times of failed détente and with a background of tectonic ideological changes in the Soviet government during the Gorbachev period (the CEH proposal).

In the next two chapters this thesis will aim to show that similar proposal (in terms of the goals sought and tactics used) was again put forth by the successor state to the Soviet Union – the Russian Federation – on two distinct occasions: during the Yeltsin period and during the Medvedev period.

#### **Chapter 4 Conclusions**

In the third historical period (1985-1990) that represents one set of a single case study the Soviet Union renewed the campaign for collective European security architecture called the “common European home”, however there are number of important divergences in tactics and rhetoric as well as goals sought. Despite, several key goals remain that can be considered as continuous from previous campaigns.

**What were the concrete initiatives of the Soviet Union *vis a vis* the preferred way of organization of the European Security?**

- The Soviet initiatives under M. Gorbachev were not provided in the form of a draft text as during the 1<sup>st</sup> period under study or in the form of communiqué's and memorandums as in the second period under study, but rather, were voiced mainly as part of the official speeches by M. Gorbachev and then were taken up in diplomatic negotiations or meetings.
- Collectively, the initiative could be called a “common European Home” initiative and can be seen as evolving over the span these speeches: Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in France titled “For a peaceful future of Europe and of all mankind” (1985); Speech made in Prague, titled “For a ‘common European home’, for a new way of thinking” (1987) and a “Europe as a Common Home” speech given in Strasbourg at the Council of Europe (1989).

**What were major Soviet preferences *vis a vis* European Security architecture across the identified historical episode?**

**First wave of ideas (1985-86)**

- Soviet Unilateral concessions in terms of IRBM disarmament, proposals for a complete abolition of offensive space weapons, decrease by 50 percent of the strategic offensive weapons, complete abolition of chemical weapons and stockpiles and active participation under the Geneva disarmament conference (Gorbachev, 1987).
- Change in relations between Europe and the USSR and call for the development of economic relations and intertwining of institutions such as CMEA and EEC.
- Readiness to emphasize Human Rights.

**Second wave of ideas (1988-88)**

- Again, the importance of a wide scale talks of the CSCE foreign ministers for the purpose of radical downsizing of tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. Need for nuclear and chemical weapons free zones and corridors in Central Europe and readiness to comply with such an agreement.



- The Soviet readiness to enhance the concept of security beyond hard security and include human rights issues.
- Under Western insistence, the shift in Gorbachev’s thinking on European issues, including the German question, NATO and acceptance of a place for the United States and Canada in the “common European home.”

### **Third wave of ideas (1989)**

- Embracing the notion of the ‘freedom of choice’ and subsequent renouncement of the Brezhnev doctrine;
- A common European home to rule out the probability of an armed clash and the very possibility of the use or threat of force
- The emergence of a vast economic space from the Atlantic to the Urals where Eastern and Western parts would be strongly interlocked based on the relations between Western regional organisations — the European Community, EFTA, and the CMEA.
- Holding of a second Helsinki type meeting with the US and Canadian participation.

### **What were the Soviet/Russian end goals when proposing these initiatives?**

- At an initial stage, preserving the Helsinki geopolitical order would serve as the foundation for reconfirming the territorial borders (particularly the Oder-Neisse boundary), maintaining the two Germanys and the Soviet sphere of influence in the Eastern front.
- The widest possible disarmament (nuclear, chemical and conventional) was first and foremost needed to take away the financial burden the Union could no longer bare; second, this possibly could lead to the disappearance of military blocs and alliances and establishment of collective security.
- The pan-European economic, trade and cultural cooperation was a needed goal due to growing economic and social problems.
- Consolidating the Soviet power was an objective as well as proved by Gorbachev’s continuous return to the theme of the international standing and prestige of the Soviet Union in his speeches.

### **What were the factors that resulted in failure of cooperation over the proposed initiative?**

- The very initiatives and sets of ideas that made such grand rapprochement between the West and the Soviet Union possible clipped the Soviet Union of its East European buffer zone and alliance, which it had gained for its victory in World War II. Socialism with a human face became compromised as Central and Eastern European states chose to join the family of European nations not through carrying forward with the Socialist model, but by adopting western model.
- Gorbachev mesmerized the whole world with his new vision and largely defined the agenda of European politics but from 1988 he was no longer in charge of the unfolding events.

### **What are the factors that contributed to certain outcomes as a result of these initiatives?**

- Gorbachev responded to the challenge of maintaining the Union's national security interests in a different, almost radical way. The ideas and conceived notions were the major driving force behind his decision-making. Big ideas such as Common European Home took precedence over the immediate demands and traditional ways of protection of state interests.
- The leading and urgent factor however, promoting change in Moscow's European policy was the steep decline of the Soviet economy and huge military burden it could no longer withstand.
- To prove that his intentions were true, Gorbachev had some real changes to make which he did in terms of many unilateral concessions in disarmament and troop withdrawals, German unification and its NATO membership and the overall conciliatory rhetoric.
- Calls for closer economic cooperation where warranted by the nearing of the year 1992, when a major integration of the European Community would be achieved.
- With on-going reformist movements in the sphere of Soviet influence it was needed to permit movement toward autonomy without tolerating genuine autonomy and keeping stability without losing control. Hence the 'common European home' idea was developed to hold things together.

In conclusion of this chapter it can be stated that Gorbachev's new thinking and perestroika coupled with the Common European Home proposal materialized into some type of Helsinki two conference, the Summit of the Heads of States held in Paris on 19–21 November 1990 adopting *the Charter of Paris for a New Europe*. The Charter enumerated the politically binding commitments and principles for the member states of the OSCE, established frequency of consultations, Councils and Summits and established number of bodies that would be in charge of such issues as conflict prevention and free elections. Another important outcome of the new thinking and subsequent security policy was the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on November 19, 1990. The treaty established a military balance between the two groups of States by providing equal ceilings for major weapons and equipment systems, in the whole area from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Undoubtedly, the Soviet redefinition of hostile rhetoric, ideas and actions met a rational, realistic and open-minded Western attitude. The joint efforts put in place the political toolbox needed for the peaceful development of European politics. However, the next decade proved that the progress was not without threats of a setback and Russia returned to the decades old concerns for regulated an area of hard security in Europe.

## References

- Adomeit, H., 2006. *Gorbachev's consent to Unified Germany's Membership in NATO*, Working paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, [online] Available at: [http://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Consent\\_to\\_Nato\\_ks.pdf](http://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/Consent_to_Nato_ks.pdf) [Accessed on December 21, 2012].
- Allison Jr. G. T., 1988. Testing Gorbachev, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 18-32.
- Asmus, R. D., 1990. A United Germany, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 63-76.
- Asmus, R. D., 2002. *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Baker, J., 1995. *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992*. New York: Putnam.
- Bialer, S. and Afferica. J., 1985. The Genesis of Gorbachev's World, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 605-644.
- Blacker, C. D., 1989/90. The Collapse of Soviet Power in Europe, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1.
- Bogdan, C., 1989. Crossing the European Divide, *Foreign Policy*, No. 75, pp. 56-75.
- Bunce, V., 1991. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold War, *International Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 220-241.
- Burke, J. F., 1993. Gorbachev's Eurasian Strategy, *World Affairs*, Vol. 155, No. 4, pp. 156-168.
- Brown, A., 1996. *The Gorbachev Factor*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Charles Gati, C., 1987. Gorbachev and Eastern Europe, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 5.
- Charter of Paris for a New Europe. 1990. OSCE Official website. [online] Available at: <http://www.osce.org/mc/39516?download=true> [Accessed on July 10, 2015].
- Checkel, J., 1993, Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution, *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 2.
- Dunay, P., 1991. *The CFE Treaty: History, Achievements and Shortcomings*, PRIF Reports.
- Doder, D. and Branson, L., 1990. *Gorbachev: heretic in the kremlin*, New York: Viking.
- Falkenrath, A. R., 1995. *Shaping Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Flynn, G. and Farrell, H., 1999. Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the "Construction" of Security in Post-Cold War Europe, *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 3.

- Forsberg, T., 1999. Power, Interests and Trust: Explaining Gorbachev's Choices at the End of the Cold War, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 4.
- Gill, G. and Markwick, R. D., 2000. *Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Glad, B., 1996. Passing the Baton: Transformational Political Leadership from Gorbachev to Yeltsin; from de Klerk to Mandela, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-28.
- Goldstein, S. J. and Freeman R. J., 1990. *Three-way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gorbachev, M., 1985. Interview with Time Magazine, *Pravda*, 1 Sept., 1st ed.
- Gorbachev, M., 1987–1990. *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, 7 volumes. Moscow: Politizdat.
- Gorbachev, M., 1987. *Perestroika i novoe myshlenye dlya nashei strany i dlya vsego mira*. Moscow: Politizdat.
- Gorbachev, M., 1989. 'Address Given by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Council of Europe'. [online] Available at: <[http://www.ena.lu/address\\_given\\_mikhail\\_gorbachev\\_council\\_europejuly\\_1989-03-11160](http://www.ena.lu/address_given_mikhail_gorbachev_council_europejuly_1989-03-11160)> [Accessed on July 10, 2015].
- Gorbachev, M., 2000. *On My Country and the World*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hoagland, J., 1989/90. Europe's Destiny, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1.
- Holloway, D. 1988/1989. Gorbachev's New Thinking, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 1, America and the World, pp. 66-81.
- Isaacson, W., 1988. "The Gorbachev Challenge", *Time Magazine*, December 19
- Lukyanov, F., 2010. *Gorbachev's Abandoned 'European Home'*, [online] Available at: [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/n\\_14661](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/n_14661) [Accessed on January, 7, 2013].
- Luttikhuis, B., Top European, Europe and me magazine, issue N 08, n. d. [online] Available at: <http://www.europeandme.eu/8brain/453-top-european-mikhail-gorbachev-autumn-of-nations> [Accessed on August 12, 2012].
- Rey, M. P., 2004. Europe is Our Common Home: A study of Gorbachev's Diplomatic Concept, *Cold War History*, Vol 4. No 2.
- Rosenfeld, S. S., 1990. The Summit: So Much For Gorbachev's "Common European Home", [online] Available at: <http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19900603&slug=10752> [Accessed on September 10, 2012].
- Sherlock, T., 2007. *Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia. Destroying the Settled Past, Creating an Uncertain Future*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Wettig, G., 1993. Moscow's Acceptance of NATO: The Catalytic Role of German Unification, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 45, p. 6.
- Zelikow, P. and Rice, C., 1995. *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed. A Study in Statecraft*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Zubok, V. M., 2007. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

## **CHAPTER 5: The Yeltsin-Kozyrev quest for Pan-European Security architecture and the Creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)**

### **Introduction**

The aim of this chapter is to explore the fourth historical episode which the thesis claims bears similarity to the four other episodes explored in a sense that despite the lapse of time, change of leadership, complete jettisoning of communism and one party ideology the attitude of Russian governing elites towards European security architecture remained similar: Russia demanded NATO's transformation and creation of a pan-European collective security system in which Russia would enjoy a veto power.

Notably, the study focuses on the most tumultuous period – the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of fifteen new republics in its place, with Russia featuring as a *primus inter pares* among them. The chapter explores the fourth episode under study via analysis of primary sources, such as declarations, official statements and letters as well as secondary sources, which provide explanations of the historical episode under study.

### **Yeltsin-Kozyrev campaign for changing the European Security architecture**

#### **The background in which the campaign unfolded**

Starting from the second half of 1980's in parallel to the Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost reforms, Soviet constituent republics, first and foremost the Baltic States but also the South Caucasian states, Ukraine and Belarus started independence movements and demanded freedom from Soviet control. On December 8, 1991 leaders of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine met in Belovezhskaya Pushcha (name of a forest in Belarus) to declare the dissolution of the Soviet Union and creation of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as its successor, sealed by the "Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent State". On December 21, 1991, while meeting in Alma Ata, eight other former Soviet Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) joined the CIS (Georgia joined only two years later as a result of Russia's various tactics to bring Georgia in). Disappointed and disempowered Gorbachev resigned on December 25, handing over its powers – including control of the Soviet nuclear missile codes – to Russian

President Boris Yeltsin (who had been elected as the President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on 12 June, 1991). On that day the Soviet flag flew over the Kremlin for the last time (for a thorough discussion of the dissolution of the Soviet Union see Gvosdev, 2008).

Of course the Alliance itself was grappling with the transpiring reality of the on-going dissolution of the Soviet Union. At the NATO Rome Summit on November 9, the Heads of State and Governments of the member countries spoke of a completely new chapter in NATO history in which they would work “toward *a new European security architecture* in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other” (Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, 1991). This was a completely new reality indeed that had changed from bloc to bloc enmity to rapprochement and deepening of cooperation. NATO was offering to the crumbling Soviet Union to work together for European security using a framework of ‘interlocking institutions’ in Europe and North America, in which institutions such as NATO, CSCE, EC, WEU and the CoE would take up complementary roles to prevent instability and division (Ibid.,).

The same Summit, also for the very first time in NATO history, unveiled a new Strategic Concept based on total realization of the new European reality. It reaffirmed NATO’s core functions, but also stated that the weight of defence would fall on political means:

“Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance’s objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater. Consequently, our security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. The use, as appropriate, of these elements will be particularly important to prevent or manage crises affecting our security” (Ibid.,).

In accordance to the burgeoning spirit of cooperation with the camp of former adversaries, on December 20, 1991 NATO launched a brand new format – the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which met as a group comprising of the Alliance and former Warsaw Pact states plus the Soviet Union, which was represented by its Ambassador to Belgium, Nikolai N. Afanasyevsky. Before the end of the first Council sitting Mr. Afanasyevsky, after receiving an urgent call from Moscow, shocked the foreign ministers by announcing that the Soviet Union no longer existed, and that he had been ordered to delete all references to the “Soviet Union” from



the final communiqué (Friedman, 1991). However, this was not the only shocking moment of the NACC meeting that day. The Soviet Representative read out an address on behalf of President Yeltsin at the meeting. The message welcomed the prospect of cooperation and most importantly, raised a question of Russia's membership in NATO:

“We consider these relations to be very serious and wish to develop this dialogue in each and every direction, both on the political and military levels. Today we are raising a question of Russia's membership in NATO, however regarding it as a long-term political aim” (Friedman, 1991).

That statement was scandalous on many levels as it was unexpected, in the nick of time and hard to fathom as a possible reality at that point. For the Allies, the immediate concerns were that if they did it for Russia, they would also need to do it for the former Warsaw Pact members as well. From such an early perspective, that was seen as threatening NATO's institutional viability and was impossible to be discussed seriously; officials were not ready to dilute a healthy and developing institution in exchange for a mere promise of democracy and peace. Notably, from the Russian perspective, the specific membership request has not been undertaken or pursued beyond the letter mentioned above nor have the Allies acted on that request, hence no concrete talk of Russia's imminent membership in NATO followed. However, that letter did show a characteristic Russian yearning to be a part of the existing European and Euro-Atlantic institutional arrangements.

At the end, the inaugural NACC meeting agreed to hold annual meeting as well as bi-monthly meetings at the Ambassadorial level; additional meetings at ministerial level or Ambassadors of liaison partners, as circumstances warrant as well as meetings, at regular intervals, with liaison partners and NATO committees (see North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership And Cooperation, 1991). Basically, NATO was in tune of the on-going pace of events in Europe not only rhetorically but practically as well.

Just like the Rome declaration, the NACC statement also underscored for the new European security architecture to be built on interlocking network of institutions, in which the CSCE's role was specifically promoted:

“We are determined to make another substantial contribution to our shared goal: a Europe whole and free. Our new joint undertaking will contribute to strengthening the role of the CSCE and to the achievement of its objectives without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms. We seek an architecture for the new Europe that is firmly based on the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris“ (North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership And Cooperation, 1991).

Half a year after being elected and couple of months after the attempted August putsch, the President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Boris Yeltsin took away the steering wheel from Gorbachev, basing his political platform on the complete jettisoning of the Communist ideology and Soviet politics, declaring as the new aim to build a democratic and economically viable Russian state.

By the end of November 1991, Yeltsin wrote a letter to President George Bush of the United States, in which he unequivocally declared:

“Russia is breaking with the Communist past. The total regime has been crushed. A new democratic state system is in the making, one that is based on supremacy of law, the principle of free elections and political pluralism. For the first time in its history Russia has a real chance to integrate into the international community of democratic law-governed states” (Letter from Yeltsin to Bush, 1991, p. 1).

Yeltsin also announced that the primary preoccupation of his government was “the success of the economic reform.” In this task, Yeltsin saw no other partner than the “outside assistance” from the “community of developed democratic countries.” He maintained, “we are confident that these countries will be able to play its historic role in reviving a free and democratic Russia” (Ibid., p. 2).

Moreover, Yeltsin declared that he “positively assesses the outcome of the session of the NATO Council in Rome. *We are in support of the NATO efforts to build a new system of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok...* We welcome the decision by the NATO Council to establish the Atlantic council on cooperation and intend to get involved in the work of this body” (Ibid., p. 4).

Notably, Russian side called for Russia's "return to the world civilization" and that "a reformed and democratic Russia" would "become a guarantee of stability in the world" (p. 4).

However, the dream of democratization and economic recovery became overburdened by difficulty of the tasks ahead as well as failures in executing them effectively. The situation inherited was extremely dire: exhausted foreign reserves, hyperinflation and budget deficit that totalled to about 20 percent of the GDP. To take up the problem, Yeltsin surrounded himself with young technocrats, led by Yegor Gaidar, who together with foreign advisors devised a program known as "shock therapy" which, however, failed to achieve desired results. Instead, a new class of 'robber barons' emerged and crime and corruption became widespread. According to Talbott, the most incapacitating flaw of the Russian reform was the absence of cordial cooperation between the government and the Parliament. Already by early 1992, the Parliament consisted of about three hundred democrats and the rest were communists and ultranationalists. The communist group leader was Yeltsin's own vice-president Alexander Rutskoi. As Talbott recalls, Rutskoi had a large map of the USSR on the wall of his office and liked to tell visitors: "That's the past, but it's also the future" (2002, p. 30).

Another principal adversary was Ruslan Khazbulatov, Yeltsin's former deputy and successor as speaker of the Supreme Soviet. Khazbulatov was supported by Georgi Arbatov, who had incidentally participated in the opening of the Soviet society but now, personally embittered, sided with the reactionary forces (*ibid.*, p. 30).

'The Russian question' had become a subject of the pre-election campaign in the United States. Presidential candidate for democrats Bill Clinton had been pressing Bush for being "overly cautious on the issue of aid to Russia" (Talbott, 2002, p. 31). Bush in turn had worked with G-7 countries to pull resources and expertise to aid immense economic problems in Russia and other Soviet Republics. Eventually, on April 1, 1992 Bush had conducted a press conference dubbed 'today we must win peace' in which he announced a massive assistance comprised of three components: first component was a multilateral effort, with active US participation, to put together a USD 24 billion package of assistance (mainly aimed at currency stabilization and economic reconstruction). Second component was a bill to be tabled in congress called the Freedom Support Act (FSA), which would authorize a U.S. quota increase of USD 12 billion for the I.M.F. The I.M.F. and World Bank would be the primary source of funding for the major financial assistance needs of the new governments in the former Soviet expanse. Third

component was the addition of USD 1.1 billion in new Commodity Credit Corporation credit guarantees for the purchase of American agricultural products to the already granted USD 3.75 billion by the U.S. since January 1991. Six hundred million dollars of that would go for U.S. sales to Russia, and an additional USD 500 million for U.S. sales to Ukraine and other states (New York Times, April 2, 1992).<sup>15</sup>

Part of the newly started cooperation process was to be the continuation in the sphere of arms control. The most pressing issue was further reductions to strategic arms, hence the needed follow-up to the START treaty. Negotiations for the START II treaty began in the winter of 1992 and were over in just five months (Notably, it took 15 months to finalize START I). The agreement focused on the limit of the strategic nuclear warheads and destruction of the delivery systems. The agreement was signed on January 3, 1993. It called for the reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both countries to 3000-3,500. The major concession made by Russia in START II was an agreement to eliminate all land-based ICBM's armed with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's) while the United States was permitted to retain the heart of its strategic force – multiple-armed warheads in submarines. The date for completing the reduction in warheads and prohibited missiles was 2003. Both Presidents made solemn speeches at the signing ceremony, commanding START II as of greater magnitude and historic (The President's News Conference With President Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow, January 3, 1993).

While the President-elect Bill Clinton endorsed the agreement in full, on the Russian domestic front the picture was not as homogeneous. Donaldson *et al.*, noted opposition's disapproval with its major mouthpiece newspaper *Pravda* claiming that this agreement was a "hasty, unwarranted concession to Washington and Russia's final loss of the status and importance of a superpower" (2014, p. 233). Notably, the agreement remained as a Russian bargaining chip for years and was not ratified until April 2000. In the end, the agreement was never implemented and was replaced by Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002.

---

<sup>15</sup> Immediately after its announcement the Bush package came under scrutiny and criticism. For example, a conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation prepared "Five Problems with the Bush Aid Package to Russia" in which it argued that the aid package was likely to miss the strategic target, which is the acceleration of the free market reform in Russia. The paper argued that the only way successfully to assist Russia in making the ruble a stable, convertible currency is to insist that, in exchange for Western aid, monetary control is removed from political control and to channel assistance directly to the emerging private sector in Russia, rather than to the government. Online. Available at: <<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1992/04/five-problems-with-the-bush-aid-package-to-russia>>

The debates on reforming the European security institutions continued at the CSCE Helsinki Summit in July 1992. According to Smith, in general, Russian leaders at this time were against 'foreign' institutions (notably NATO) operating in the former Soviet area, but more persuadable about prospective roles for the institutions in which Russia had a prominent status (2006, p. 11). Hence, to accommodate the nuances of the emerging Russian state, the CSCE participating states agreed to declare the CSCE a regional instrument to fulfill the duties under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, thus providing "an important link between European and global security", and intending "to work together closely with the UN especially in preventing and settling conflicts" (The Helsinki Document "The Challenges of Change," 1992). Its main area of engagement would be early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (including fact-finding and rapporteur missions and peacekeeping), and peaceful settlement of disputes. It also created the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities (Velitchkova, p. 11).

Although in general Russian role during the Helsinki 1992 Summit was considered as constructive, the CSCE ministerial was startled by Foreign Minister Kozyrev in which he denounced Western interference in the Baltic states, deplored the UN sanctions against Serbia, stated that the CSCE norms did not apply to the former Soviet Union and declared 'near abroad' as Russia's sphere of interest where Russia would reserve the right to "take all necessary unilateral measures to protect ... interests." In Less than an hour Kozyrev retracted his statement in a second speech claiming that this is what would happen if reforms failed and Yeltsin lost to conservatives. Incidentally, in a couple of hours it became known that Gaidar was out of office – a sign that conservatives were on the rise in Moscow. According to Smith "This bizarre episode suggested to some that Russia was not, in fact, taking the CSCE completely seriously and was continuing the Soviet approach of (mis)using its fora and mechanisms for the purposes of tactical manoeuvring" (2006, p. 12).

As a compensation for concessional positions in the START II negotiations, the military had lobbied Yeltsin for two other issues: The revision of the CFE treaty and arms sales abroad (Donaldson *et al.*, p. 235). On both issues, siding with the military Yeltsin pressed the West. In September 1993 he formally proposed to consider amending the CFE treaty. There was a strong resistance to this in NATO, particularly from Turkey, but as Russia remained adamant, and threatening the possibility of renunciation of the CFE treaty altogether, NATO agreed to negotiate the issue (*ibid.*, p. 235).

On the other hand, the pursuit of integration with the West, development of democracy and economic reform did not bring improvement to the lives of ordinary Russian citizens. By the Parliamentary elections of 1993 it had become apparent that the Russian electorate had associated democracy and market economy with poverty and instability. According to Mankoff, “notions of convergence and integration with the West lost their appeal, and Russia’s leaders began shifting back onto a more Westphalian Great Power course” (2009, p. 37).

In the Summer of 1994, G. Arbatov had written a “Eurasian Letter: A new Cold War?” in *Foreign Policy*, in which he argued that whilst the Cold War is over, it was not yet certain whether political processes were over and whether Russia and the U.S. could enjoy cooperation (1994). He argued that a possible economic collapse in Russia with the subsequent explosion of nationalism and ‘neo-imperialism’ and the rise of dictatorship would threaten the Peace (Arbatov, 1994). In line with many scholars as well as majority of the public opinion argued against “Gaidar reforms,” which were seen as Western tools (primarily because they were guided by Western specialist like Anders Aslund and Jeffrey Sachs with the blessing of IMF). He argued that the results of this “shock therapy” were disastrous for Russia’s economy, which pushed 40 % of the population below the poverty line while 7 % became extremely rich. Such a reform, argued Arbatov, was far from democracy. Rather, it bred poverty and crime, promoted bad governance and the government would only survive if democracy was suppressed (1994, pp. 90-92). Arbatov maintained that one facet of failure of Gaidar reform was the outcome of the 1993 elections, which saw “nationalists, fascists and communists” dramatically increase their representation in the new parliament (p. 95). Neo-imperialist powers such as nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and their concepts of ‘paternalistic imperialism’, with Russia’s exclusive rights and responsibilities in near abroad (the so called Russian Monroe Doctrine) was deemed as extremely dangerous for Russia and the entire post Soviet Union space (p. 100). Although he blamed Russian inept government for such an outcome, Arbatov also chided the US government, who after two Summits has not yet changed its policy towards Russia: it still supported the reform and still did not deliver on its promise of generous support. This situation in turn fuelled conspiracy theories and nationalistic attitudes among the population that this reform was instigated by the West to destroy Russia. Arbatov maintained that isolation would drive Russia further down the path of nationalism and that it was paramount that “Russia ... be involved in world affairs – especially those that affect our national interests – because that involvement can influence our internal development positively” (p. 99).

It was in this setting that the Yeltsin-Kozyrev and later Putin's approach to European Security unfolded and bore results.

### **Honeymoon with the West: initial preferences for Common European Security**

During the 1993, the Russian government maintained its basic position on the future of NATO and European security. One of the conceptualizations of this position was expressed in a report published in November by the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) headed by Yevgeny Primakov. According to Smith "Primakov took care to stress that his report had the endorsement of military leaders and, although he denied that he had also cleared it with the President and foreign ministry before publication, it was widely suspected that he had, in fact, done so" (p. 56). According to the report, Russia would oppose NATO enlargement if it was done in isolation. However, in case NATO enlargement also meant the change of the nature of NATO than that scenario could fall within the zone of Russian interests:

"It would be in Russia's interests if the process of expanding the zone of NATO's responsibility were synchronized with a change in the nature of that alliance and with an adaptation of its functions to the special features of the present stage of historical development" (cited in Smith, 2006, p. 57).

There was also another report – the military doctrine, which the Russian government adopted in November 1993. The document identified 'the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation's military security' as being amongst 'the basic existing and potential sources of military danger' to Russia (cited in Smith, 2006, p. 55).

It is widely believed that under the pressure from the military, President Yeltsin had sent a letter in October 1993 to President Bill Clinton of the United States, President Francois Mitterrand of France, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany and Prime Minister John Major of Britain clarifying that Russian positions made in Warsaw, Prague and Bratislava had to be seen in the wider context of future security of Europe in which Russia must play a major role. The letter was clear on the fact that the Russian view of an enlarged alliance is only the kind that also includes Russia and that expansion of NATO without expansion to include Russia will undermine European security. Obviously, NATO aspirant countries like Poland, Slovakia and the Czech

republic opposed any prospect, which would undermine their free will to join any Alliance and were deeply annoyed by the change of Warsaw specifics by Yeltsin (see Cohen, 1993).

From spring 1994, unwilling to see its proposed PfP as a hollow instrument due to Russian non-participation, NATO started to think on how to accommodate Russian demands for a privileged relationship with NATO. As a result, on June 22, 1994, once Russia signed up for the PfP, the Alliance issued “summary conclusions” of its discussions with Russia’s foreign minister Kozyrev, in which it stated:

“The Alliance and Russia agreed to develop an extensive individual Partnership Programme corresponding to Russia’s size, importance and capabilities... They agreed to set in train the development of a far-reaching, cooperative NATO/Russia relationship, both inside and outside Partnership for Peace” (Summary Conclusions, 1994).

Along with demanded special elevated status within European security institutions and first and foremost in NATO, Russia also actively claimed its special rights in ‘its near abroad’. In 1993 Yeltsin officially articulated the proposal for the first time, in an address to a forum of the Civic Union in Moscow, saying that “the time has come for distinguished international organizations, including the UN, to grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the former regions of the USSR” (cited in Hill et al., 1994, p. 1). Kozyrev restated that statement, demanding the international recognition and assistance for Russia’s peacekeeping efforts in its ‘near abroad’ at the United Nations, in September 1993 (ibid., p. 2).

However, in reality, it was becoming evident that Russia was usurping its regional leadership role and despite the peacemaking rhetoric, massive evidence accrued, which attested that Russia was not acting as an honest broker in the conflict or crisis situations ensued after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. For example, in 1994 a group of authors writing for the Ethnic Conflict Project, the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, and the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, have delivered a study, which concluded:

“An analysis of the conflicts in the republics of the former Soviet Union since 1992, reveals a disturbing pattern. In each of the conflicts, there is evidence to suggest that Russia has intervened in such a way as to promote their escalation and/or continuation instead of their cessation...”; “...in a manner that would seem consistent with stated



Russian policy, the sovereignty of each of the republics of the former Soviet Union has been compromised, forcing them into an increasingly dependent relationship with Moscow” (Hill et al., 1994, pp. 1-2).

Meanwhile the push for the Alliance enlargement picked up power and strength. The seemingly smooth delay with the proposition of the PfP format was too little for the eastern European aspirants as well as minorities residing in the United States. There were strong proponents for the enlargement within the Clinton administration (For example A. Lake and R. Holbrook) as well prominent experts outside of the official circles (such as Kissinger and Brzezinski). Goldgeier argues that while Kissinger’s ideas were regarded more as bipartisan, Brzezinski together with RAND experts R. Asmus, R. Kugler and S. Larabee had a real impact on the administration policy (2010, pp. 47-48). After complex policy considerations in which number of prominent individuals participated and affected outcomes, the idea had ripened within the Clinton administration by January 1994 that the question of NATO enlargement was no longer of whether but when and how. On January 12, Clinton, while meeting Visegrad Leaders in Prague, had stated:

“Let me be absolutely clear: The security of your states is important to the security of the United States... While the Partnership is not NATO membership, neither is it a permanent holding room. It changes the entire NATO dialog so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how” (Clinton, 1994).

After Prague, Clinton arrived for his first ever-official visit to Moscow. During the meeting Yeltsin had told Clinton on the issue of NATO enlargement the following:

“The time will come when Russia will be integrated and all the others will be integrated, but they will be integrated with one another in just one package, as they say. And this will bring security to everybody. But if you sort of dismember us, I mean, accepting us or admitting us one by one is not good. I’m against that – opposed. That is why I support the initiative shown by the U.S. President with respect to the Partnership for Peace” (cited in Goldgeir, 2010, p. 60).

Evidently, the Russian Federation still regarded the post Soviet Space as its part and was alien to the notions of their sovereignty, independence and their inherent right to choose Alliances.

Whilst the Russian outlook was narrow, the reality demanded that the quest of these states be answered, an ordeal, which later unfolded with dramatics of NATO enlargement process and corresponding Russian dissatisfaction, despite NATO's major efforts to keep Russia involved.

At the end of the visit the two leaders issued a joint Moscow declaration, which underscored their commitment to bilateral relations and readiness for cooperation in security issues, including arms reduction and nonproliferation. Russian side underscored the irreversibility of economic transition while the U.S. pledged to support ongoing reforms. On the account of new European security order, the declaration (reflecting the preferences of the host country) stated that it would need to be inclusive, non-discriminatory and cooperative:

“Proceeding from the conviction that new divisions of Europe must be avoided, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed upon the need to create a new European security order that is inclusive, non-discriminatory and focused on practical political and security cooperation. The two presidents agreed that the concept of the Partnership for Peace adopted at the Brussels meeting of the NATO member states is an important element of an emerging new European security architecture” (Moscow Declaration, 1994).

Granted Clinton's resolve just two days before, expressed in Prague as well as Yeltsin's misconception of the PfP based on his informal talks with Clinton, it was obvious the two sides had different conceptions of security and non-discrimination. That misconception quickly became a contentious issue, bringing the chills of possible new Cold War at the top of the headlines.

### **End of the honeymoon and the threat of a 'Cold Peace'**

Once the dust from the collapse of the Soviet Union settled and the 'honeymoon' phase (Truscott, 1997) waned, Russian Federation released a more coherent and clearly discernible diplomatic effort to modify the existing security architecture in Europe. This thesis finds, that despite variations in political ideology, leadership, economic and political situation and Great power relations, Russian demands *vis a vis* European security were strikingly similar to the initiatives already expressed previously.

According to Smith, in 1994 main diplomatic work concentrated around advancement of CSCE as a *primus inter pares* among existing institutions, to the point of offering to create a United Nations-style 'security council' made up with the leading powers amongst the CSCE's members and empowered to take executive decisions on behalf of the member states as a whole (Smith, 2006, p.12). Once this initiative proved futile and received little attention, another tactical manoeuvre was to advance the CSCE both legally and factually as the lead agency in European security affairs. According to Smith terms such as a 'hierarchical' organisational structure or 'co-ordinating role' would be used in regards to CSCE *vis-à-vis* NATO, the European Union and other international organisations and institutions (2006, p. 12).

The Russian desire to change the constellation of European security institutions in a way that Russia would become first among equals with a decision-making leverage identical to the European States as well as the U.S. is well illustrated in the diplomatic efforts during 1994. Such major statement came on August 1994, when Russian foreign minister Kozyrev wrote *Russia and NATO: A partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe* (Kozyrev, 1994).

The spirit of the text underscored anew the Russian readiness "to actively promote the dialogue and contacts with the North Atlantic Alliance both at the political and military level." If not realistically, at least rhetorically the approach underscored that "both Russia and the NATO members are like-minded nations. We belong to one and the same democratic community of nations". While Kozyrev underscored readiness for further and deeper engagement, it warned, however "a genuine partnership is an equal partnership. Our relations should be deprived of even the slightest hints of paternalism. There can be no vetoes on others' actions nor surprises undermining mutual trust" (Ibid.,).

Kozyrev underscored that NATO PfP (which Russia had accepted in June, after an episode of uneasiness and hesitation) was just one mean of developing military-political cooperation and that others would need "expansion of a network of bilateral links between Russia and member states of NATO and the NACC" (Ibid.,).

Among the existing institutions, Kozyrev named CSCE as the winner of the Cold War and a key institution for building a truly single security area from Vancouver to Vladivostok:

“The CSCE has won the Cold War. It expresses adequately the main idea of the development of our continent in the post-confrontation era. The forthcoming Budapest summit of the CSCE nations is called upon to give a strong impetus to strengthening its leading role in the construction of the new Europe” (Ibid.,).

As for the main directions of partnership he enumerated Political partnership, Military cooperation, Peacekeeping, Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, Cooperation in conversion of defence-oriented industries and Cooperation in emergency situations (Ibid.,). Notably, Kozyrev expressed an opinion that in the future, if cooperation would be widespread enough, NATO’s eastward expansion would become less pressing:

“the dynamic development of the partnership, as well as cooperation within the CSCE and NACC framework, will make less pressing the issue which is widely discussed today, i.e., the eastward expansion of the NATO zone” (Ibid.,)

In the background, the issue of NATO enlargement was a cause of serious worry for the Russian side. With the continuing economic and social disarray directly affecting Yeltsin’s popularity, he was becoming much dependent on the support of the military, hence, military’s disposition, which was most negative to the issue of NATO’s enlargement, was becoming more influential and authoritative in Russian foreign policy messages.

By the Budapest CSCE Summit in 1994, the US-Russian relations have passed the honeymoon stage and were hitting a new low. The scene was set by previous events such as Russia’s attempts to get the U.S. lift the embargo on Iraq’s oil sales, the Russian use of veto in the U.N. Security Council to block an American sponsored resolution on Bosnia and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s refusal to sign the previously scheduled NATO-Russia program for cooperation at a NACC meeting in the beginning of December in Brussels.

Knowing the Russian position on the NATO enlargement, at that time the Clinton administration had been moving slowly and carefully on the enlargement issue and been trying earnestly to assuage Russian concerns (Talbot, 2002). As Goldgeier and McFaul account, already in late September, during Yeltsin’s visit to Washington, Clinton had promised his counterpart the so called three no’s: “there would be no surprises, no rush and no exclusion” meaning that the enlargement would take place but based on consultations and a time-table and that Russia was

also eligible for NATO membership. Clinton had underscored that for him NATO expansion was a way to advance the broader, higher goal of European security, unity and integration rather than a possibility to steal away former Warsaw member states into NATO (Goldgeier and McFaul, 2003, p. 189). According to the Authors, during this trip, President Yeltsin had asked his American counterpart to come to CSCE upcoming Summit in Budapest, which Clinton promised he would do (ibid., pp. 189-190).

The Summit went down otherwise than expected. Both Presidents exchanged contrasting projections of European future (Williams, 1994). Apparently, the situation was compounded by the U.S. decision to undertake a Study on NATO Enlargement. In response, just prior to Budapest meeting, Yeltsin had instructed his Foreign Minister not to sign the NATO document even though it was aimed at developing a special relationship with Russia, one that would go beyond what was available to NATO's other eastern partners through PfP, as requested by Russia. Hence, while in Brussels, Kozyrev refused to sign the final communiqué because of the inclusion, which, called to 'initiate a process of examination inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership' (Smith, 2006, p. 62).

The summit itself was a historic occasion as it was there that member states agreed to turn CSCE into an organization – the OSCE, effective from 1 January 1995. This celebratory occasion however turned into a bitter exchange of remarks between President Clinton of US and Yeltsin of Russia. In response to Clinton's chiding Russia for its opposition of NATO enlargement and stressing that no "No country outside will be allowed to veto expansion" Yeltsin retorted that "Europe, not having yet freed itself from the heritage of the cold war, is in danger of plunging into a cold peace..." (Church et al., 1994). Yeltsin further retorted: "Why sow the seeds of mistrust? After all, we are no longer enemies. We are all partners" (Yeltsin, 1994).

Furthermore, Yeltsin had stated:

"Establishment of a *full-fledged all-European organization with a solid legal basis* has become a vital necessity for Europe..."; "...The basis of an *all-European security system* could be a strong fabric of bilateral agreements on good neighborliness and cooperation among the participating States in all areas. There is also a need for mutual guarantees to individual States or groups of States. Russia is prepared to discuss guarantee issues on a

bilateral or multilateral basis. This is a foundation upon which all-European institutions could be created. *Their goal would be dispute settlement and early prevention and resolution of conflicts*” (1994).

In place of NATO expansion, he proposed to bolster CSCE objectives, starting with the “rights of minorities and curbing aggressive nationalism”; provide the CSCE with effective peace-keeping potential, saying that “Russia has an interest in sharing political and material responsibility for peace-keeping operations with our UN and CSCE partners, be that in Karabakh, Tajikistan, Georgia, or Moldova” (Ibid.), at the same time warning, that such cooperation should happen “without detriment to the effectiveness of the operations”. In a third point, Yeltsin concluded that Europe would be truly unified only with the conclusion of a common all-European economic space. In the end, an effort was made, once again, to project CSCE as the dominant institution whose reliability required interaction of the CIS, NATO, WEU, EU, the CoE and others on the bases of common interests (Ibid.,).

As part of its campaign to elevate CSCE as well as ensure CSCE support to Russian ‘peacekeeping’ efforts it agreed to number of OSCE missions. For example, in March 1994, it agreed to allow the OSCE a much larger role in monitoring developments in and around the conflict zone in Tskhinvali Region, South Ossetia, Georgia as well as allowed for OSCE participation in the Joint Control Commission comprised of representatives from the peacekeeping units of Russia, Georgia and the Russian republic of North Ossetia. It also allowed for the role of OSCE in Moldova (Lynch, 2000, pp. 114-115). Basically, Russian position in conflict mediation has shifted exclusively in favor of the OSCE positions to the extent that it even allowed for the limited OSCE role in the Chechen war, with an agreement to send an OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya (AG) in April, 1995 (ibid., p. 114).

In terms of broader security initiatives, the Budapest summit endorsed a Russian proposal to launch a discussion on a “Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st century” (CCSM). As for concrete outcomes, the *Budapest Document 1994 “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era”* - reconfirmed the necessity for further enhancement of the CSCE’s role and capabilities in early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, including peacekeeping operations and missions as well as post-conflict rehabilitation and assisting with reconstruction (Velitchkova, 2002).

Notably, just a few days after the Budapest Summit, the Russian President had ordered troops to cross over into Chechnya and on December 11, 1994 a first Chechen war ensued which immediately degenerated into a bloody war with huge civilian casualties and indiscriminate destruction. Many became prone to believe that Chechen war “murdered Russian democracy in its cradle” (Muratov, 2014). These cast further doubts on Russia as a peaceful security actor in Europe.

According to Dmitry Simes, from 1993 Russian assertiveness especially in its ‘near abroad’ had the Western observers alarmed. Despite the official rhetoric of likeness and common values, Simes noted:

“there is a widening gap between Russian and Western definitions of responsible behaviour for Russian in international politics. In the West, there is a strong tendency to view Russia as a defeated superpower that must go through a long period of reflection and redemption akin to that of post-war Germany and Japan. Most Russians, however, have a radically different perspective. They do not perceive Russia as a defeated villain but rather as both the victim of and victor over the Soviet empire... No special restriction on Moscow’s freedom of international action ... are considered justified” (Simes, 1994, p. 77)

Simes further noted that the “universal human values” rhetoric was supplanted by the “new national security thinking” (Ibid., p. 78). Kozyrev himself had reminded the West of Russia’s “special interests, different from Western interests and at times even competing” (Ibid.,).

To go along with this rhetoric, from the early 90’s Russia had demonstrated its eagerness and readiness to participate militarily in the near abroad, whereas its conduct conveyed the hallmark of the policy of *divide et impera* and was aimed at ensuring that those local leaders or forces would win that favoured Russia, that ensured economic affiliation and preferences for Russia and those who would align their foreign policies with a look to the East. Such behaviour had quickly raised the fears of Russian neo-imperialism in the Western capitals as well as other CSCE member states, and despite the reproaching rhetoric by Russia, these were the acts very hard to ignore.

## Stepping up the rhetoric on European security order

Already on May 31, 1995 the Russian Federation has accepted the Individual Partnership Program but in conjunction with *the Broad, Enhanced NATO-Russia Dialogue and Cooperation* documents, which offered cooperation beyond PFP. The document consisted of three sections: Sharing of information on issues regarding politico-security related matters; Political consultations on issues of common concern; co-operation in a range of security-related issues including, as appropriate, in the peacekeeping field. For each section the document outlined the methods of sharing information, methods of consultation and methods of co-operation respectively. Basically, the document established an ad hoc “16 + 1” format, that is Allies plus Russia.

On this occasion, Foreign minister Kozyrev addressed the NAC in Noordwijk, on May 31. Notably, he had very few words to say about the reached agreement, while he once again recounted the Russian outlook: it was stated bluntly that Russia was against expansion and as it would run counter to the idea of a single Europe and that while the transformation was slow the issue still was “a truly effective working mechanism of constructive and equal interaction between Russia and NATO whose principles and parameters could be recorded in corresponding agreements” (Statement by Kozyrev, 1995). As for the NATO, if it were to become a part of pan-European security it would need to turn into a political organization:

“The evolution of European structures and above all NATO is an essential element of the future Pan-European security system and European equilibrium. However, one cannot reduce all only to the prospect of NATO expansion. So far the alliance has been changing slowly. *If the alliance wishes in practices to become a part of a Pan-European security system it must get transformed from a military alliance to a political organisation with corresponding changes in NATO institutions and basic documents*” (Kozyrev, 1995).

Notably, in a complementary move, Russian foreign Minister published an article in *Foreign Policy* already in the summer of 1995, in which he again revived the concept of a pan-European security system. Citing a lack of “a permanent and smoothly operating mechanism” between Russia and the West, and calling for the need of “new security architecture in Europe:”

“The existing European security structures would need to be fundamentally transformed



in order to solve two interrelated tasks: finding an adequate response to the new challenges to European stability and preventing any new schisms or demarcation lines on the Continent” (Kozyrev, 1995, p.10).

He called in question NATO *raison d’etre* and dubbed the decision-making of the day in security matters an “institutional trap” in which partnership becomes hostage of the lack of joint decision-making mechanisms (Ibid.,).

Much like the Stalin proposal to Western governments, Kozyrev said that Russia does not exclude the possibility that at some point Russia itself may become a member of the alliance (p. 11). For the time-being however, he rejected as unacceptable and of only interim character any “special relations with Russia“ through treaties or institutional innovations and called for a “qualitatively new level of relations between NATO and Russia” after a step by step transitional period:

“The essence of this transitional period should constitute the transformation of NATO (*inter alia*, through its interaction with us) into a pan-European security organization and a joint instrument for the efficient response to the new common challenges, such as ethnic conflicts, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking” (p. 13).

According to Foreign Minister Kozyrev, only such a proposed transformation would be a precondition for Russia’s willingness to gradually enter into a new NATO that would also include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe: “this would result in withdrawal of our objections against a gradual entry into a new NATO that would include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.”

For the transformation he suggested two stages. Stage one would focus on the implementation of a program of dialogue and cooperation between Russia and NATO and the activation of the PfP program. Stage two would be a transitional period of three to five years and would be focused on expanding bilateral cooperation and also multilateral cooperation under the PfP in conjunction with NATO transformation. The ultimate aim was to move further from the “sixteen plus one” format to a “permanent consultative body.”

Kozyrev also described partnership between Russia and the United States as paramount for the formation of a broad coalition of democratic nations allied to solve international problems and warned against drifting into a “cold peace” if such a partnership was not facilitated (p. 14). At the same time, he did make a reservation that partnership would not “automatically solve all problems and prevent frustration in the development of new Russian-American relations” (ibid., p. 14).

While the Russian sentiments were high *the Study on NATO Enlargement* was completed and unveiled on September 3, 1995. This was a hugely important document for the aspirant countries. Finally, they had the criteria on how to accede to NATO. The document stated:

“When NATO invites other European countries to become Allies, as foreseen in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty and reaffirmed at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, this will be a further step towards the Alliance’s basic goal of enhancing security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, within the context of a broad European security architecture” (The Study on NATO Enlargement, 1995).

The study outlined the principles of enlargement as well as the commitments that the new members would have to take up if they were to join the Alliance. Most importantly, the document upheld that “No country outside the Alliance should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process and decisions” (Ibid.). It stated that there was no fixed list of criteria, the decision would be made case-by-case and that Allies would be decided by consensus based on their judgment of whether such a decision would promote security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Document also wisely mentioned OSCE documents “which confirm the sovereign right of each state to freely seek its own security arrangements” (ibid.).

At that point the most important thing for President Yeltsin was the informal decision that no enlargement would take place until after Presidential elections of 1996 in which Yeltsin was running on a very tight margin for victory. Hence, the Study was publicized without a serious feedback from Russia. In the meanwhile, the Dayton peace accords were reached and the Russian troops began working with NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) on the ground, in the spirit of previous agreements not to have ‘any surprises’ and to work hand in hand on matters of European security.

## **Efforts within the OSCE**

In a parallel front, the CCSM discussion, initiative by Russia in 1994 continued within the OSCE throughout 1995. Many saw this discussion as compensation to Russia for NATO enlargement (Lynch, 2000, p. 116). While the CCSM was quite vague, it was reinforced by Kozyrev at a meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers in December 1995 calling for the formulation of a Charter to place the organization on a legal footing, the creation of a European security council and coordinated activities between the OSCE, the CIS and NATO (Ibid., p. 116). The Russian idea was to promote a hierarchical security structure, which would be centered around one institution (the Council) in which Russia would of course have an equal position and a decision-making power equal to other European and Atlantic powers.

These were ambitious projects but rarely well thought through or even realistic. Basically, these initiatives offered to dilute the existing institutions for a new collective security type institution. However, with the ongoing reality, in which Russia had taken partial positions in its neighborhood and published an aggressive military doctrine in 1993, made these initiatives elusive with the CSCE participants unwilling to become part of any Council with Russia as a dominant actor in it (n. a. *Institute for Public Policy Research*, 1996, p. 146).

What emerged instead within the OSCE security process (which started roughly with the 1994 Budapest CSCE Summit) was the idea of a co-operative security, which can be defined as a “method, which facilitates the achievement of the objective defined as a common security space in the OSCE space without old or new dividing lines. Co-operation serves the OSCE concept of comprehensive and indivisible security” (Motolla, p. 89 in Koskenniemi, 1998).

Before the final adoption of the model for co-operative security (over collective or concert type security championed by Russia) the Lisbon 1996 December Summit was once again overshadowed by the dispute over the question of NATO enlargement and the question of hierarchy, which organization would be the primary agent for European security. Russia championed the OSCE, whilst all the other ideas (dilution of NATO or creation of a Council) failed.

Prime Minister V. Chernomirdin acted much the same way Yeltsin did two years before, championing for OSCE as the primary security organization in Europe and saying ‘nyet’ to

NATO expansion. In response, Vice President Gore had stated, “NATO does not intend to threaten anybody, least of all Russia, but ... it neither intends to be told by other what it can or cannot do” (Neely, 1996).

A 1996 survey about the Lisbon Summit agenda, based on 87 reports from 15 countries, concluded that most editorials were of the opinion that through the years the OSCE had been paralyzed by the need for consensus among its 54 members and hence it cannot serve as the key security organization from Vancouver to Vladivostok and that therefore the Europe will continue to need NATO (Neely, 1996).

Hence, the 1996 Lisbon OSCE document rejected the principle of hierarchy and asserted the principle of freedom of choice stating that “no State, organization or grouping can have any superior responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE region” (The Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, 1996).

The Document also upheld the EU initiative “a platform for Co-operative Security” which is based on a common concept for the development of co-operation between mutually-reinforcing institutions and brings up measures for developing the OSCE’s practices in early warning, preventive diplomacy, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation – an area of collective actions where the OSCE is recognized as a primary instrument” (Motolla, p. 91 in Koskenniemi, 1998).

In addition, the Lisbon document upheld the idea of comprehensive security:

“The OSCE plays a central role in achieving our goal of a common security space. Its fundamental elements – the comprehensiveness and indivisibility of security and the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior – inspire our vision of empowering governments and individuals to build a better and more secure future (Lisbon document)”.

An element of growing significance in this multi-institutional security order was the promotion of good neighborliness, a very important aspect of security granted Russia’s emerging identity crisis and the conflicts all across the post-Soviet space. The Lisbon document also developed

modalities for the interrelationship between the security institutions. According to Motolla, within the framework of common principle the OSCE model of inter-institutional security order included elements of collective security, integration-based security (that of EU for example) and soft and hard aspects of common action (1998, p. 94).

In terms of concrete tangible outcomes, the Lisbon Summit agreed to revise the CFE per Russia's request, an issue that was resolved later at a 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit. Overall, the great power egoistic interests aside, the OSCE Lisbon Summit made a very important contribution to the broad aspects of security by upholding the need for institutional linkages, creation of norms of State behavior toward each other and towards the citizens of Europe (Rupp and McKenzie, 1998, p. 125).

Later at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, the member states adopted a set of very important documents for European Security, among them *the Charter for European Security* (1999) which established a number of new steps including: Platform for Co-operative security, which dealt with cooperation and interrelationship among various international organizations and institutions; further developed the OSCE's peacekeeping role, created the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT); expanded the OSCE ability with police-related activities; established an Operation Center to reinforce field operations and streamlined the consultation process with the OSCE by establishing the Preparatory Committee under the OSCE Permanent Council (*The Charter for European Security*, 1999).

According to Lynch, with the CCSM process Russia tried to ensure that NATO does not become the central axis for European security. Admittedly, after achieving the special mechanism arrangement with NATO, Russia's focus was no longer on hierarchy but on equality of security institutions that would accord it a special place (2000, p. 117). Towards that point argued Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in early 1999 that "the Charter could be the 'linchpin' of a 'new, stable and balanced structure of European security' that stands in juxtaposition to a model based on NATO" (Ivanov, 1999, quoted in Lynch, 2000, p. 117).

### **Shaping the Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS)**

Immediately in parallel to the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russia took the lead in forming the CIS. According to Sakwa Yeltsin had three basic goals with respect to CIS: to strengthen the

CIS, to consolidate relations with the member states and to 'bilateralize' relations (2002: 383). CIS was aimed at the creation of an integrated political and economic community, evident in growing economic cooperation. From the beginning Russia wanted to promote closer security cooperation but the attempt to create a joint CIS Security Council and integrated military forces were not successful (Roeder, 1997, p 224). According to Adomeit major goal was to re-integrate based on instruments like Russian minorities, energy dependence, guarding borders and avoiding ethnic conflicts (1998, p. 43).

More coherent defence cooperation under the CIS emerged with the signing of the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security in 1992 by nine former Soviet Republics (all except for the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova and Turkmenistan). According to Johnson the CST had little to do with Collective security but rather represented a nascent collective defence organization although little military integration was achieved (2001, p. 104). In April 1999 a crises emerged as the three countries: Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan did not extend their participation in the CSTO upon the expiration of the Treaty. Major factor that pushed the CIS into a defence-oriented organization in the 1990's was the NATO enlargement process. Under Yeltsin, the CIS was seen as a counterweight to NATO, and it was important to Russia that the CIS countries had a common stance on NATO (Nygren, 2008, p. 31). Important improvements would be undertaken later by Putin, which would transform CST into the international organization in 2002 – the Collective Security Treaty Organization. However, it is argued that CIS as an anti-NATO Alliance largely failed (Bugajski, 2004, p. 57).

According to Nygren, CIS was associated with a number of persistent problems: First was Russia's involvement in conflicts in the former Soviet Union area (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova), which were seen as an attempt to maintain the dominance and influence these countries' domestic politics. Second problem has been a low survival potential of the organization. Throughout the Yeltsin period the prevalent understanding among memas that the CIS had no future and it was rather created "to save what could be saved" and allow for a civilized divorce. A third problem had been a low capacity to implement reached agreements and a fourth problem – the 'splinter movements' – the creation of counter-alliances within the organization such as the Central Asian Union, the Union of Belarus and Russia and GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). All in all, the fear of Russia's domination reinforced by its sheer size and the fact that CIS's working language was Russian and perception that the CIS could be used to re-create the USSR have all contributed to the loose nature of the

organization and the constant talks for the need to re-organize (2008, pp. 25-26).

### **The Outcome and the crises**

As a response to Russia's clear-cut desire to establish a qualitatively new level of relations with NATO, relations that would underline Russia's special role and significance above all other former Warsaw Pact countries, NATO foreign ministers agreed on December 1996 on special arrangements to deepen and widen the scope of NATO-Russia relations. Since then NATO's new Secretary General Javier Solana and the new Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov (he replaced Kozyrev in 1996) have conducted six rounds of talks starting from January 1997 till mid May 1997, culminating into a document called "*Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation.*" The Secretary General and Heads of State and Government of NATO and the Russian President signed the Act on May 27, in Paris.

The document gave Russia a great deal of the aspired goals. For example, it promised to revise NATO's core strategic Concept, to continue to "expand political functions", and take on "new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe". Most importantly, the document stated that 'NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason' to deploy or store nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. The Act also established the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council. As "a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, ...where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern" (Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation, 1997). The Council meetings would take place "at various levels and in different forms" (Ibid.). However, neither the Council nor anything in the Act would "provide NATO or Russia, in any way, *with a right of veto over the actions of the other* nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action" (Ibid.).

The Act was widely received in the West as a positive milestone and an end of the Cold War rivalry as well as Russian acquiescence to imminent NATO expansion. However, some misunderstandings over the interpretations of the meaning of some of the statements remained while there were also different opinions of the usefulness of the reached agreement: some in the

West warned over the imminent dilution of the Alliance and feared of Russia's rising influence in various NATO councils, while in Russia itself the Act was largely seen as a final capitulation in the face of NATO expansion (see Mendelsohn, 1997).

Notably, the Act and the PJC meetings were seen of as marginal success while the Russian side completely suspended its participation in the PJC on March 24 1999 in response to NATO's operation "Allied Force" in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Rambouillet Accords on March 23. The locus of Russian official anger was the fact that NATO did not even try to obtain a Security Council resolution. However, that move was warranted as previously Russia had made it crystal clear that if NATO sought UN mandate it would exercise its veto (Smith, 2006 p. 80).

However, Russia did not cut off all links with NATO. Despite some strong domestic voices, Yeltsin kept Russian participation in the SFOR and called to resume negotiations of the Contact group. Eventually, the G8 unveiled proposals, which incorporated NATO's five demands but also four significant additions, reflecting the core elements of the Russo-German plan. According to Dov Lynch, the G8 package "contained important elements of success for Russia" (Lynch, 1999, p. 76). The final G8 package was agreed on May 6, 1999, which Milosevic accepted in June 1999. For Russia it was important to show that NATO could not bring results on its own and that its participation was still important (Smith, 2006, pp. 84-85). In the post-settlement process the Russian side had accepted that the security presence would be NATO-led. This was incorporated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 passed on June 10, 1999. Hence, the NATO-Russia relations survived the Kosovo crises but they never recovered to the fullest during Yeltsin's remaining time in office.

### **Restarting the outcome**

Yeltsin started to talk about leaving office as his health severely deteriorated, his popular ratings dropped to single digits and the entire governing class became rumoured to have been involved in grave corruption cases. At the beginning of August 1999, he appointed a virtually unknown person – Vladimir Putin of FSB as his fifth Prime Minister. Unlike popular views, Yeltsin went on and declared Putin as his successor on December 31, 1999, just prior to the March 1999 Russian Presidential elections (Truscott, 2004, pp. 94-95).



During his tenure as acting-president of Russia, Putin gave a famous interview to BBC's Sir David Frost, in which he had said "we believe we can talk about more profound integration with NATO, but only if Russia is regarded as an equal partner" (Truscott, p. 135).

That was an overstatement of Russia's aims, which was corrected soon enough first by the military; for example, General Leonid Ivashov of the Defense Ministry 'clarified' that this was 'hypothetically' possible but prior NATO would need to transform itself into a European security institution and Russia be given an equal voice and veto rights (Truscott, p. 135-136). The concept of being equal and the need for reinforced relations remained as the hallmark of Putin's European security policy. To sum up:

"What most of the Russian policy-maker ideally wanted was a relationship where Russia could veto NATO's military decisions, and where Moscow was equal to the entire weight of the Atlantic Alliance countries put together. A bilateral arrangement between equal partners was what Russia sought (with veto power), and it was this relationship, which NATO naturally resisted. Even when the USSR was a superpower, it had struggled to achieve parity with NATO, and post-1991 Russia's claim to be a global force had dramatically diminished" (Ibid., p. 136).

Similarly, Robert Hunter argues "Russia sought to maximize its role in affecting the full range of NATO policies and actions, and in which the allies sought to limit Russia's role to a 'voice but not a veto'. Russia wanted to place limitations with a legally binding treaty but the Allies only agreed to political commitments (2000, p. 125).

Once in power, the diminishing role of Russia was a primary concern to Putin. His fears in this regard were well presented in a ten-year development strategy Kremlin had produced in 1999, titled "Russia on the Brink of the Third Millennium". The document outlined Russia's economic reform, but as Truscott points out, it was evident that the reform was not the end but the means to ensure Russia remains as a great power. In the Millennium paper Putin had written "for the first time in the past 200 to 300 years, it is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states. We are running out of time left for removing this threat" (2004, pp. 123-124).

Economic and political underdevelopment was not the only thing keeping Russia from its great power status. Already in August, instability ensued again in the Caucasus as Islamists invaded Russian Dagestan Republic – presenting an immediate challenge to the newly appointed Prime Minister. The September bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk and Volgodonsk (which were later rumoured but never confirmed to have been instigated by FSB) served as a *casus belli* and by the end of September a second Chechnya War ensued, with Russian troops given the task to subjugate Chechnya once and for all (Truscott, p. 102).

Just as the first Chechen war became a reason for criticism and discontent between the West and the Russian State under Yeltsin, so did the second Chechnya war become a huge subject of discomfort between the West and Russia under Putin due to rampant human rights violations there (For example, in June 2000, Human Rights Watch issued a 46 page long report detailing the massacre of at least sixty Chechen civilians in the Grozny suburb of Aldi).

While Russian officials have tried hard to pass Chechnya campaign as purely a fight against the terrorists, the West had huge caveats in terms of conducted human rights violations. The West had tried throughout, sometimes directly or at times diplomatically, to underline the difference between fighting terrorism and obliterating whole cities to the ground.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States did bring to the forefronts the need to cooperate with Russia in the fight against international terrorism. If before 2001 the two powers were unable to agree on any joint endeavors except for passive economic measures, while Bin laden went on and actively consolidated power, after September 11 the main trend has been “for each side to recognize the primary constructive role of the other’s influence... and welcome the other’s influence as a reinforcement of its own” (Straus, 2003, p. 249).

Notably, Putin was one of the first leaders to reach out to U.S. President George W. Bush and to offer assistance in the aftermath of the bombing. However, it is argued that Putin’s rapprochement was not purely altruistic. He harbored number of goals, including the need to considerably mute Western criticism over Chechnya, induce tolerance towards Russian policy of limiting various forms of autonomy on its territory and the need for deeper economic engagement with the West and help with the ongoing efforts to join the World Trade Organization (Hunter, 2003, p. 40). Not surprisingly, part of this new look West policy was also a desire to deepen relations with NATO and increase cooperation and engagement with the

European Union (Ibid., p. 41). ‘In his interview, Putin stated on the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM: “If relations between Russia and the West, Russia and NATO, Russia and the US continue to develop in the spirit of partnership and even of alliance, then no harm will be done” (Interview with the Financial Times, 2001).

Hence, Russia continued to lobby for this goal bilaterally during the high level meetings. However, once the momentum created by the September 11 waned and old disagreements started to resurface especially in the face of talks of further NATO enlargement to include the Baltic States. Russia worried that after the second enlargement, NATO would become the principal organization of collective security in Europe and Moscow would be left as an outsider (Karabeshkin and Spechler, 2007).

Misgivings about Russia’s further integration with the Alliance increased in the Alliance as well. The new Central European NATO Allies argued against such move and lobbied against it in the important NATO capitals. Hence, there was an overwhelming fear that NATO consensus would not take place (Straus, 2003). Besides, voices of opposition from prominent policy-makers highlighted the prevalent hesitation that it was not easy to make friends with Putin’s Russia, which did not deliver. Former Secretary of State, James A. Baker, who back in the early 1990’s argued for NATO’s Eastward expansion to also include democratic Russia in 2001 noted that “the idea that Russia could even be eligible for membership has been met with opposition and indifference, mainly because Russia has never been ripe for membership – because it has embraced democracy and free markets only rhetorically, without creating the institutions or exercising the political will necessary to commit itself fully” (Baker, 2001, p. 95).

Throughout early 2002, Putin argued for a new joint body of cooperation with NATO. He maintained that the council linking Russia and the 19 NATO members “will only be effective if all countries taking part in the process are cooperating on an equal basis (Meyer, 2002, cited in Kulhanek, 2010, p. 151).

The breakthrough came during the NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s visit to NATO in November 2001, just a week after Putin’s U.S. visit and talks with G. W. Bush. Robertson formally proposed the council of twenty to the Russian government. He also gave it a provisional name, the Russia – North Atlantic Council (RNAC). During his press point with *Izvestia* media centre, Robertson suggested:

“The proposal that has been put forward by Prime Minister Blair, Prime Minister Berlusconi of Italy, by Prime Minister Chretien of Canada, by President George W. Bush and others is that on occasion, perhaps on specific subjects, NATO and the Russian Federation, ambassador or minister, ministerial PJC, would sit around the round table in the NATO Council Chamber between Portugal and Spain, and that I, as the chairman of the North Atlantic Council, we chair what might be called the Russia-North Atlantic Council, the RNAC. This is what has been suggested as a name...That would involve Russia having an equality with the NATO countries in terms of the subject matter and would be part of the same compromising trade-offs, give and take, that is involved in day-to-day NATO business” (Press Conference with NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 2001).

The year 2002 was marked by negotiations over the new Council on both sides. What emerged was the Reykjavik meeting, which was in a sense a preparatory Ministerial before the NATO Prague Summit and had to deliver guidance for the development of NATO’s new capabilities, the process of NATO enlargement, creation of new security relations with Russia but as well with Ukraine and other partners (see Final Communiqué, 2002). The Ministerial announced the creation of the NATO Russia Council (NRC) as a replacement to the PJC.

Two weeks after Reykjavik, leaders from the nineteen NATO member states met in Rome with President Putin and adopted a declaration – *NATO–Russia Relations: A New Quality*. The document was solemn in announcing the improvements to NATO-Russia relations:

“The NATO-Russia Council will serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. It will operate on the principle of consensus. It will work on the basis of a continuous political dialogue on security issues among its members with a view to early identification of emerging problems, determination of optimal common approaches and the conduct of joint actions, as appropriate. The members of the NATO-Russia Council, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations, will take joint decisions and will bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. Each member may raise in the NATO-Russia Council issues related to the implementation of joint decisions.”

It enumerated 9 important areas in which the Allies and Russia would cooperate (NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, 2002). The main qualitative difference of the NRC was that NRC was designed to operate on the basis of consensus, with Russian representatives involved in the negotiating process. Under the NRC, Russia created the post of ambassador to NATO, who would participate in monthly meetings of the council. Observers noted a qualitative change in the way representatives from Russia and NATO dealt with each other in the framework of the NRC, compared with the old PJC (Mankoff, 2009, p. 169). The press was upbeat, calling the NRC “the most far-reaching change in the North Atlantic alliance since NATO was founded in 1949” (The New Alliance, 2002).

Basically, Putin’s effort to carve out an equal role for Russia in Euro-Atlantic institutions represents a culmination of the Yeltsin-Kozyrev effort and the PJC as an outcome, later stonewalled by the Kosovo crises. The Putin effort seemed like an attempt to re-launch the NATO-Russia relationship on a basis of what was already set out in the 1997 *Founding Act* (Fawn, 2003, p. 68-69).

Just like with the Founding Act and the PJC, the outcry on NRC was mixed both in Western as well as the Russian media. According to Smith “uncertainty remained about the future of Russia–NATO relations, as did a certain unease over the likely durability of any institutionalised arrangements between the two, especially if a major new crisis were to erupt” (2006, p. 100).

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson provided the most accurate essence of the ongoing situation in European security affairs. He explicated that the only thing that would make the reached arrangement work was a genuine political will:

“People often ask me about the real difference between “19+1” and “20”. My answer is: chemistry rather than arithmetic, as even the best format and seating arrangement can be no substitute for genuine political will and open mind on both sides” (Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the Charles University, 2002).

The Prague 2002 Summit, which declared the ‘big bang’ enlargement to 7 European States, including the Baltics was met with “calmly negative” attitude from Putin (Kelin, 2004) and the NRC continued to work and expand cooperation until the Alliance declared “no business as

usual with Russia” over its military invasion and occupation of Georgia in August of 2008 (Belton et al., 2008).

## **Chapter Summary**

In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union Europe’s foremost collective defence institution NATO arrived at a decision in November 1991 that a new European architecture would require complementary work of “NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe”. Basically, NATO had hold out a hand of cooperation to the crumbling Soviet Union to work towards European security using a framework of ‘interlocking institutions’ that would take up complementary roles to prevent instability and division.

Towards that prospect, already in December 1991, the Alliance launched a brand new format – the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which would include the Allies and former adversaries into a forum to discuss security matters. In a complementary move, Russia broke with its communist past, the new Russian President pledged to build a democratic state based on supremacy of law, the principle of free elections and political pluralism and embraced the idea of *a new system of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok* and the decision by the NATO Council to establish the Atlantic council on cooperation.

However, as the pursuit of integration with the West, development of Democracy and economic reform did not bring improvement to the lives of ordinary Russian citizens these goals lost their appeals and Russian elite started to fall back to the old notions of nationalism and Russian Great Power status.

In 1993 two reports were issued, one by the Foreign Intelligence (FIS) and second a military doctrine, which took a stance against NATO enlargement and perceived such a scenario acceptable only under the condition of major transformation of the Alliance. That position was also clearly explicated in Yeltsin’s letter to presidents Clinton, Mitterrand and chancellor Kohl. The October 1993 letter conveyed a message that expansion of NATO without expansion to include Russia would undermine European security.

At the same time, Russia started to demand its ‘special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the former regions of the USSR’. Also, by 1994 main diplomatic work concentrated

around advancement of CSCE as a *primus inter pares* among existing institutions, to the point of offering to create a Europe's 'security council' made up with the leading powers amongst the CSCE's members and empowered to take executive decisions on behalf of the member states as a whole.

The disagreement over the issue of NATO's imminent enlargement (already in 1994 Clinton administration had made that prospect not contingent on whether but when) became a reason for resurrecting the shadow of the Cold War at the 1994 Budapest CSCE Summit. While Clinton declared that no outside country would be allowed to veto NATO expansion Yeltsin retorted that Europe is in danger of plunging into a cold peace...".

With the degeneration of the first Chechen war into a bloodbath and impasse coupled with Russia's tarnished image from its ongoing interventions in the conflicts in the neighbouring States, Russian initiatives sounded more elusive while the campaign for NATO's enlargement had picked up full speed.

Russian position regarding NATO crystalized in 1995. Kozyrev suggested a two stage approach in which stage first would focus on the implementation of a program of dialogue and cooperation between Russia and NATO and stage two would be a transitional period focused on expanding bilateral and multilateral cooperation under the PfP in conjunction with NATO transformation. The ultimate aim was to move further from the "sixteen plus one" format to a "permanent consultative body."

Meanwhile, Russia pursued its proposed CCSM discussion in the OSCE and in December 1995 called for the formulation of a Charter to place the organization on a legal footing, the creation of a European security council and coordinated activities between the OSCE, the CIS and NATO. The Russian idea was to promote a hierarchical security structure, which would be centered around one institution (the Council) in which Russia would have an equal position and a decision-making power equal to other European and Atlantic powers.

The OSCE carried out the CCSM talks and what emerged instead within the OSCE security process was a concept of co-operative security, which would serve the OSCE concept of comprehensive and indivisible security. Hence, the 1996 Lisbon OSCE document rejected the principle of hierarchy and asserted the principle of freedom of choice stating "no State,

organization or grouping can have any superior responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE region.”

On the Russia-NATO front relations were still centred around achieving an equal partnership, which after six rounds of talks between Secretary General and Russian Foreign Minister as well as other high level meetings resulted into a *Founding Act and a NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC)*. The document gave Russia a great deal of the aspired goals: it promised to revise NATO’s core strategic Concept, to continue to “expand political functions”, and take on “new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’. Most importantly, the document stated that ‘NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy or store nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.

The PJC meetings had marginal success in the beginning while the Russian side completely suspended its participation in the PJC on March 24, 1999 in response to NATO’s operation “Allied Force”. Despite this, marginal relations still continued but never recovered to the fullest during the Yeltsin’s remaining time in office.

With Putin’s ascent to power, his main concern was the diminishing role of Russia and the foreign policy focused on asserting Russia’s supremacy. In the beginning of his first term, Putin pursued a foreign policy, which aimed at Russia integration into NATO, but on Moscow’s terms. In the aftermath of the September 11, Russia used the new anti-terrorist wave to increase its influence on NATO countries while trying to promote a policy of NATO’s transformation into a more political organization. Throughout early 2002, Putin strongly argued for a new joint body of cooperation with NATO. He maintained that the council linking Russia and the 19 NATO members “will only be effective if all countries taking part in the process are cooperating on an equal basis”. The year 2002 was marked by negotiations over the new Council, finally adopting a declaration – *NATO–Russia Relations: A New Quality*, which also announced the creation of a NATO Russia Council (NRC). The main qualitative difference of the NRC was that the decision would be based on consensus, with Russian representatives involved in the negotiating process. Under the NRC, Russia also created the post of ambassador to NATO and started to partake in monthly meetings of the council. Hence, under the NRC, Russia and NATO member states meet as equals “at 20” – instead of in the bilateral “NATO+1” format under the PJC. As a result, it can



be assumed that Russian demands towards the European security architecture were met and no requests for changing it were issued in the first half of the 2000's.

The preceding chapter showed that even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and rebirth of the Russian sovereign state, the attitude towards European security order remained the same in its ultimate aim: to change the security architecture in a way that would dilute NATO to which Russia was not part. In this study period (from 1991 till 1997) at least two tracks can be discerned: first of all the aim was to achieve 'equal' standing with NATO by adopting a format of relationship with NATO that would go beyond those offered to other partner states and the one that would put Russia on par with the NATO Allies. On number of occasions the official Russian position had been that it was necessary to dilute NATO's institutional purpose and nature by demanding to change its core functions and to become a political entity, which, according to Russian position, would then open the way for Russia's membership. Second track of the policy aimed at changing the existing European security architecture through the OSCE. In this respect, the aim was to promote the OSCE as the primary security organization in Europe and to promote a hierarchical order, instead of the 'interlocking' order offered by the European and Atlantic states. The overall aim was to adopt a collective security type of order, in which the great states, including Russia, have superior functions and a veto power.

## **Chapter 5 Conclusions**

In the fourth historical period (1993-2002) that represents one set of a single case study the Russian Federation continued to campaign for changing the existing European security architecture; despite changes in tactics and rhetoric several key goals remained that can be considered as continuous from previous campaigns.

### **What were the concrete initiatives of the Russian Federation *vis a vis* the preferred way of organization of the European Security?**

In the identified period the Russian campaign for changing the security architecture did not follow a coherent strategy; a draft treaty had not been floated either, however, the preferences that were raised throughout Yeltsin's presidency bear striking resemblance in goals and objectives with the previous cases discussed. Major documents and statements that were voicing

the new President and the government's preferences *vis a vis* European Security architecture where the following:

The 'honeymoon phase':

- The 1993 Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) report;
- 1993 Yeltsin address to a forum of the Civic Union in Moscow;
- NATO Russia Summary of Conclusions, 1994.

After the end of the 'honeymoon phase':

- Kozyrev 1994 article: *Russia and NATO: A partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe*;
- Yeltsin's speech at the Budapest CSCE Summit, 1994;
- Kozyrev 1995 article in Foreign Policy.
- Kozyrev speech at a meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers, December 1995.

**What were major Russian preferences *vis a vis* European Security architecture across the identified historical episode?**

- During the 'honeymoon phase' Russian preference was displayed in less inflammatory language but the essence called that the expansion of NATO was synchronized with the change of the Alliance and its adaptation to the changing environment. The Yeltsin letter of 1993 to major Euro-Atlantic powers stated that expansion of NATO without expansion to include Russia would undermine European security.
- Besides the elevated status within the European security architecture Yeltsin also demanded for Russia its special rights in 'its near abroad'. Both he and his foreign Minister have claimed that other organizations needed to grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the former regions of the USSR.
- Whilst Yeltsin seemed to agree with NATO enlargement and the PfP it emerged that the Russian understanding of the process was different from reality; The Russian president considered that the enlargement would be based on accepting the entire former Soviet bloc altogether in its entirety not one by one.

After the honeymoon phase:

- In 1994 main diplomatic work concentrated around advancement of CSCE as a *primus inter pares* among existing institutions, to the point of offering to create a United Nations-style ‘security council’ made up with the leading powers and able to take executive decisions on behalf of the member states as a whole. Once this original scheme proved futile the next tactical manoeuvre was to advance the CSCE both legally and factually as the lead agency in European security affairs. Basically, Russia championed to promote a ‘hierarchical’ organisational structure or ‘co-ordinating role’ for CSCE *vis-à-vis* NATO, the European Union and other international organisations and institutions.
- At the end of year, Yeltsin unveiled the most coherent view of European security calling for the need for a full-fledged all-European organization with a solid legal basis, with a ‘a strong fabric of bilateral agreements on good neighborliness and cooperation among the participating States in all areas’. Promise of either bilaterally or multilaterally negotiated ‘mutual guarantees’ to individual States or groups of States. The goal of this new architecture would be ‘dispute settlement and early prevention and resolution of conflicts’.
- In 1995 the opposition to NATO enlargement and calls for Pan-European security system became more vocal (i. e. Kozyrev FP article). For NATO to become a member of the architecture it needed to ‘get transformed from a military alliance to a political organization with corresponding changes in NATO institutions and basic documents’. In such a case, Russia would be willing to gradually enter into a new NATO along with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.
- The proposed transitional stage included as its aims to move further from the “sixteen plus one” format to a “permanent consultative body” between NATO and Russia.
- After the failed PJC Putin called, from early 2002, for a new joint body of cooperation with NATO with participation on an equal footing.

### **What were the Russian end goals when proposing these initiatives?**

- Major end-goal in the on-going diplomatic effort was to achieve a primary role for Russia in the existing European institutional set-up with a decision-making powers identical to the European States as well as the USA.

- Promotion of a hierarchical institutional structure would make the NATO as well as its eastward enlargement ‘less pressing.’

**What were the factors that resulted in failure of cooperation over the proposed initiative?**

- The continuing economic and social disorder directly affected Yeltsin’s popularity at home and abroad;
- The West viewed Russia as a “defeated superpower”. Most Russians, perceived Russia as both the victim of and victor over the Soviet empire. Hence, no special restriction on Moscow’s freedom of international action was considered justified.
- From the early 90’s Russia’s conduct conveyed in the ‘near abroad’ was aimed at ensuring that local leaders would win that favoured Russia and who would align their foreign policies with it. Such behaviour had quickly raised the fears of Russian neo-imperialism in the Western capitals as well as in other CSCE member states.
- The first and second Chechen wars have become a reason for criticism and discontent between the West and the Russian State under Yeltsin and Putin respectively.
- With the withering of the momentum created by the September 11, old disagreements between Russia and the West started to resurface especially in the face of talks of further NATO enlargement to include the Baltic States.

**What were the factors that contributed to certain outcomes as a result of these initiatives?**

**What were the outcomes?**

- The 1994 Budapest summit endorsed a Russian proposal to launch a discussion on a “Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st century” (CCSM) as part of which Russia tried to promote a collective security order. The 1996 Lisbon OSCE document rejected the principle of hierarchy and asserted the principle of freedom of choice stating that “no State, organization or grouping can have any superior responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE region” (The Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, 1996).
- Six rounds of talks between NATO and Russia (January 1997 - May 1997), culminated in a “*Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the*

*Russian Federation*” signed on May 27, in Paris. The Act created the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).

- The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States brought to the forefronts the need to cooperate with Russia in the fight against international terrorism.
- NATO member states and Russia adopting a declaration – *NATO–Russia Relations: A New Quality* and creating the NATO Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002, in Rome. Unlike the PJC, it operated on the bases of consensus.

Although the major goal of creating a hierarchical collective security type order in Europe did not materialize, Russia’s new president continued to focus on mounting domestic and global security reputation, mainly by capitalizing on the raising oil prices. The Prague 2002 Summit, which declared the ‘big bang’ enlargement was met with “calmly negative” attitude by Putin and the NRC continued to work and expand cooperation until the Alliance declared “no business as usual with Russia” over its military invasion and occupation of Georgia in August of 2008. Once again, the new Russian government went on to blame the new European security crisis on the broken security order in Europe.

## References

- Adomeit, H., 1998. Russian national security interests, in Allison, R. and Bluth, C. eds., 1998. *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.s
- Arbatov, G., 1994. Eurasia Letter: A New Cold War? *Foreign Policy*, No. 95, pp. 90-103.
- Asmus, R. D., 2002. Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Baker, A. J., 2002. Russia in NATO? *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 95-103.
- Belton, C. and et al, 2008. NATO says 'no business as usual' with Russia. *Financial Times*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c7219756-6de1-11dd-b5df-0000779fd18c.html#axzz3hOTd6Ta0>> [Accessed on July 30, 2015].
- Bugajski, J., 2004. *Cold Peace. Russia's New Imperialism*. Westport, Conn. London: Praeger.
- Church, G. J., Donnelly, S. B., and Simmons, A. M., 1994. Next, a Cold Peace? *Time Magazine*. [online] Available at: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,982016,00.html#ixzz1SlPoyDJC> [Accessed on July 21, 2011].
- Cohen, R., 1993. Yeltsin Opposes Expansion Of NATO in Eastern Europe, *The New York Times*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/02/world/yeltsin-opposes-expansion-of-nato-in-eastern-europe.html>> [Accessed on July 15, 2015].
- Donaldson H. R., and Noguee. L. J., 2015. *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests*. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge.
- Friedman, L. T., 1991. SOVIET DISARRAY; Yeltsin Says Russia Seeks to Join NATO. *The New York Times*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/21/world/soviet-disarray-yeltsin-says-russia-seeks-to-join-nato.html>> [Accessed on July 15, 2015].
- Goldgeier, M. J., 2010. *Not Whether But when: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Goldgeier, M. J., and McFaul, M., 2003. *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Gvosdev, K. N., ed., 2008. *The Strange Death of Soviet Communism: A Postscript*. The National Interest Series, Transaction Publishers.
- Hawkes, M., et al, 2000. Russia, Chechnya, February 5: A Day of Slaughter in Novye Aldi, *Human Rights Watch*, [online] Available at: <[http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/russia\\_chechnya3/](http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/russia_chechnya3/)> [Accessed on July 20, 2015].

- Heath, M., 2001. Putin prepares for long march to NATO, *The Russia Journal*, 039.
- Hill, F., et al, 1994. “Back in the USSR” Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs Of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Toward Russia. [online] Available at:  
<<http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/03/back-in-the-ussr-1994-hill-jewett/back-in-the-ussr-1994.pdf>> [Accessed on July 15, 2015].
- Hunter, R. E., 2000. Solving Russia: Final Piece in NATO’s Puzzle. *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 115-134.
- Hunter, R.E., 2003. NATO-Russia Relations after 11 September, *Journal Of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies*, 3, 3, pp. 28-54, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, viewed 28 July 2015.
- Ivanov, I., 1999. ‘Europe on the Threshold of the 21st Century’, *International Affairs*, (Moscow), Vol. 45, No. 1, 1999,
- Kelin, A., 2004. Attitude to NATO Expansion: Calmly Negative. *International Affairs*, vol. 50, no. 1, 2004, pp. 17-25.
- Kozyrev, A. 1994. Russia and NATO: A partnership for a united and peaceful Europe, *NATO Review*, 1994, vol. 42, no. 4. [online] Available at:  
<<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1994/9404-1.htm>> [Accessed on July 15, 2011].
- Kozyrev, A., 1994. Russia and NATO: A Partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1994/9404-1.htm>> [Accessed on July 15, 2015].
- Kozyrev, A., 1995. Partnership or Cold peace? *Foreign Policy*, No. 99, pp. 3-14
- Kulhanek, J., 2010. Putin’s Foreign Policy and the Founding of the NATO–Russia Council. *CEJIS*, issue 3:1. [online] Available at  
<[http://static.cejiss.org/data/uploaded/13835988606132/KulhanekPutins\\_Foreign\\_Policy.pdf](http://static.cejiss.org/data/uploaded/13835988606132/KulhanekPutins_Foreign_Policy.pdf)> [Accessed on July 28, 2015].
- Leonid A. Karabeshkin and Dina R. Spechler, “EU and NATO Enlargement: Russia’s Expectations, Responses and Options for the Future,” *European Security*, 16 (September 2007): 307-328.
- Lynch, D., 1999. “Walking the tightrope”: The Kosovo conflict and Russia in European security, 1998–August 1999. *European Security*, vol. 8, no. 4.
- Lynch, D., 2000. Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Webber, M. ed., 2000. *Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation?* Basingstoke: Macmillan
- Mankoff, J., 2009. *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc.

- Mendelsohn, J., 1997. The NATO Russia Founding Act. *Arms Control Today*. [online] Available at: <[https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997\\_05/jm](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/jm)> [Accessed on July 18, 2015].
- Meyer, H., 2002. Putin demands “equal” role with NATO, *The Baltic Times*, 2.
- Motolla, K., 1998. Collective and Co-operative Security Arrangement in Europe in Koskenniemi, M. ed., 1998. *International Law Aspects of the European Union*. Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Muratov, D., 2014. “The Chechen wars murdered Russian democracy in its cradle.” *The Guardian*.
- n. a. 1991. Letter from President Boris Yeltsin to President George Bush, National Security Archives. [online] Available at: <<http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB447/1991-1100%20Letter%20from%20President%20Yeltsin%20to%20President%20Bush.PDF>> [Accessed on July 20, 2015].
- n. a. 1991. North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership And Cooperation. [online] Available at: <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_23841.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23841.htm?selectedLocale=en)> [Accessed on July 20, 2015].
- n. a. 1992. Aid to Russia; Excerpts From Bush’s Remarks on Aid Plan: ‘Today We Must Win the Peace.’ *The New York Times*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/02/world/aid-russia-excerpts-bush-s-remarks-aid-plan-today-we-must-win-peace.html?pagewanted=1>> [Accessed on July 15, 2015].
- n. a., 1993. The President’s News Conference With President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow. [online] Available at: <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20409>> [Accessed on July 15, 2015].
- n. a., 1994. Summary Conclusions. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940622a.htm>> [Accessed on July 14, 2015].
- n. a., 1994. Text of Moscow Declaration by President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin, Moscow, Russia. [online] Available at: <<http://fas.org/nuke/control/detarget/docs/940114-321186.htm>> [Accessed on July 18, 2015].
- n. a., 1994. The President’s News Conference With Visegrad Leaders in Prague, [online] Available at: <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49832>> [Accessed on July 15, 2015].
- n.a. 1991. Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm>> [Accessed on July 20, 2015].



- n.a. 1992. The Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change” [online] Available at: <<http://www.osce.org/node/39530>> [Accessed on July 25, 2015].
- n.a. 1993. The President’s News Conference With President Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow. [online] Available at: <<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20409>> [Accessed on July 20, 2015].
- n.a. 1995. Areas for Pursuance of a Broad, Enhanced NATO/Russia Dialogue and Cooperation. [online] Available at: <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_24750.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24750.htm?selectedLocale=en)> [Accessed on July 28, 2015].
- n.a. 1996. About Turn, Forward March with Europe: New Directions for Defence and Security Policy, *Institute for Public Policy Research*.
- n.a. 1996. The Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century.
- n.a. 2001. Interview with the Financial Times, December. [online] Available at: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21447>> [Accessed on July 18, 2015].
- n.a. 2001. Press Conference with NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, Izvestia Media Center, Moscow, Russian Federation. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011122b.htm>> [Accessed on July 18, 2015].
- n.a. 2002. Final Communiqué Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Reykjavik. [online] Available at: <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_19577.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19577.htm?selectedLocale=en)> [Accessed on July 18, 2015].
- n.a. 2002. NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation. [online] Available at: <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_19572.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19572.htm)> [Accessed on July 20, 2015].
- Neely, M. S. ed., 1996. OSCE in Lisbon: ‘Marred’ by row over European Security, United States Information Agency, Foreign Media Reaction Report. [online] Available at: <<http://fas.org/man/nato/news/1996/www1204.html>> [Accessed on July 27, 2015].
- Nygren, B., 2008. *The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin’s Foreign Policy Towards the CIS Countries*. London: Routledge.
- Roeder, P., 1997. From hierarchy to hegemony: the post-Soviet security complex, in Lake, D. and Morgan, P. eds., *Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 219–244.
- Rupp E. R. and McKenzie, M. M., 1998. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Institutional Reform and Political Reality in McKenzie, M. M. and Loedel H. P. eds., 1998. *The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation: States, Interests, and Institutions*. Westport: Praeger Publishers, Greenwood Publishing Group.

- Sakwa, R., 2002. *Russian Politics and Society*. 3<sup>rd</sup>. ed. London: Routledge.
- Simes, D., 1994. The Return of Russian History. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1, pp. 67-82.
- Smith, M., 2006. *Russia and NATO Since 1991: From Cold War Through Cold Peace to Partnership?* Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge.
- Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the Charles University. Prague, March 21, 2002. [online] Available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020321a.htm>> [Accessed on July 30, 2015].
- Straus, I., 2003. NATO: The Only West That Russia Has?, *Demokratizatsiya*, 11, 2, p. 229, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, viewed 28 July 2015.
- Talbott, S. 2002. *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*, New York: Random House.
- Truscott, P., 1997. *Russia First: Breaking with the West*, London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.
- Velitchkova, G., 2002. NATO-OSCE Interaction in Peacekeeping: Experience and Prospects in Southeast Europe, *NATO/EAPC Research Fellowship 2000-2002, Final Report*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/Velitchkova.pdf>> [Accessed on July 25, 2015].
- Williams, D., 1994. Yeltsin, Clinton Clash over NATO's Role. *The Washington Post*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/12/06/yeltsin-clinton-clash-over-natos-role/19b7b3a1-abd1-4b1e-b4b2-362f1a236ce9/>> [Accessed on July 15, 2015].

## **CHAPTER 6: The Medvedev Initiative - the Treaty on European Security (2008-2011)**

### **Introduction**

The aim of this chapter is to explore the fifth historical episode in which Russia evoked the topic of overarching European Security Treaty for the whole of Europe to be agreed by at a general conference. The prelude, the interlude as well as the postlude of the initiative bear striking resemblances to the other four historical episodes despite the time lapse, change in leadership and the international security and political environment. The Russian side argued that since the end of the Cold War Europe still did not have a functioning security system. In this episode, spanning from 2008 till 2011 the new President of Russia demanded withering away of existing security institutions under an umbrella of a binding Treaty on European Security and an architecture in which all countries (especially the big ones) would enjoy a veto power over security matters. The beginning of the campaign in July 2008 was briefly interrupted with Russian military adventure in August 2008 towards Georgia due to almost all-around diplomatic isolation of Russia. However, overtaken by the need for cooperation and pragmatism, Russia came to be accepted slowly but surely in official European circles and already in October 2008 Russia resumed its campaign for new model of European security, arguing that the Georgia crisis was an embodiment of the broken security architecture in Europe.

Hence, the current Chapter will explore the environment in which the initiative sprung with a new light, the international reactions, the phases of the campaign and its outcomes.

### **The background in which the Medvedev campaign unfolded**

In December of 2003 the President's party United Russia won a majority in the parliamentary elections followed by Putin's own landslide victory in the Presidential elections in March of 2004. Domestically, strengthening the Kremlin's grip on vertical power, its control over the regions, the media and the civil society has been at the centre of Putin's policies (Pravda, 2005, p. 24). Another distinct feature of Putin's presidency was the unprecedented tightening of security controls in the country in the face of on-going problems in the North Caucasus and ensuing terrorist acts, while at the same time framing these problems in terms of a war against international terrorism (ibid., p. 32).

According to William Tompson the strategy of persecutions (such as with Khodorkovsky and Yukos) has enabled Putin to subjugate even the most assertive tycoons. The business leaders have accepted that they are dependent on the Kremlin and have adjusted their actions accordingly. Namely, in the 2003 elections they have concentrated their investments in the presidential party, United Russia (Tompson, in Pravda ed., 2005, p. 179)

These domestic developments, combined with Kremlin's moves to tighten control, reinforced the Western concerns about the authoritarian direction of Putin's Russia.

Putin's assertiveness was bolstered by the increase in commodity prices, such as the price of petroleum (which rose from about 10 USD per barrel in 1999 and to over a 100 USD per barrel). According to Goldman, "because of the increase in oil prices, Russia's rebounding economy would make whoever was in office at the time look like an economic genius" (2008, p. 96). After introducing the flat tax, combined with high oil prices, Russia's GDP started to grow. In parallel with the growth of GDP, Putin increased the size of Russia's military budget, by 27 percent in 2005 and 22 percent in 2006 (ibid., p. 97). He also went on to reclaim the State ownership of oil and gas outputs. For example, in 2000, the state's share of total crude oil production was 16 percent; by late 2007, it had increased to about 50 percent (ibid., p. 99). In the same manner, the State reclaimed the control over the Gazprom, by removal of both Chernomyrdin and Vyakhirev from management and their replacement with Dmitri Medvedev and Alexei Miller, Putin's acquaintances from the days of his work in St. Petersburg (ibid., p. 177). Overall, according to Goldman, by 2008 the situation was such that:

"... if the Russians or Gazprom threaten to halt the flow of their natural gas, there is little anyone can do about it. After twenty years or so, Russia's natural gas has become an integral part of the economies in the countries it serves. The European pipeline network does distribute gas from other countries but by far the greatest flow is from Russia. If the gas flowing from Russia—or the gas transiting from Central Asia in the Russian pipeline—were to be curtailed, consumers in Germany and other Central European countries near the Russian border would have a difficult time finding a substitute (Ibid., p.178)".

According to Pravda, Putin was a double realist:

“He takes pride in recognizing realities and dealing with them practically. He is a realist, too, in the Hobbesian sense of seeing the world as an arena where the weak lose out to the strong. While he may extol the merits of cooperation and compromise, Putin’s actions testify to an understanding of politics as ultimately a zero-sum game in which determination and power decide conflicts. This kind of thinking was of course central to the Bolshevik tradition and the Soviet security culture in which Putin spent his formative professional years. One must be careful not to exaggerate and oversimplify the ‘KGB effect’ on his style of leadership. At the same time, one should not overlook features of his approach to problems that might well have been reinforced by training and experience in the intelligence community. Prominent among these is Putin’s inclination to frame problems as threats and challenges to state power (2005, p. 28).

In parallel to Russia’s emergence as an energy superpower, Putin revamped the country’s security outlook as seen from the various editions of country’s security documents, such as the National Security Concept (2000), the Military Doctrine (2000) and the Foreign Policy Concept (2000). Marcel De Haas finds that while in the 1997 National Security Concept (NSC) expressed a positive view of international developments and placed internal problems at the centre of Russia’s national security, the newest edition changed the objectives from stress on international cooperation to cooperation and integration within the CIS. Overall, “Major points of view in the security documents of 2000 were an assertive attitude towards the West, strengthening Russia’s position both within the CIS and on a global level, as well as an emphasis on military means as an instrument of security policy” (De Haas, 2010, p. 16). Document included references to the principles of foreign and security policies for achieving the external objectives of Russia’s grand strategy. In ensuring security by foreign policy, priority was given to the UN Security Council (Ibid., pp. 17-18).

The second generation of security papers (the 2007 “Overview of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” and the 2008 Strategy 2020) also provided reoccurring topics such as the USA and NATO, including themes such as the Missile shield and NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia. These were continuously considered as threats to Russia’s national security. US unilateralism as well as the prominent place for the Russian dominated CSTO remained as reoccurring topics. Russia’s newfound strength was cast in both documents as a dominant new feature, asserting that Russia had regained its power status in the international arena and this development had to be taken into account by other actors. A new topic was that of energy

security in terms of energy politics, diplomacy, reserves, conflicts and the threat of force to obtain energy resources (Ibid., p. 34-35).

This growing gap regarding security policies and outlooks between Russia and the West was elucidated by Putin at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. He spoke of the end of the unilateral world, which did nothing good for the World, including for the United States. Having the Iraq war in mind, Putin heavily criticized the unilateral use of force, claiming that such policies created more troubles than provided solutions. He reviewed the whole range of disarmament and security regimes including the INF and the CFE and put the entire blame on the West for lack of progress or stagnation. Putin was especially critical of the Western plans for Missile Defense and NATO enlargement. At the same time, he lamented the fact that Russia was also discriminated against in terms of investments as well.<sup>16</sup> Senator John McCain criticized the speech as the “most aggressive remarks by a Russian leader since the end of the Cold War” (Fidler and Sevastopulo, 2007). The media and experts overwhelmingly agreed that Putin speech sounded a lot like Cold War rhetoric (Watson, 2007). The official Washington dismissed the speech as mainly aimed at the internal Russian audience. A white House spokesman, Gordon D. Johndroe said in statement that Washington was disappointed and that Putin’s accusations were wrong and that Washington’s expectation was to continue cooperation with Russia on important issues for international community (Shanker and Landler, 2007). The speech was criticized in other Western capitals as well making the point that oil and mineral revenues have emboldened Mr. Putin but that they saw double standards in his approach as it was Russia that used energy to reward some and punish others (Ibid., 2007).

One of the most vivid breaking points was Russia’s suspension of the CFE treaty at the end of 2007. The process had started earlier in July, when Putin announced that unless the treaty limits on Russia and NATO were altered according to Moscow’s preferences, Russia’s implementation of the treaty would cease. Granted the lack of European deference, already in December Russia’s Foreign Ministry announced that it would no longer provide information or host inspections per treaty requirements but it would continue to attend the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) meetings (Boese, 2008).

---

<sup>16</sup> Full text can be viewed from Washington Post online:  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>

As the election year loomed the worries of growing authoritarianism was augmented. One big factor of concern was the widespread belief that Putin would change constitution to remain in power; however, contrary to the outlooks, in December 2007 Putin endorsed Medvedev's candidacy for President. In March 2008, Medvedev won by a landslide victory against three other rivals, in a campaign that was widely criticized abroad, almost matching Putin's 2004 record. Putin has agreed to serve as prime minister after Medvedev took over in May as the third President of Russia. Under this proposed power configuration, experts predicted that tensions between the two officials would be inevitable due to the controversial division of power (Finn, 2008).

It was in this international and domestic setting that Medvedev took over the Presidency and within a month of take over started a strong the campaign for the new Treaty on European Security (TES) which was first voiced during his first official visit to Germany.

#### **Medvedev's address to the German political, parliamentary and civic leaders, Berlin, 5 June, 2008**

During his official visit to Germany, at the meeting with nearly 1000 German political, parliamentary and civic leaders in Berlin, the president of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev championed the idea of "drafting and signing a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organisations currently working in the Euro-Atlantic area could become parties..." (Medvedev, 2008a).

A rather lengthy speech opened with an extended segment on the critique of the existing institutions in Europe and the alleged attempts to "replace the UN with 'exclusive format' groups" (Ibid.). From the regional organizations the OSCE and NATO were singled out for criticism and ironically dubbed as the culprits for bringing down the existing world order. President Medvedev lamented that:

"An organisation such as the OSCE could, it would seem, embody European civilisation's newfound unity, but it is prevented from doing so, prevented from becoming a full-fledged general regional organisation" (Ibid.).

It was explained that the problem with OSCE incompleteness lay with “the old line of bloc politics.” President spoke how NATO failed to find its new purpose and how its intention to expand would ‘ruin’ the existing relations with Russia or future prospects. From that perspective, he proposed a regional pact and a general European summit to achieve this goal:

“We could look at a regional pact based, naturally, on the principles of the UN Charter and clearly defining the role of force as factor in relations within the Euro-Atlantic community. This pact could achieve a comprehensive resolution of the security indivisibility and arms control issues in Europe that are of such concern to us all. I also propose that we consider holding a general European summit to start the process of drafting this agreement” (Ibid.,).

The crux of the initiative was “drafting and signing a legally binding treaty on European security in which the organizations currently working in the Euro-Atlantic area could become parties” (Ibid.,). This was most certainly a hint that the CSTO and the CIS would need to be legitimate participants of any such security architecture. The Helsinki Final Act was named as a historical analogy but the scope of the proposed treaty was compared to the 1928 Kellogg Briand pact.

Notably, Medvedev called on states to participate in the Summit as individual countries “...leaving aside any allegiances to blocs or other groups. National interests stripped bare of any distorting ideological motivations should be the starting point for all taking part” (Ibid.,). Unmistakably, this was an open message that Russia desired NATO and European Union member countries not to coordinate their positions in the proposed negotiations but rather to operate with their own “national interest.” This tactic seemed to be aimed on capitalization of the existing nationalistic tendencies in Europe but at the same time making sure to preclude any collective resistance from the West, for example on ideological differences of opinion on democracy.

It was stated implicitly that this pact would be a “regional pact” based on UN principles, which would “clearly define the role of force as factor in relations within the Euro-Atlantic community” (Ibid.,). Attributing a regional dimension to the pact as well as calling for the need to clarify the role of use of force meant that Russia was openly campaigning to curtail the US influence and obtain an outside veto on NATO decision-making through this pact (Van Harpen, 2008 and Io, 2009).



The speech then continued to other areas in which Russia was interested such as Russia's preference for "a common technological space" (Medvedev, 2008a). After unveiling this initiative Medvedev attempted to address some of the major grievances of the Euro-Atlantic countries towards Russia, including the issue of human rights, the treatment of NGO's and the issue of Media freedom. However, this was done in a manner of prevalent official Russian rhetoric leaving intact the existing and widening value gap between Russia and the rest of the European and Atlantic countries on these matters.

According to one of the observers, initiative came as a complete surprise to German media and most of the German press failed to even highlight the proposal. It was alleged that apparently Russia hoped that the evolving Russo-German "special relationship" could serve as a fruitful environment for voicing Russian newest proposal of this sort. Notably, unlike their historical analogues, when the primary targets of such campaign in Europe were the left-leaning opposition groups, this time the audience for the restarted Russian campaign was the businesses and civil society (Socor, 2008).

After this international exposure, Medvedev adopted the initiative as part of Russia's Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) introduced in July, 2008. The Concept stated:

"The main objective of the Russian foreign policy on the European track is to create a truly open, democratic system of regional collective security and cooperation ensuring the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, in such a way as not to allow its new fragmentation and reproduction of bloc-based approaches which still persist in the European architecture that took shape during the Cold War period. This is precisely the essence of the initiative aimed at concluding a European security treaty, the elaboration of which could be launched at a pan-European summit" (Foreign Policy Concept, 2008).

The Foreign Policy Concept made a bit more impact than the pronouncement in Berlin, however the initiative was still dismissed as something purely aimed at weakening NATO, OSCE and other European security institutions. Hence, Russia's Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin was tasked to clarify the matter at the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on July 28, 2008. After NATO Ambassadors' critique and myriad of questions it was promised that further explanations would be provided at the next NRC meeting set for 24 September. However, that prospect was

postponed as the NATO suspended the NRC format *vis a vis* Russia's military aggression against Georgia in August, 2008 (De Haas, 2010, p. 131).

### **The Russian-Georgian Conflict of August 2008 and its implications for European Security**

Along with the increase of Russia's assertiveness, its policies have toughened in its supposed sphere of influence, especially towards Georgia, which was displaying firm willingness as well as the ability to reform and perform to be qualified for European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Russia's political aggression and hostile, destabilizing moves have particularly accelerated from the beginning of 2008, as Georgia awaited for a strong signal from NATO's upcoming Bucharest Summit.

As a first notable destabilizing move, on March 6, 2008 Russia left the CIS sanctions regime imposed on Abkhazia, citing "changed circumstances" and calling on other CIS members to follow the suit (n. a. Civil Georgia, 2008). Russia started to openly treat Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and repeatedly violated Georgia's skies in a show of force (n. a. Reliefweb, 2007). After the Bucharest NATO Summit, which stated that Georgia will become a member of NATO (Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008) Russia entered its railway forces in Abkhazia and enforced peacekeeping battalions in both conflict regions with artillery and airborne forces, much against the essence of its peacekeeping mandate (n. a. Civil Georgia, June, 2008).

As some authors claim Russia was prepared for a military confrontation with Georgia since 2006 (Illarionov, 2009). Later in 2012, Putin attested publicly, that the plan to attack Georgia was drawn as early as in 2006. In an interview he stated: "It's not a secret that there was a plan. The Russian side was acting exactly within the framework of this plan (n. a. Russia Today, 2012).

Before the outbreak of the war from the beginning of August 2008 Russian mercenaries and South Ossetian militia were being mobilized and started shelling of Georgian villages with machine guns and grenade launchers. As a result of the shelling civilians and police servicemen became heavily injured. Tskhinvali also reported casualties (n. a. Civil Georgia, August, 2008). This led to the escalation of tension and eventually a full out attack on Tskhinvali by the Georgian regular forces. As the International Fact Finding Mission stated "the shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian armed forces during the night of 7 to 8 August 2008 marked the

beginning of the large-scale armed conflict in Georgia, yet it was only the culminating point of a long period of increasing tensions, provocations and incidents” (IIFMCG, 2009, p. 11). This resulted in Russia’s full-scale military advance into Georgia’s territory well beyond Tskhinvali region, with accompanying destruction and blockade of the county and a combination of many illegal acts, which were deemed as disproportionate, not justifiable and in violation of international law (IIFMCG, 2009, pp. 25-26).

As Condoleezza Rice remembers in her memoirs, Russia’s ultimate goal was to change the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili and even demanded from the US that they were entitled to regime change; however, the US firmly stood the position of unacceptability of regime change of a democratically elected government of a sovereign country. With firm political support from the international community Georgian forces regrouped to defend the capital at all cost while the cease-fire was under negotiation (Rice, 2011, pp. 688-689).

August 12 cease-fire agreement was drawn up with active participation of the EU Presidency, French President, Nicolas Sarkozy. This agreement was then followed up by the September 8 implementing measures, through which Russia pledged to withdraw its forces and allow the EU monitors, as well as to continue the UN and OSCE missions. Russia indeed consented on the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission, however never allowed the monitors to enter the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2009, Russia discontinued the UN and OSCE presence in the two occupied regions leaving Abkhazia and South Ossetia with no credible international presence, hence halting any reports on either the security, or, human rights situation in the two regions, now under effective Russian occupation (Robinson, 2009). In parallel, Russia has remained largely in breach of the six-point cease-fire agreement (See for example European Parliament Resolution, 2011).

On August 26, 2008 in a move to legitimize its illegal military presence on another country’s sovereign territory, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and campaigned to get other countries to do the same. However, the policy took a great deal of “check book diplomacy” and still only three other countries followed the suit - Nauru, Venezuela and Nicaragua. Two more states, Vanuatu and Tuvalu first recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but then re-established the diplomatic ties with Georgia in 2013 and 2014 respectively (n. a. RFEL, 2014). Basically, non-recognition “war” ensued between Georgia and Russia, with the international community and particularly the EU and NATO supporting the

former (Ker-Lindsay, 2012).

As Ronald Asmus points out, the main reason for the war was that Georgia chose pro-Western course over pro-Russian alternative. “The Kremlin openly told Tbilisi it had to decide whether they were on the side of Moscow or the West and that Moscow’s attitude on resolving the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be driven by Georgia’s answer to that central question” (Asmus, 2010). Most authors ascribed to this view, however Russia maintained a narrative that the war was a result of bad security architecture in Europe and first and foremost continued existence and enlargement of NATO. Notably, the OSCE report of the Eminent Persons in 2015 gave two narratives of the 2008 war.<sup>17</sup> According to the Russian narrative “Before the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, the West did not even pretend to consult Russia, although the promise of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine was, as President Putin later said, “a direct threat” to Russian security”. Therefore Russia stopped the NATO enlargement by attacking Georgia (OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons, 2015, p. 25). According to the Western and Georgian narratives, “The intervention by Russia was a response to the active pro-NATO and pro-EU policy of Georgia. After the April 2008 Bucharest decision that stated that “Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO”, Russia resorted to the use of force to stop the enlargement process. Moreover, Russia occupied the two territories of Georgia and declared them independent states. This was a new paradigm that no one was ready for. At least, Russia could not be called neutral any more: it became a clear party to the conflict” (OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons, 2015, p. 28).

Russia’s military invasion and then occupation of two Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia further widened the existing value gap between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community of states (for detailed account of the war see Asmus, 2010; Cornell and Starr, 2009). This was an event of huge magnitude for European security. Europe has not witnessed such a military incident since the Balkan crises of the 1990’s but those were hardly a comparison as they were rather ethnic conflicts compared to classical inter-state war.

---

<sup>17</sup> The Panel of eminent persons was launched on the initiative of the 2014 Swiss OSCE Chairmanship in close co-operation with Serbia and Germany at the OSCE Ministerial Council 2014 in Basel on 4 December. The panel was tasked to prepare the basis for an inclusive and constructive security dialogue across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions, reflecting on how to re-build trust among OSCE participating States, and examine perceived threats in the OSCE area and potential common solutions. OSCE website, online at: <<http://www.osce.org/networks/pep>>

The war created system wide crises, as it was an expression of complete and unwarranted violation of existing rules and norms of the international law and fundamental principles of European security architecture. The occurrence evoked a wide range of criticism towards Russia with most Western States supporting a range of restrictive measures such as suspension of NRC as well as suspension of Russia's place in the G8 in parallel to providing political and humanitarian support to Georgia (Larsen, 2013).

Most notably, following the conflict, the EU member states held the Extraordinary European Council on 1 September 2008. The presidency conclusions read: "The European Council is gravely concerned by the open conflict which has broken out in Georgia, by the resulting violence and by the disproportionate reaction of Russia" (Council of the European Union, 2008).

Furthermore, the Council strongly condemned Russia's unilateral decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and called it "unacceptable" urging all member states not to recognize this proclaimed independence (Ibid.). The Council pronounced that "the EU and Russia have reached a crossroads" and that the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement would be postponed "until troops have withdrawn to the positions held prior to 7 August" (Ibid.)

Notably, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has also met in a special foreign ministerial session on 19 August 2008 to discuss the situation in Georgia and its implications for Euro-Atlantic stability and security. NAC welcomed the cease-fire agreement and stressed the need for its swift and complete implementation. Allies also "re-affirmed their support for Georgia's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence..." (n. a. NATO News, 2008). It was also decided to set up a NATO-Georgia Commission that would follow up the decision taken during the 2008 Bucharest Summit (Ibid.). In parallel, NATO suspended the NRC "until Russia adhered to the ceasefire and the future of our relations will depend on the concrete actions Russia will take to abide by the ... peace plan"; "We are not closing doors", said Secretary General during the Press conference, but "we...cannot continue with business as usual... as long as Russia does not commit to the principles upon which we agreed to base our relationship" (Ibid.).

Being practically under Western isolation and hence failing to attract an active engagement, much like in the 1960's when the Soviet initiative was kept alive within the Warsaw Pact, Russia moved on to champion its initiative at forums where it enjoyed exclusivity and dominance. At the Moscow meeting of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on 4 September

Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov concluded that the CSTO had agreed to 'organize joint work' on creating a European security treaty (De Haas, 2010, p. 131).

All in all, after the war with Georgia, Russia's image of a moderate, stable and norm abiding country, which Mr. Putin was harnessing during his tenure, disappeared with Russia's military adventure in Georgia. In the eyes of European partners, from that war Russia emerged with a new reputation of an unpredictable and irresponsible partner.

## **Second phase of the Campaign: Evian, Nice and Helsinki**

### ***World Policy Conference, Evian, France, 6-8 October, 2008***

The next big European forum at which the initiative was reinforced was at Evian, France. Notably, from that point on Russia-EU relations started revival. Medvedev used the conference to officially declare the withdrawal of Russian troops from two "buffer zones" inside Georgia, two days before the set deadline (n. a. DW, 2008). Sarkozy welcomed this development but did underscore that "The full implementation of the (Georgia peace) accords... paves the way for the resumption of negotiations on an ambitious framework agreement" that would "lead the way towards a real human and economic common space" (Ibid.,).

Medvedev's speech was as critical as usual towards the West and the US in particular. NATO's enlargement was again depicted as hostile and unacceptable act for Russia. In terms of the ESA initiative, the speech was important as Medvedev unveiled the five underlining principles for the proposed Treaty, albeit recognizing the lack of substance critique:

1. The Treaty should clearly affirm the basic principles for security and intergovernmental relations in the Euro-Atlantic area. These principles include the commitment to fulfil in good faith obligations under international law; respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states, and respect for all of the other principles set out in the truly fundamental document that is the United Nations Charter.
2. The inadmissibility of the use of force or the threat of its use in international relations should be clearly affirmed. It is fundamental for the Treaty to guarantee uniform interpretation and implementation of those principles. The treaty could also cement a unified approach to the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts in the Euro-

Atlantic space. The emphasis should be on negotiated settlements that take into account the different sides' positions and strictly respect peacekeeping mechanisms. It would perhaps be useful to set out the dispute resolution procedures themselves.

3. It should guarantee equal security, and I mean equal security and not any other kind of security. In this respect we should base ourselves on three 'no's. Namely, no ensuring one's own security at the expense of others. No allowing acts (by military alliances or coalitions) that undermine the unity of the common security space. And finally, no development of military alliances that would threaten the security of other parties to the Treaty. We need to concentrate on military and political issues because it is hard security that plays a determining role today. And it is here that we have seen a dangerous deficit of controlling mechanisms recently.
4. It is important to confirm in the Treaty that no state or international organization can have exclusive rights to maintaining peace and stability in Europe. This applies fully to Russia as well.
5. It would be good to establish basic arms control parameters and reasonable limits on military construction. Also needed are new cooperation procedures and mechanisms in areas such as WMD proliferation, terrorism and drug trafficking (Medvedev, 2008b).

The biggest difference between Medvedev's Evian statement and his Berlin address was the shift in geographic focus from European to Euro-Atlantic. There was now an implicit understanding that the US could not be excluded from any revised security architecture, focus from a purely regional undertaking shifted to a more global one and 'Euro-Atlantic' versus European, became a more frequently used term. Issues of common concern with a more global scope were highlighted, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism. Moreover, instead of calling on nations to participate in their individual capacity, he now invited "all key Euro-Atlantic organisations" to take part in a European security conference (Lo, 2009, pp. 3-4.).

Medvedev urged for the convening of a "special forum" at which "the leaders of all European states and the leaders of key organisations in the Euro-Atlantic area could take part." Sarkozy was a very responsive host, himself calling for a total reconstruction of the European security structure and proposing for an OSCE Summit in 2009 "to discuss (Russian) proposals and those of the European Union for new concepts of a pan-European defence" (n. a. DW, 2008).

### ***Prior to Nice Summit***

While Russia was busy with breaking the isolation by diluting the attention from concrete issues to a general issue of security architecture, the EU was struggling on the tactics of whether to resume talks with Russia or continue with the isolation. At the meeting of EU Foreign Ministers on 10 November, the Commission received a political backing to pursue negotiations on the EU-Russia Agreement. However, prior to the long planned 14 November EU-Russia Summit in Nice number of EU officials have made their statements to clarify the fact that Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity was still a priority. The most telling was the statement by Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who underscored that the review of EU Russia relations has received overwhelming backing from EU member States, however:

“Our team will approach the forthcoming negotiations with Russia with a clear-eyed sense of where the EU sees its own advantage. At the same time, the EU stands firm on the positions we have adopted since the Georgia crisis: the Geneva process must advance, and the principle of territorial integrity must be upheld (European Commission Press Release, 2008).

Although the EU maintained that it “does not accept status quo in Georgia” and that full implementation of the 12 August ceasefire agreement and 8 September implementing measures were essential, it was becoming clear that the hard-liners within the EU, who called for sanctions and no-business as usual with Russia until its full compliance, did not manage to forge a consensus (n. a. 2008

*Euractive*). Rather, it emerged that the strategy on EU's behalf tilted towards engagement with Russia as a way to manage other problems. The prevalent attitude in European capitals and the EU was that Europe could not afford to lose sight of the fact that there is the need for cooperation with Russia as a partner in relation to Afghanistan, the Middle East, energy policies or nuclear weapons proliferation” (Hasselbach, 2008).

### ***The EU-Russia Summit, Nice, France, 14 November 2008***

The European Security Treaty became an exclusive topic favoured by Russia, which was now voiced at every possible forum, bilateral or multilateral. Russian active campaign for mounting a support for the initiative bore some fruits as the French president Sarkozy gave his huge support



at the regular EU-Russia summit, in Nice on 14 November. At the Summit press conference President Sarkozy focused less on Russia's actions in Georgia and appeared keener to look ahead. He was also more critical of the United States and its European policy and openly threw his broad support behind the Russian initiative: "We could then lay the groundwork for what could be the basis of an agreement between us [all], as long as we don't talk about missile shields that will not lead to security, that will complicate matters, and that will render [security] more remote" (Lobjakas, 2008).

Medvedev himself went on bashing the US unilateralism:

"Russia for its part has never taken such steps unilaterally. All those decisions that we have made, including the ones I put forward just recently, are a response to the actions of certain European countries that, without consulting anyone, essentially agreed to deploy new [military] capabilities on their territory (Ibid.)."

This statement sounded especially cynical after Russia's unwarranted and brisk military and air campaign against sovereign Georgia, however, by this time most of the European political elite seemed ready to move on towards better prospects of cooperation on other security issues.

### **The OSCE Ministerial Council, Helsinki, 4-5 December, 2008**

Now it was the turn of Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to garner an all around support for the initiative at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Helsinki, set for December 4-5, 2008. However, OSCE member states did not display willingness to accept the proposal despite some states' support, to convene a special summit in 2009. The major problem was of course the renewed mistrust and fear towards Russia and its intentions. Overall, instead of organizing an exclusive summit, it was maintained by all European states as well as the US and Canada that any further talk on the pan-European security had to be contained within the OSCE, as the most exclusive forum to date. The OSCE ministers adopted thirteen decisions, however, no joint political declaration was achieved. The upcoming Greek Chairmanship was tasked to continue the dialogue on Euro-Atlantic security and clarify the questions that remain (n.a. OSCE News, 2008). Hence, a course of action known as the Corfu process emerged that tried to address all the open issues on European security.

The speech made by then German Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the Schwarzkopf Foundation in Berlin, on December 10, 2008 highlighted the crust of European understanding of the existing security situation. First and foremost, Steinmeier described the key problem with European security:

“Peace in our European neighbourhood has not yet been secured. The war in Georgia demonstrated that military force is still being used as a political tool in Europe. Mistrust and threat perceptions have re-emerged more strongly than we could have imagined” (Steinmeier, 2008).

Steinmeier underscored that for common security for Europe Russia is also needed but it was made explicit that it is not an easy partner. On the other hand, the opposite was also made clear – Russia needs Europe for its massive modernization needs. Hence, it was not surprising that he tried to pay an attentive ear to Medvedev’s calls for a new pan-European security. However, he did warn that “...we need a peace order that rests on an understanding of common interests, common values and common security.” From that understanding Minister then spelled out what in his understanding was lacking and was needed to be addressed while Europe, Russia and the North America set down to business together:

- Fresh start in conventional arms control
- Progress on nuclear disarmament and arms control
- A fresh start in NATO-Russia relations including the resumption of the NRC
- Address the acute lack of confidence in the stability of the European order in Russia’s western neighbourhood, something that Russia has to work on. An integral part of eliminating the threat perception would be a substantial progress towards resolving the territorial conflicts in Moldova, Nagorny Karabakh and Georgia, where all require Russia’s constructive participation.
- EU’s intensification of its neighbourhood policy and strengthening of its responsibility for security and stability in its eastern neighbourhood (Ibid.,).

Only after these steps were undertaken it was meaningful, from the German perspective, to have a binding document, which would be based on “a broader, contemporary understanding of

common security.” A new Charter would be based on the Charter of Paris from 1990 and all countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok would take part in the drafting process.

Notably, he also addressed the issue of institutions stating clearly that the EU, OSCE and NATO would remain an essential part of this new security system but called for a new Harmel report – a new concept that would address the issue of “how to shape a security partnership with Russia across the area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok...” (Ibid.,).

It must be underscored here that Germany is Russia’s European partner that is most understanding of her security concerns, most conservative about the issue of NATO enlargement as well as a best bilateral partner to Russia. Hence, despite the fact that in general both France and Germany were in essence sympathetic to Russian calls for revamping the European security architecture they also remained sober to the fact that there were real security issues that needed to be addressed. The proper cause and effect chain was made lucid by above stated Steinmeier speech.

### **The Beginning of the Corfu Process**

On the bases of the 2008 Helsinki OSCE Ministerial Council decision the Greek OSCE Chairmanship initiated an extensive security dialogue in June 2009, which came to be known as the OSCE Corfu Process. This was an informal meeting in which 56 OSCE member states as well as heads of major regional organizations operating in the OSCE area spanning from Vancouver to Vladivostok assembled “to make a fresh beginning” to reach the goal of “a Europe free and united and at peace with itself” (OSCE Magazine, 2009).

As a result of the informal talks the Greek Chairmanship launched the “Vienna Informal Meetings at Ambassadors’ Level”. The Greek Chairperson-in-Office had tasked the Greek Ambassador to the OSCE and Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council to initiate a process with the participating States and relevant experts that would focus on the priority threats to European security and engage in a focused and structured security dialogue (Ackermann and Salber, 2013, p. 198).

It was decided that during the Corfu Process meetings that the participating States would review and draw up a list of:

- Principles that have not been consistently maintained;
- Commitments that have been either partially or selectively implemented and subjectively or unilaterally interpreted; and
- OSCE mechanisms and procedures for conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes that have either not been activated or have proved insufficient or outdated.

In preparing for the Athens Ministerial, the OSCE Ambassadors would bear three guiding matters in mind:

- The basic principles of comprehensive and indivisible security;
- The existing commitments across the three dimensions, with a view to their strengthening and further implementation; and
- The need for strengthened co-operation in crisis management, arms control and responses to new challenges (OSCE Magazine, 2009, p. 5)

The Corfu informal meeting was also denoted with a first meeting of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on 27 June, which had been suspended after the dramatic events in August of 2008. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented after the meeting: “The NRC which has been in the neutral stand for almost a year, is now back in gear...; No one tried to paper over our differences in the meeting, on Georgia, for example. But we agreed [...] not to let those disagreements bring the whole NRC train to a halt” (n. a. NATO News, 2009).

After the NRC meeting it was announced that the participants “identified common security interests, such as the stabilization of Afghanistan, arms control, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, crisis management, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and counter-piracy.” It was also made known that a process of examining the institutional structure of the Council was underway, with a view to “making it a more efficient and valuable instrument for political dialogue and practical cooperation” (Ibid.,)<sup>18</sup>.

It was clear that with its active diplomacy on the ESA Russia had managed to crack the isolation and engage in the security dialogue via all the existing formats, the EU, the NATO and the OSCE. However, the focus of the dialogue was much wider than just the hard security. The scope of the dialogue was also bigger than the one envisioned by Russia: the European and Euro-

---

<sup>18</sup> For more detailed overview of NATO-Russian relations after Russo-Georgian conflict see Marcel de Haas, *NATO-Russian Relations after the Georgian Conflict*, 2009, Number 7.

Atlantic states had resolved to be in the dialogue but on all those issues which they perceived needed attention. Notably, the talks were also firmly placed under the OSCE framework, as the most relevant institutional forum for such discussions.

During the year more than 50 food-for-thought papers have been distributed by the OSCE Participating States regarding the ways to improve the European security architecture in all three dimensions - politico-military, economic and environmental and human. These discussions were also marked with the attempts by Russia to focus the attention of the OSCE on the hard security issues and the counter-attempts of the West to bring the issues of human dimension, such as fair elections, democracy and human rights to the forefront of the proposed agenda. For example, during the Corfu process deputy Minister Alexander Grushko maintained that main gaps in European security architecture was in the politico-military dimension and that human dimension issues could be discussed elsewhere, for example within the Council of Europe format. Such statements reinforced European concerns that the whole campaign was aimed at undermining NATO (Cliff, 2011, p. 67). Despite, Grushko actively elucidated the Russian concern at high European forums that it was not fair that the OSCE was only political and NATO was legally binding for its members: “While in the OSCE the principle of indivisible security is a political commitment, in NATO the same principle has legal force with no veto right for third countries. But there can be no reliable first-or second-rate security”, he sated at the international conference in London (Grushko, 2009).

### **The Draft Treaty on European Security and the Athens OSCE Ministerial, December 2009**

Even though Russia engaged in the discussions within the OSCE, it has maintained that the European Security Treaty was supposed to be discussed outside of the OSCE. In that spirit Medvedev took up the issue yet again calling anew for a new architecture, this time nick named the ‘Helsinki Plus’ during his speech at the Helsinki University on 20 April 2009.

Still failing to attract the needed attention and engagement, Russia unveiled a draft text of the so-called treaty on European security on November 29, 2009 (Draft Treaty on European Security, 2009) just prior to the December OSCE Ministerial in Athens and the planned ministerial meeting of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

The draft treaty was carefully timed in other respects as well. The United States and other European Allies were busy with Iraq and Afghanistan, the financial crisis in the background was testing the capacity of liberal states to withstand the crisis while the perception of the Alliance not being able to reassure NATO member states of their security, especially those bordering Russia was at its height. Last but not least the Central European states were also feeling unsettled by the developments around the ballistic missile defence plans (BMD) plans (n. a. Stratfor, 2009).

The proposed Draft consisted of lengthy 14 articles (just like the NATO Charter, but with 639 more words in it) and used a similar language to that of the NATO Charter. The text of the treaty was sent to the heads of relevant states and to chief executives of international organizations operating in the Euro-Atlantic region such as NATO, the European Union, the CSTO, the CIS, and the OSCE. It was noted that Russia was open to any proposals and called for starting a substantial discussion on specific elements of the draft treaty.

According to Kremlin website which introduced the online text, the main idea of the treaty was to set up a common undivided space through formalizing in the international law the principle of indivisible security as a legal obligation. Pursuant to the concept of indivisible security no nation or international organization operating in the Euro-Atlantic region would be entitled to strengthen its own security at the cost of other nations or organizations:

“Article 1: According to the Treaty, the Parties shall cooperate with each other on the basis of the principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security. Any security measures taken by a Party to the Treaty individually or together with other Parties, including in the framework of any international organization, military alliance or coalition, shall be implemented with due regard to security interests of all other Parties. The Parties shall act in accordance with the Treaty in order to give effect to these principles and to strengthen security of each other” (The draft of the European Security Treaty, 2009).

In Article 2, the text offered that any Party to this treaty should base its actions on existing fundamental documents such as UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act, Charter for European Security, the OSCE documents and an Article 1 of this Treaty.

The measure of control and the degree of involvement desired by the Russian Federation was showing overwhelmingly in certain Articles. For example, Article 3 stipulated that Parties “shall be entitled to request, through diplomatic channels or the Depository, any other Party to provide information on any significant legislative, administrative or organizational measures taken by that other Party, which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its security”.

If and when a threat to security would occur the treaty would provide mechanisms of consultations and conferences to counter this. The conferences would arrive at unanimous and binding decisions, which would need to be carried out by the signatory states. Furthermore, the draft treaty provided for the possibility for the signatories to give military assistance if another signatory state was attacked. The Draft provided for the three levels of conferences:

- a) Consultations among the Parties;
- b) Conference of the Parties;
- c) Extraordinary Conference of the Parties.

Notably, the draft did not envision the unanimous attendance for the Consultations, which would be by invitation. The Conference was not to be mandatory either and the proposed sufficient attendance number for the Conference was specified at two thirds. However, the Treaty proposed that the decisions of the Conference would be taken by consensus and would be mandatory! The draft clearly showed Russian preference for exclusivity and the desire to exclude and isolate some members. It can be easily inferred that in practice such a Treaty would most certainly result in big powers making decisions, which then would be mandatory for all.

Then there was the Article 7, which was an amalgamation of Article 5 of the NATO Charter and Article 51 of the UN Charter in the context of the collective security arrangement. The Draft proposed that the attacked Party or any other Party is tasked to convene an extraordinary Conference, which shall be effective if it is attended by at least four fifths of the Parties to the Treaty to decide on necessary collective measures (Para. 1 and 2, Article 8). Notably, the only intricacy that was addressed in this regards was the fact that the vote of an offending Party would not be included in the total number of votes of the Parties in adopting a decision (Article 8, para. 4). Other than that there was no specification of possible collective punishment mechanisms under the proposed collective security arrangement. Hence, the Proposed Treaty featured as a combination of a collective defence and collective security mechanisms despite the fact that the UN Charter already undertook the latter. Most importantly, this version of the Treaty, which

stipulates the theoretical and legal possibility of the parties to be against each other at some point in the future, is in direct violation of the Article 8 of the NATO Charter, which obliges its member states not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty (NATO Charter, 1949). Most importantly, such a complex treaty with all of its shortcomings and legal inconsistencies was prepared and unveiled unilaterally, unlike the established practice of making such treaties.

According to de Haas, Medvedev's draft took up the negative attitude: instead of describing what could be done it proscribed things that could not be done. It could be inferred from the proposed draft that its major purpose was to preclude any necessary military action by the Western countries. It also blatantly left out the existing institutions such as NATO, OSCE and EU from the decision-making process under the proposed Treaty (De Haas, 2010).

The draft then was discussed at the OSCE Ministerial, which was held in Athens from December 1-2, 2009. The Russian Draft received little direct support as the initiative was met with skepticism. While both the German government and other EU states welcomed the Russian proposals, they had two crucial reservations: on the one hand, the Russian initiative may not call into question existing alliances, such as NATO or the OSCE; while on the other hand, Moscow would have to present more concrete proposals on how could such a common security space would come to life. The discussions at the OSCE highlighted the fact that the Russian proposal lacked and in fact omitted those issues that were truly central to the European Security. For example, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said the Russian proposal omitted the issues of arms control, human rights, and the Georgian-Russian conflict. His comments were seconded by Ian Cliff Obe, head of the British delegation, who also stressed the need for "a resolution of the crisis" of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, implementation of which Russia suspended in December 2007. The Central and Eastern European countries in particular were openly antagonistic about the Russian proposals. They pointed to the war in Georgia and warned against an attempt to undermine solidarity in the Western defense alliance. Georgia's then foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze strongly challenged the necessity of the draft as a representative of the country, which had suffered from Russian voluntarism and disobedience to the already existing fundamental principles and norms of international law. Vashadze questioned "the need to redraft" European security "in accordance to the whims of one revisionist power" (Charnysh, 2010).



There was at least the consensus that any discussion would have to take place within the OSCE and not outside it. To that effect, the Ministerial Council adopted the Political Declaration on the Corfu Process in which the acknowledgement was made that an inclusive dialogue was necessary and that the informal meeting in Corfu had already contributed to the “revitalization” of the “political dialogue in the OSCE on security and co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok” (Ministerial Declaration on the OSCE Corfu Process, 2009). The Athens Ministerial also adopted decision in which it tasked the OSCE to discuss eight specific issues, known as the “Corfu ticks”. The Decision envisioned that the upcoming 2010 OSCE Chairmanship would then submit an interim report summarizing the various proposals presented by participating States within the framework of the Corfu Process. The eight ticks were as follows:

1. The implementation of all OSCE norms, principles, and commitments;
2. The role of the OSCE in early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation;
3. The role of the arms control and confidence and security building regimes in building trust in the evolving security environment;
4. Transnational and multi-dimensional threats and challenges facing the OSCE;
5. Economic and environmental challenges;
6. Human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as democracy and the rule of law;
7. Enhancing the OSCE’s effectiveness;
8. The interaction with other organizations and institutions on the basis of the 1999 Platform for Cooperative (Furthering the Corfu Process, 2009).

For the time being, the discussion in Athens highlighted the need to revitalize the security dialogue but not in the frames offered by the Russian Federation. All but Russian side felt that true discussions on European security would necessarily have to include issues such as adherence to principles, OSCE’s role on conflict prevention and resolution, arms control and CSBM’s, environmental challenges and human dimension. Basically, in OSCE’s view security challenges facing Europe were not only in the area of hard security and that the bases of any meaningful discussions were the need to implement already existing commitments. All in all, at Athens scepticism prevailed concerning the need for a new binding treaty exclusively on hard security matters.

## **Continuation of the Corfu Process**

The Corfu Process continued in 2010, during the Kazakh OSCE Chairmanship, however it has lost the momentum as soon as the stage of providing food-for-thought papers was over and the phase of adopting decisions approached. The Corfu process basically ended with a comprehensive report produced by the Kazakh Chairmanship in mid 2010, which put together all the important ideas proposed during the “brainstorming” phase. Second half of the 2010 was marked with the attempts of the West, led by the US and EU to push through the notion of “European Security Community”, however no concrete feedback and action followed from the Russian Federation. Astana Summit failed to agree on the concrete plan of action, thus marking the end of the serious discussions on the European Security architecture within the OSCE context. The incoming Lithuanian Chairmanship attempted to continue the dialogue in the so-called V2V (Vancouver to Vladivostok) format but no concrete deliverables have emerged in 2011. Discussions over the TES have subsided in 2011 and were not discussed seriously by either the Russian Federation, or the West. Only the press has reported few instances when Medvedev had raised the issue, mainly in the bilateral discussions with some of the European partners.

All in all, according to British Ambassador to OSCE Ian Cliff, the Corfu Process was one of the building blocks in restoring trust between Russia and the EU/NATO countries after the Georgia crisis but it also vividly demonstrated the limits of what could be achieved. It constituted part of the “reset” but was less tangible than, for example, the new START Treaty (Cliff, 2011).

## **Reactions and Criticism**

Soon after the unveiling of the draft Treaty, the NATO Secretary General rejected the proposal, stating that “We have already a lot of documents, so my point of departure is: ‘I don’t see a need for new treaties.’ But let me reiterate, we are of course prepared to discuss the ideas in the right forum” (Sweeney, 2009).

Although the proposal continued to be discussed it did not find any direct utility within the existing Euro-Atlantic structures. Most importantly, on November 19, 2010 the NATO Summit adopted the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept. The drafting for this document had started in September 2010, by the Group of Experts, led by Madeleine K. Albright (United States) and

vice-chair Jeroen van der Veer (The Netherlands). The mandate derived from an earlier NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit from April 2009, when the Alliance leaders charged the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to prepare the ground for a new NATO Strategic Concept. The idea was to address the radical changes in the security environment since the latest security concept of 1999.

In the face of calls for redefining the NATO's nature and the new challenges, the Strategic concept nonetheless reconfirmed the commitment to defend one another against attack as the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security. It called on the need to develop new capabilities and partnerships and to modernise the Alliance ability to carry out both its Article 5 commitments as well as promote international stability. The concept also called on the Allies to develop key capabilities for defense against ballistic missile attacks and cyber attacks.

Most notably, the concept internalized Russia as part of its security considerations. The strategy mentioned Russia in relations to five different aspects of security. First was related to missile defence. The concept pledged that they would “actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners”.

The second topic where the Allies saw the need for cooperation was on the nuclear weapons and stated that they would seek for Russian agreement to increase transparency as well as relocate these weapons away from NATO territories.

In paragraph 33 the concept titled its relations with Russia as of “strategic importance...” “as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia” (NATO Strategic Concept, 2010).

The Security Concept also underscored that:

“The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular

issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security. We are determined to: enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security; use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia” (Ibid.).

Basically, NATO gave Russia a very special treatment but short of providing any new mechanism for cooperation.

Notably, in January 2010 the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton made a speech in Paris on the Future of the European Security, which showed the limits of mutual understanding on security issues with Russia as well as provided clear answers on the US positions regarding the TES:

“...the Russian Government under President Medvedev has put forth proposals for new security treaties in Europe. Indivisibility of security is a key feature of those proposals. And that is a goal we share, along with other ideas in the Russian proposals, which reaffirm principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. However, we believe that these common goals are best pursued in the context of existing institutions, such as the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council, rather than by negotiating new treaties, as Russia has suggested – a very long and cumbersome process (Clinton, 2010).”

The speech made it clear that Russian actions undermined the very foundations of transatlantic security:

“We have repeatedly called on Russia to honor the terms of its ceasefire agreement with Georgia, and we refuse to recognize Russia’s claims of independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. More broadly, we object to any spheres of influence claimed in Europe in which one country seeks to control another’s future. Our security depends upon nations being able to choose their own destiny” (Clinton, 2010).

The reactions to the newest attempts by the Russian Federation to revamp the established structure as well as understanding of the European security order was met with extreme criticism from scholars and academics besides the official reactions. One of the most prominent trans-Atlantic formats, the Brussels' Forum considered the question of a new European Order. Two opinion pieces appear in its March 2010 publication one by Robert Legvold and another by David J. Kramer and Daniel P. Fata.

Robert Legvold in his paper titled "Include Russia and its Neighbors: How to Move Toward a Common Security Space" took a more conciliatory rather than the outright hostile attitude towards the Russian initiative. His main argument is that all the actors have high stakes in "transcending today's reality" (2010, p. 5) and it would be pity to miss a chance of forging region's collective capacity:

"if a moment has arrived when some are again ready to consider ways of reducing Europe's security divisions and inequalities, while strengthening this vast region's collective capacity to deal with the large security challenges facing it, then to waste it would be foolish, even reckless" (Ibid., p. 5).

However, the way ahead described by author highlights at least three major obstacles: conceptual, practical and psychological (2010, p. 6-9). As a way out, author provides a road-map for "attacking this multi-layered challenge." In terms of overcome the psychological obstacles, author sees the need for actually changes and offers a set of political confidence-building measures:

- Steps to avert further Russian-Georgian confrontation by de-escalating military preparations on both sides;
- Agreement to bring proposals for easing the stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniestria;
- Encouraging the planning staffs in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia as well as Poland, Belarus, and Russia to cooperate in devising CBM;
- Giving serious consideration to CSTO proposals for cooperation with NATO (Ibid.,).

In terms of conceptual challenge, author sees four serious shortcomings in the Medvedev proposal:

- It focuses on process and architecture leaving aside how legislating “indivisible “ and “equal” in the Treaty would solve real life problems or “even improve on the commitments already in existing treaties..”
- The Concept of European security is exclusively based on military and political, the so called hard security issues, leaving aside the human dimension.
- Conceptual flow is underscored by different understanding of concepts. Principles only work when there is an agreement on their content.
- A fundamental conceptual problem: collective security is the great failed concept of the last century... in ambiguous security environments mutual security arrangements sooner or later trump collective security commitments (Ibid.,).

In conclusion the author argues that “the focus should be on launching and then nurturing a process that encourages positive reciprocity – a constructive tit-for-tat dynamic to replace the more negative version of the lost decade” (2010, p. 14).

Notably, if Robert Legvold is favourable to the need for a dialogue with an outlook on a change in perspective that needs to be fostered by mutual concessions, even he sees certain value gaps that need to be addressed before a meaningful exchange can commence. Among these differing security conceptions and a problem of commitment to existing norms and rules feature prominently, despite author’s sympathetic attitude towards’ Russia.

Also, the author does not involve in dissecting the existing problematic. It would suffice to say that Mr. Legvold does not at all address the root causes of the Russian-Georgian conflict and assumes that the major problem there is the “military preparations”. On the account of Nagorno-Karabakh issue, likewise it is not explored what causes the stalemate and whether Russia is at least theoretically interested in moving towards a settlement. However, without going deep into this discourse, the suggested path of “positive reciprocity” seems difficult enough and has proven unrealistic given Russia’s subsequent actions in Ukraine.

Kramer and Fata on the other hand are confident that the Russian proposal is a non-starter, not because there is no need to improve the European security architecture with Russia as part of it, if it so desire, but because Russia proposed a Treaty in exchange of institutions such as NATO and OSCE that functioned well enough for decades (2010, p. 20). The authors also undertake the critique of the Russian proposal: First all, they find that aside from legal confusions what seems quite clear is “an effort to subordinate existing structures, like NATO to this Treaty.” Moreover, the need for an Extraordinary Conference if a party to the treaty was attacked would delay action for self-defence – something that NATO is meant to address. In terms of principles, authors find it very problematic that the country proposing the treaty is “already in violation” of these principles by its “continued illegal troop presence in Georgia’s separatist regions, its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, and its unwanted presence in the Moldovan separatist area of Transnistria” (Ibid., p. 26). The next shortcoming seems to be the fact that the draft “makes no reference to human rights standards and democratization, key issues for the OSCE and NATO (Ibid., p. 26).

Authors then take the initiative to be the renewed attempt something that the Russians have tried their hand in the past:

“In its purest form, the Russian proposal recycles Soviet-era thinking to separate the United States from European security and to set the conditions for Moscow to further their “divide et impera” aims toward Europe and specifically NATO” (Ibid., p. 26).

In the end authors conclude that despite their rejection of the Medvedev proposal, it does one thing: offers the opportunity to engage with Russia in addressing Europe’s security needs; however, not by creating a new European security organization but by improving existing ones. Authors make a claim that if Russia were to truly abide by the principles proposed in the draft Treaty the security would undoubtedly improve for all (Ibid., p. 32).

## **Chapter 6 Conclusions**

In the fifth historical period Russia returned to the old and well tested Soviet tactics of proposing a treaty in regards to overarching security architecture in Europe. The first stage of the campaign unfolded in the environment of general apprehension about growing Russian authoritarianism at home and assertiveness abroad, while the second stage of the campaign unfolded after shocking

Russia-Georgian war of August, 2008. Notably, while European and Euro-Atlantic states saw a major security problem in the lack of compliance to the existing norms, Russia blamed the war on the broken European security architecture. Hence, the proposal was put forth as a fix it all alternative to the existing problems. Hereby, chapter summarizes the findings in order to respond to the stated research sub questions:

**What were the concrete initiatives of the Soviet Union *vis a vis* the preferred way of organization of the European Security?**

- Russian proposal was voiced as part of President’s speeches abroad, including in Berlin, Nice, and Evian, but it was also formally introduced first in the Foreign Policy Concept (2008) and then was presented as a draft Treaty.
- Russia unveiled a draft text of the so-called treaty on European Security on November 29, 2009 and it consisted of 14 Articles. The draft was sent to the heads of relevant states and to chief executives of international organizations operating in the Euro-Atlantic region such as NATO, the European Union, the CSTO, the CIS, and the OSCE.

**What were major Soviet preferences *vis a vis* European Security architecture across the identified historical episode?**

Russia desired following:

- To sign a binding Treaty on European security, which would be based on “the principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security.”
- If and when a threat to security would occur the treaty envisioned counter mechanisms of consultations and conferences. In practice proposed Treaty suggested a concert type arrangement, which would most certainly result in big powers making decisions, which would then be mandatory for all.
- Article 7 was presented as an amalgamation of Article 5 of the NATO Charter and Article 51 of the UN Charter in the context of the collective security arrangement for Europe.



### **What were the Soviet/Russian end goals when proposing these initiatives?**

- Basically, Russia wanted to fully regulate the hard security area in Europe and place all the possible decisions in this regard within its reach.
- The proposal envisioned supplanting existing regional institutions with a loose security conference (which would not require unanimity but the presence of the four fifth of the member states would be sufficient) with the monopoly on the use of force.
- Indirectly, this institution would dilute the necessity of other existing regional organizations in Europe, first and foremost of the NATO.

### **What were the factors that resulted in failure of cooperation over the proposed initiative?**

- Despite some European states' (such as Germany and France) sympathetic attitude, overall the European and Euro-Atlantic states had number of crucial reservations:
  - The initiative called into question existing security institutions, such as NATO or the OSCE, which was deemed unacceptable;
  - The initiative was also perceived as a way to separate the United States from European security, saw discord and set in place a policy of “divide et impera”.
  - The proposal was very vague and was not addressing pressing issues of European security.
  - Russia emerged with a reputation of an unpredictable and irresponsible partner from the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. On that count, European reading was that the major problem was with compliance with the existing norms and rules already enshrined in the fundamental security documents and before any progress towards a binding Treaty Russia needed to address its existing commitments.

### **What are the factors that contributed to certain outcomes as a result of these initiatives?**

#### **What were the outcomes?**

- European and Euro-Atlantic states were convinced that they needed to cooperate with Russia as a partner in relation to Afghanistan, the Middle East, energy policies, conventional arms control and disarmament and other global issues.

- Russia was deemed as an inseparable part of European security agenda; hence, European states went half-way to meet Russian calls and initiated the so called Corfu Process under the OSCE umbrella.
- The Corfu Process did not turn out considerable results. This was partly undermined by Russian attempts to focus the attention of the OSCE on the hard security issues and the counter-attempts of the West to bring the issues of human dimension, such as fair elections, democracy and human rights to the forefront of the proposed agenda.
- The Corfu Process became an important building block in restoring trust between Russia and the EU/NATO countries after the Georgia crisis but it also vividly demonstrated the limits of what could be achieved between Russia and Euro-Atlantic states at that point.

In conclusion of this chapter it can be stated that the latest Russian campaign did not produce the desired results which was the creation of the collective security type conference, denoted by a binding treaty on European security. Rather, the ensued Corfu Process served as a venue to flesh out the European states' approaches to security problems. The process did serve as a way to melt the ice brought about by Russia's unilateral and unwarranted military aggression in Europe; however, it also highlighted major difference in terms of security policies of Russia and the European states.

The fifth historical case also highlighted that Russia's basic security interests in Europe have not changed since the Stalin period. The following chapter will highlight the possible explanations as to why does the European security architecture remain vulnerable and unstable based on the regime theories.

## References:

- Ackermann, A. and Salber H., 2013. The OSCE “Corfu Process” – A Preliminary View of the Security Dialogue on Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Crisis Management, and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation in IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2012, Baden-Baden. [online] Available at: <<https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/10/AckermannSalber-en.pdf>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon 19-20 November 2010. [online] Available at: [http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat\\_Concept\\_web\\_en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf)> [Accessed 10 September, 2015].
- Asmus, R. 2010. A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West. St. Martin’s Press.
- Boese, W. 2008. Russia Suspends CFE Treaty Implementation, Arms control today, [online] Available at: <[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008\\_01-02/cfe](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_01-02/cfe)> [Accessed 10 December, 2015].
- Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest, 3 April, 2008. [online] Available at: <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_8443.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm)> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- Charnysh, V., 2010. Russia Drafts European Security Pact, *Arms Control Association*. [online] Available at: <[https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010\\_01-02/EuropeanSecurity](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/EuropeanSecurity)> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- Cliff, I., 2011. The Corfu Process – What Was It All About? In Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH ed. OSCE Yearbook. [online] Available at: <[http://www.nomos-shop.de/\\_assets/downloads/9783832973117\\_ljese01.pdf](http://www.nomos-shop.de/_assets/downloads/9783832973117_ljese01.pdf)> [Accessed 10 December, 2015].
- Clinton, H., 2010. Remarks on the Future of European Security, the Department of State. [online] Available at: <<http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/136273.htm>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- Cornell, S. E., Starr, S. F., eds., 2009. The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia (Studies of Central Asia and the Caucasus). M.E. Sharpe.
- Council of the European Union, Extraordinary European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 1 September, 2008. [online] Available at: <[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/102545.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/102545.pdf)> [Accessed 18 December, 2015].

- De Haas, M., 2009. NATO-Russia Relations after the Georgian Conflict, 2009, Number 7. [online] Available at: <[http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20090000\\_cscp\\_artikel\\_mhaas.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20090000_cscp_artikel_mhaas.pdf)> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- De Haas, M., 2010. Russia's foreign security policy in the 21st century: Putin, Medvedev and beyond, London and New York: Routledge.
- Decision No. 1/09, Furthering the Corfu Process, MC.DEC/1/09 of 2 December 2009, in: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Seventeenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council*, pp. 15-16.
- EU-Russia Summit Hints At Geopolitical Rapprochement, Ahto Lobjakas, November 14, 2008 [online] Available at: <[http://www.rferl.org/content/EURussia\\_Summit\\_Hints\\_At\\_Geopolitical\\_Rapprochement/1349273.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/EURussia_Summit_Hints_At_Geopolitical_Rapprochement/1349273.html)> [Accessed 18 December, 2015].
- European Commission Press Release, 2008. *EU-Russia Summit in Nice on 14 November*, European Commission Press Release Database. [online] Available at: <[http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-08-1701\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-1701_en.htm)> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- European Parliament resolution of 17 November 2011 containing the European Parliament's recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the negotiations of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, [online] Available at: <<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-0514>> [Accessed 18 December, 2015].
- Fidler, S., Sevastopulo, D., 2007. Putin Rails against US Foreign Policy, *The Financial Times*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b4eef8e6-b91d-11db-a5bc-0000779e2340.html#axzz3wI4VLuSA>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- Finn, P. 2008. Putin's Chosen Successor, Medvedev, Elected in Russia. *Washington Post Foreign Service*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/02/AR2008030200362.html?sid=ST2008030201044>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008. [online] Available at: <<http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>> [accessed on march 11, 2011].
- Goldman, M. I., 2008. Petrostate: Putin, power, and the new Russia. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Grushko, A., 2009. *Proposals from the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on the New European Security Treaty: Origins and Prospects*, International Conference Towards a New European Security Architecture? London, UK.

- Hasselbach, C., 2008. Opinion: EU Doing Little, But All It Can on Georgia, *DW*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-eu-doing-little-but-all-it-can-on-georgia/a-3648433>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- Illarionov, A., 2009. The Russian Leadership's preparation for War, 1999-2008, in Cornell, S. E., Starr, S. F., eds., 2009. *The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia*. M.E. Sharpe IIFMCG, International Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Volume 1.
- Ker-Lindsay, J., 2012. *The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession, Preventing the recognition of contested states*, Oxford University Press
- Larsen, H. B. L. 2013. The Russo-Georgian War and Beyond: Towards a European Great Power Concert. Chapter 8 in Fawn, R., ed. 2013. *Georgia: Revolution and War*. Oxon, UK: Routledge.
- Lo. B., 2009. Medvedev and the New European Security architecture, Center for European Reform, Policy Brief.
- Medvedev, D., 2008. Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders, Berlin, June 5, President of Russia official web portal. [online] Available at: <[http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/06/05/2203\\_type82912type82914type84779\\_202153.shtml](http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml)> [accessed on July 23, 2011]
- Medvedev. M., 2008. Speech at World Policy Conference, Evian, France, October 8, President of Russia official web portal. [online] Available at: <[http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/10/08/2159\\_type82912type82914\\_207457.shtml](http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type82912type82914_207457.shtml)> [accessed on march 11, 2011]
- Ministerial Declaration on the OSCE Corfu Process: Reconfirm-Review-Reinvigorate Security and Co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok, MC.DOC/1/09 of 2 December 2009, in: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Seventeenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 1 and 2 December 2009, Athens, 2 December 2009, pp. 3-4
- n. a. 2008, OSCE 'revitalized' at Helsinki Ministerial Council, high-level talks on European security to continue, OSCE News. [online] Available at: <<http://www.osce.org/node/50467>> [accessed on march 11, 2011]
- n. a. 2008. EU-Russia pact on hold as Georgia talks collapse, *Euractive*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.euractiv.com/foreign-affairs/eu-russia-pact-hold-georgia-talks-collapse/article-176445>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- n. a. 2008. MIA: Seven Georgians Injured in S. Ossetia Shootout, *Civil Georgia*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18872>> [Accessed 15 December, 2015].
- n. a. 2008. NATO's foreign ministers reiterate their support for Georgia, NATO News. [online] Available at: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/08-august/e0819a.html>> [Accessed 18 December, 2015].

- n. a. 2008. Russian, Georgian Presidents to Hold Phone Talks - Minister Says. *Civil Georgia*, [online] Available at: <<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=18455>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- n. a. 2008. Sarkozy, Medvedev Call for New European Security Pact, *DW*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.dw.com/en/sarkozy-medvedev-call-for-new-european-security-pact/a-3699817>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- n. a. 2009. Informal NATO Russia Foreign Ministers Meetings, *NATO News*, [online] Available at: <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events\\_55951.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events_55951.htm)> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- n. a. 2012. Russia was prepared for Georgian aggression – Putin, *Russia Today*, [online] Available at: <<https://www.rt.com/politics/putin-ossetia-war-plan-168/>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- n. a. 2014. Tuvalu Retracts Recognition Of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, *RFERL*, [online] Available at: <<http://www.rferl.org/content/tuvalu-georgia-retracts-abkhazia-ossetia-recognition/25315720.html>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- n.a. 2007. Georgia: Press conference on 6 August airspace 'violation' by Russian aircraft, *Relief web*, [online] Available at: <<http://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/georgia-press-conference-6-august-airspace-violation-russian-aircraft>> [Accessed 15 December, 2015].
- n.a. 2008. Tbilisi Says Lifting Abkhaz Sanctions 'Dangerous', *Civil Georgia*. [online] Available at: <[http://www.civil.ge/eng/\\_print.php?id=17281](http://www.civil.ge/eng/_print.php?id=17281)> [Accessed 15 December, 2015].
- n.a. 2009. Russia Drafts New European Security Treaty, *Geopolitical Diary*, Stratfor. [online] Available at: <<https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/russia-drafts-new-european-security-treaty>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- OSCE Magazine, Issue 3, 2009. [online] Available at: <<http://www.osce.org/secretariat/39200?download=true>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons, *Back to Diplomacy*, Vienna, 2015. [online] Available at: <<http://www.osce.org/networks/205846?download=true>> [Accessed 15 December, 2015].
- Pravda, A., ed. 2005. *Leading Russia: Putin in Perspective*. Essays in Honour of Archie Brown. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Rice, C., 2011. *No Higher Honor, A memoir of my years in Washington DC*, Crown Publishers.
- Robinson, M., 2009. UN monitors leave Georgia, OSCE Mission shuts, *Reuters*, [online] Available at: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-monitors-idUSTRE55T3OR20090630>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].

- Shanker, T., Landlerfeb, M. 2007. Putin Says U.S. Is Undermining Global Stability, *The New York Times*. [online] Available at: <[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/world/europe/11munich.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/world/europe/11munich.html?_r=0)> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- Socor, V., 2008. Medvedev Proposes All-European Security Pact During Berlin Visit, *Eurasia Daily Monitor* Volume: 5 Issue: 109.
- Sweeney, C., 2009. NATO chief opposes Russia's security pact proposal, *Reuters*. [online] Available at: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/17/us-russia-nato-idUSTRE5BF38D20091217>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- The draft of the European Security Treaty, 2009. Official website of the President of Russia. [online] Available at: <<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6152>> [Accessed 20 December, 2015].
- Tompson, W., 2008. Putin and the 'Oligarchs': A Two-sided Commitment Problem in Pravda, A., ed. 2005. *Leading Russia: Putin in Perspective: Essays in Honour of Archie Brown*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Van Harpen, M. H., 2008. Medvedev's proposal for a pan-European security pact: its six hidden objectives and how the west should respond, Cicero Working Paper 08-03, Paris/Maastricht, October
- Watson, R., 2007. Putin's speech: Back to cold war? *BBC*. [online] Available at: <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm>> [Accessed 18 December, 2015].

## CHAPTER 7: Conclusions

### Summary of research goals and findings

This thesis has described the efforts of the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation to form a European security architecture under which it would feel comfortable and secure. The thesis has also tried to address a main research question: What has contributed to the cooperation or failure to cooperate between Soviet Union/Russia and the Euro-Atlantic states on the issue of organization of the European Security architecture? The thesis also addressed five research sub-questions:

- What were the concrete initiatives of the Soviet Union *vis a vis* the preferred way of organization of the European Security?
- What were major Soviet preferences *vis a vis* European Security architecture across the identified historical episodes?
- What were the Soviet/Russian end goals when proposing these initiatives?
- What were the factors that resulted in failure of cooperation over the proposed initiative?
- What were the outcomes and the factors that contributed to certain outcomes as a result of these initiatives?

The findings of the historical description of a chosen single case study are summarized in a *table 2* below, while the data supporting the presented summary can be traced back in the five analytical history chapters preceding the concluding chapter.

The comprehensive and coherent historical description of a given single study has revealed a number of findings:

**A first finding** is that the Soviet and the Russian preferences towards the organization of the European Security architecture have mostly remained the same. In all five episodes, the Soviet Union (the first three episodes) and then the Russian Federation (the last two episodes) have put forth quite similar preferences towards the overall organization of the European Security architecture. These preferences were described in albeit slightly different speech forms or narratives, but the core objectives have reoccurred. These have been the following:



1. The permanent aspiration to do away with any security institution in Europe, even the defensive ones, to which the Soviet Union/the Russian Federation was not part of.

During the Stalin/Molotov/Bulganin and the Warsaw pact campaigns *vis a vis* the European security architecture the proposal was direct and blunt in wanting the dissolution of NATO and other security institutions the Union was not part of. In exchange the Union favoured a security order to be based on a loosely linked Conference type collective security order denoted by the non-use of force principle. It was also made explicit that no state or group of states could enter in any other coalition or alliance, but would leave intact the pre-existing bilateral agreements. Basically, the Union asked from the Western countries to do away with their existing security institutions and possible future ones, while maintaining its network of bilateral commitments with Eastern European countries as well as its spheres of influences in Europe and over the territory of the former Soviet Union.

During the Gorbachev period onwards, staged approaches were proposed at the end of which the existence of NATO would become redundant. The idea was again for Russia to find its place in the existing security institutions, including possibly in NATO, but on the condition of complete transformation of this institution and acceptance of the notion of Russia's sphere of exclusive influence. The new collective security architecture would be a loose, conference based collective security mechanism. With this arrangement Russia would achieve a fully regulated hard security area in Europe and place all the possible security decisions within its reach.

2. The interest to either isolates the USA (as well as Canada) from the European security affairs or at the very least balance its presence.

As described in the five historical episodes and summarized in the chart, the Soviet Union and Russia have always made attempts to either isolate the USA from European affairs or when it was made explicit that such a move was not favoured by other European security actors, proposed inclusion of other major outside powers such as China as well as other security institutions in Europe such as the CIS, as part of a single and overarching security architecture.

3. The explicit interest to cement under its unchallenged control its perceived spheres of influences.

While the Soviet Union started to cement a buffer zone in Europe even before the World War II was over, it continued ever since to cement this zone of influence. During the Cold War period, main preoccupation was to consolidate the territorial gains and stress for the “immutability of frontiers” in Europe and cement the division of the two German states. After the Cold War focus was on demanding and maintaining special rights in ‘its near abroad’ (the Yeltsin and Putin/Medvedev periods).

4. Demand that the European security architecture be of concert type Collective security mechanism fully regulating the hard security area.

The demand that the existing institutions be supplanted by a loosely connected collective security Conference type mechanism denoted by the non-use of force principle and built in commitment not to enter in any other security Alliance. Notably, the consistent effort had been made to concentrate the attention on the non-use of force principle and make this a legally binding commitment while attempts were made, most notoriously during the fifth historical episode to exclude the soft security issues from the new Treaty or arrangement on European Security. Towards that goal the Russian Federation even started to diminish the role of the OSCE and searched for a different institutional arrangement in which a hard security realm would be fully regulated and placed under its veto power.

**A second finding** of this thesis is that a failure to build more holistic security architecture in Europe can be traced back to the Soviet/Russian incapacity, throughout the studied period, to adequately address the existing security agenda in Europe and become integrated. Notably, the Soviet/Russian rhetoric that the exclusive Alliances during the Cold War and the maintenance of NATO after the Cold War with continued exclusion of Russia from the veto wielding institutions is the major cause of failures of the European security architecture is not supported by the findings. On the contrary, it is shown that Russian insistence on the inverted chain of causality (Alliance causes security problems v. Threats condition the creation of Alliances) has been largely futile and served as a veil to the real security problems in Europe, postponing their resolution.

### **Theoretical interpretation of the findings**

The findings are important in order to further flesh out the essence and characteristics of Russia

as a security actor. This thesis finds that the realist theoretical framework, namely, the structural realism, best explains the Soviet/Russian actions. This thesis supports the neorealist perspective that when confronted with unfavourable power balance, states tend to balance against a potential hegemon in the system. States face strategic choices regarding their preferred choice of action. Great powers have four main options: balancing, buck-passing, bandwagoning and aggression. Smaller states have more choices; among them most frequent are 'hiding' and 'transcendence' (Hide-Price, 2007, p. 49).

Hence, this thesis will support the realist theoretical claim that the power maximization instinct has prompted the Soviet Union/Russian Federation to continuously seek to improve its status quo by advancing initiatives on pan-European security order designed in a way to ascertain its own sphere of influence and acquire a veto power in the European security decision-making process. Within the balancing strategy, Hyde-Price differentiates 'hard balancing' and 'soft balancing'. 'Hard balancing' in its turn is characterized by 'internal balancing', which involves mobilising one's own resources to shift the balance of power capabilities in its favour and 'external balancing' in the form of building coalitions and alliances with other states. 'Soft balancing' strategies involves cultivating potential strategic partners, building diplomatic understandings and tacit agreements; cooperation with others in international organizations against the dominant power; and the courting of international public opinion (Ibid., p. 49).

Schroeder defines transcendence as attempts by states to "surmount international anarchy and go beyond the normal limits of conflictual politics" (1994, p. 51). Hide-Price further explicates - "transcendence strategies are sometimes articulated by dominant powers within the system as an attempt to institutionalize and codify their hegemonic aspirations." While transcendence as a foreign policy strategy is often associated with middle powers, this thesis will argue that besides balancing strategies, granted its risks and expenditures, Russia often employs strategies mainly associated with middle powers, which are balancing (both hard and soft balancing) and transcendence to improve its relative power in Europe.

On the other hand, states in the Euro-Atlantic area have developed into a 'security community', a concept introduced by Karl Deutsch, who defines security community as "a group of people which has become 'integrated'." Integration is defined as "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population

(Deutsch, 1959). It is maintained that for the success of a pluralistic security community some essential requirements must be met: among them values (which serve as motivations for political behavior. The connection between values, institutions, and habits is termed as the ‘way of life’ which is crucial part of the security community), expectations (expectation of joint rewards ... through strong economic ties or gains envisaged for the future), and mutual predictability of behavior (Deutsch, 1959).

Thus, the notion of pluralistic security community describes a state of being in which relationships between states are transformed from hostility and competition characteristic to anarchy to one based on trust within interdependence. It is implied that in order to achieve a state of being where disputes are solved peacefully, states must undergo a process of ‘integration.’

Basically, Russia as an outsider has always tried to become part of the Western institutions not via integration but rather via imposition of rules of the game via a treaty or a conference. Hence, its efforts have largely failed because such institutional coalescence is only possible via ‘integration.’

**A second finding** of this thesis is that a failure to build more holistic security architecture in Europe can be traced back to the Soviet and then Russia’s incapacity throughout the studied period to adequately address the existing security agenda in Europe. This thesis reveals further the reasons as to why ‘integration’ in Deutschian terms never occurred between Russian and the Euro-Atlantic security community.

In order to explain a 6 decade long failure to collectivize the security architecture in Europe, beyond the presented historical description, this thesis will build on the regime theory with a concerted focus on regime formation in security realm.

According to Robert Jervis, security regime can be defined as “those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate” (Jervis, 1982, p. 357). Jervis highlights four factors that are necessary for regime formation:

- First, the great powers must want to establish it; that is, they must prefer a more regulated environment to one in which all states behave individualistically. This means that all must be reasonably satisfied with the status quo and whatever alterations can be gained

without resort to the use or threat of unlimited war, as compared with the risks and costs of less restrained competition.

- Second, the actors must also believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation. In principle this is simple enough; in practice, determining whether others are willing to forgo the chance of forcible expansion is rarely easy.
- Third, even if all major actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes cannot form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion.
- The fourth condition for the formation of a regime is a truism today: war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly (Ibid., pp. 360-361).

To follow this logic, there was hardly a mutually acceptable “principles, rules and norms” among the Soviet Union and the West during the first historical episode to prompt a regime formation in the security sphere, especially the collective security one (for concise description of the research data please see the *Table 2* below). During the 50’s the ideological competition and conflicting outlook based on the notions of “capitalist encirclement” and “inevitable conflict” versus the Western fear of communist advancement and the acknowledgement of the East West division precluded any possibility of agreement over the principles. The Soviet swift takeovers of Eastern European regimes, the Berlin blockade and the desire to perpetuate the division of Germany, its Asia policy and acquisition of a nuclear bomb coupled with hostile ideological rhetoric did not allow for a common ground to be established for the creation of a security regime. Moreover, the proposed draft Treaty failed to address the West’s longstanding positions on major issues in European security: the need to achieve German unification after the free and fair elections and the right of German people to choose its own trajectory of development. The treaty also failed to address the Western security preferences and the value they attached to NATO as a defensive organization. At the same time, the draft Treaty alluded to the fact that the Soviet Union would maintain its own network of bilateral agreements with Eastern European countries and as revealed by Soviet narratives, then prepare the ground for further expansion. Hence, in the first historical episode, despite the fact that both sides, the Soviet Union and the Western countries, placed a high value on the conclusion of a Peace treaty and the need for regulating the security realm, none of the identified theoretical preconditions for the regime formation were met, hence the Berlin and the Geneva Conferences and the Summit ended without an outcome.

In the second historical period (Warsaw Pact campaign) the ideological confrontation has lessened after Stalin’s death but the notion of ‘competitive coexistence’ bred the arms race and

heavy proliferation, while the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the tense Berlin crisis of 1958-1961, the Sino-Soviet split and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 precluded any amalgamation of interests and possibility of regime formation in the security area. However, after the 1969 the sides managed to find touching points for their interests and the cooperative outcome – the Helsinki Final Act was still achieved in 1975. It is important to interpret the reasons for this cooperation.

The reductionist security regime theories based only on neorealist assumptions are not sufficient to account for the East-West cooperation in terms of regulating the European security realm. This thesis relies on *a contextualized rationalist theory* of international regimes, which synthesizes the neorealist, neoliberal and weak cognitivist approaches (Hasenclever et. al, 2000).

According to the table produced by the authors of the *contextualized rationalist theory*, the second historical period can be identified as relative-gains dominated situation in which the realist logic is more applicable (see Table 1 on p. 17 of this thesis). In this situation the possibility of regime formation is still low but if there are regime formulas that provide for balanced gains and mechanisms for making gains more equitable (hence, lessening the relative gains considerations), then there is a probability for regime formation, although with a low stability.

The fact that the Soviet Union, feeling the need to transcend its security vulnerabilities and the need to break through the economic isolation (which was largely its own creation) restarted the failed campaign after the Prague military adventure with extensive public diplomacy efforts in Europe and more forthcoming attitude towards the SALT and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks, hence creating the grounds for lessening the relative gains consideration among the actors. Hence, the Nixon-Brezhnev compromise was reached to simultaneously hold the European security and MBFR conferences, which resulted in the most groundbreaking document - the Helsinki Final Act that laid down the foundational principles norms and procedures for the management of European security. However, the achieved cooperative outcome was short of what was desired by the Soviet Union - it did not do away with NATO, and neither did it create a collective security regime in Europe.

The synthesized theory also brings in the role of weakly cognitivist theories, which emphasize “governmental learning” and “careers of ideas” (Ibid., p. 27) that create convergent expectations

and permit actors to coordinate their behaviour in a mutually beneficial way (Ibid., p. 29). The third historical period, which resulted in the Summit of the Heads of States in Paris (1990) and the politically binding document - the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe can be best explained with this approach. In this historical episode there is prevalence of ideas that are guiding governmental actions, especially on the side of the Soviet Union. Besides the traditional interest based considerations (as described in table 2) the new Soviet leader acted in pursuit of his ideas of glasnost and perestroika and a 'common European Home' prospect as the major driving force behind his decision-making; Hence, such major steps as the renouncement of the Brezhnev doctrine; Readiness to enhance the concept of security beyond hard security and include human rights issues and the shift in the Soviet traditional positions on the German question and NATO enlargement conditioned greater rapprochement and cooperation resulting in a new generation document on Europe's security affairs, which then laid the ground for the creation of the most inclusive security institution in Euro-Atlantic area – the OSCE.

However, the subsequent developments, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the stance the Russian Federation took across security issues, including the conflicts across the former Soviet expanse as well as failures in democratic development and its handling of the war in Chechnya contributed to Russia's image as an unpredictable and unreliable partner, hence exacerbated the relative gains considerations putting the prospects for comprehensive security cooperation back in the stage of low probability area for regime formation (the fourth historical episode).

In the fifth historical episode the Russian side undertook the campaign for new security architecture in a situation of damaged image of a security partner due to its internal developments as well as its military adventure in Georgia in August of 2008. Besides, the Russian side failed to show sensitivity to soft security requirements by European and Atlantic states and continued to concentrate heavily on hard security area. Moreover, throughout the security discussions the Russian side maintained that the collectivization of hard security area would do away with Europe's security problems while the Euro-Atlantic states unanimously maintained that the problem was the lack of political will to abide by the rules of the game enshrined in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Hence, the Corfu process failed to produce any overarching cooperative outcomes towards the improvement of shortcomings in the European Security architecture. The only outcome of the latest campaign

was more or less exclusive role for Russia vis a vis NATO, resulting in the creation of a 16+1 format - the NATO Russia Council.

The developments in Ukraine and the subsequent severing of cooperation with Russia as well as the deterioration of disarmament and arms control regimes in Europe show that the 6 decade long campaign to improve security architecture in Europe is still an unfinished business. Clearly, there is the need to bridge the security outlook among its actors and major part of it lies with Russia's capacity to acknowledge its own shortcomings. Russia needs to understand that a security regime cannot be imposed over by a treaty. The security regime, like any other regime is a principles, rules and norms based institution, around which actors expectations converge and that Euro-Atlantic states regard universal commitment to the rule of law, democratic governance, human rights, including the minority rights, as integral parts of what constitutes a security. Hence, any overarching security regime in Europe would need to be based on states' common commitment to the existing rules of the game as well as a more inclusive incorporation of these soft security considerations into the new security architecture.

Moreover, according to the regime theories, it makes a difference whether a cooperation partner is a long-time ally or a long-time foe; whether the states in question are at the brink of war or are members of a Deutschian pluralistic security community (Ibid., p. 17). Hence, in order for all fifty six states in the area from V to V form an overarching security regime, its actors, first and foremost the Russian Federation have to establish the reputation of a trustworthy actor over a considerable time period. Without such moves on Russia's behalf, the Europe's security architecture will remain as an amalgamation of interlocking security institutions and continue to be prone to shortcomings.

### **Possible Areas of Future Research**

The findings in this thesis could be used to generate a hypothesis as to why the Soviet/Russian interests remain the same over the span of six decades irrespective of change.

The findings can be also used to enrich the understanding of Russian Federation as a security actor. Most notably, the findings point to the evidence that certain Russian interests are relatively constant while the factors such as the ideology, types of relations with the Western countries etc. are of marginal influence. On the other hand, the findings accrue to the strength of those theories



which point out that economic consideration is a major factor prompting or altering state behaviour.

In terms of theory building, the findings of this thesis can be used to further explore the theoretical agenda for synthesizing rational theories as well building in the role of ideas in the chain of causality.

**Table 2: Summary of the five historical episodes**

<b>Historical Period</b>	<b>1952-1955</b>	<b>1966-1973</b>	<b>1985-1990</b>	<b>1993-2002</b>	<b>2008-2011</b>
<b>Soviet/Russian Proposals</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Stalin proposals (1952);</li> <li>- The Molotov proposals (1954);</li> <li>- The Bulganin proposals (1955).</li> </ul>	<p>1<sup>st</sup> phase:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Bucharest Declaration (1966)</li> <li>- Karlovy Vary Statement (1967)</li> </ul> <p>2<sup>nd</sup> phase:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Budapest ‘Appeal’ (1969)</li> <li>- The Prague Communiqué (1969)</li> <li>- Budapest Communiqué and the Memorandum (1970).</li> </ul>	<p>‘Common European Home’ initiative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Speech in France (1985);</li> <li>-Speech in Prague (1987);</li> <li>- Speech in Strasbourg (1989).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Russia and NATO: A partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe (1994);</li> <li>- Yeltsin’s speech at the Budapest CSCE Summit (1994);</li> <li>- Kozyrev article in Foreign Policy (1995);</li> <li>- Kozyrev speech at a meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers (1995).</li> </ul>	<p>Medvedev speech in Berlin (2008);</p> <p>Speech in Evian (2008);</p> <p>Speech in Niece (2008);</p> <p>the Foreign Policy Concept (2008).</p>
<b>Written proposal</b>	Draft “General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe” (1954)	No draft but called for the “General European conference”	No written proposal but calls were made for the Helsinki II type conference	No written proposal but calls were made for a full-fledged all-European organization	draft text of the treaty on European Security (2009)
<b>Major Preferences in exchange for Peace treaty/ collective security mechanism in Europe</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Against any security Alliances in Europe it was not part of;</li> <li>- Initially, for USA exclusion from Europe’s security affairs;</li> <li>- A Conference based collective security order (underpinned by non-use of force and collective defense principles);</li> <li>- No state or group of states could enter in any other coalition or alliance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The simultaneous abolition of the existing Alliances;</li> <li>- “The immutability of frontiers” in Europe;</li> <li>- Two Germanys a reality; No vision of unification;</li> <li>- Called for a system of collective security in Europe denoted by non-use of force;</li> <li>- Clearly accepted the US and Canadian participation only at the end of the campaign in 1970.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ruling out the probability of an armed clash and the use or threat of force;</li> <li>- The emergence of a vast economic space from the Atlantic to the Urals;</li> <li>- Acceptance of a place for the United States and Canada in the “common European home.”</li> </ul>	<p>Honeymoon phase:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the expansion of NATO (to Russia as well) synchronized with the change of the Alliance;</li> <li>- Special rights for Russia in ‘its near abroad’;</li> <li>- The enlargement welcomed only for the entire former Soviet bloc altogether not one by one.</li> </ul> <p>After the honeymoon phase:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ‘hierarchical’ organisational structure or ‘co-ordinating role’ for CSCE <i>vis-à-vis</i> NATO, the European Union and other international institutions;</li> <li>-Russia would be willing to gradually enter into a new, transformed NATO along with the nations of Central</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- sign a binding Treaty on European security, based on “the principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security;”</li> <li>- Collective security based in a system of consultations and conferences;</li> </ul>

				and Eastern Europe.	
<b>End goals</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Dissolution of the EDC and NATO and exclusion or balancing of the US role from European security affairs;</li> <li>- Stalinist goal of the buffer zones and keeping the platform for possible future enlargements;</li> <li>- the guarantees of military non-intervention in its sphere of influence;</li> <li>- the German unification conditional upon its neutrality.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe including the division of Germany and recognition of GDR.</li> <li>- Dissolution of the Alliances and reorientation of European security towards 'all-European co-operation' under a loose conference type collective security system.</li> <li>- Acquiring strategic advantage based on bilateral agreements with the Eastern European states.</li> </ul> <p>2<sup>nd</sup> phase:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The need for peace offensive to restore the tarnished image after the 1968 military campaign.</li> <li>- The need for greater economic and technological cooperation with the West.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preserving the Helsinki geopolitical order - the foundation for reconfirming the territorial borders (particularly the Oder-Neisse boundary);</li> <li>- The widest possible disarmament (nuclear, chemical and conventional);</li> <li>- Consolidating the Soviet power;</li> <li>- The pan-European economic, trade and cultural cooperation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Primary role for Russia in the existing European institutional set-up with a decision-making powers identical to the European States as well as the USA;</li> <li>- Promoting a different institutional hierarchy and as a result making the NATO and its enlargement 'less pressing.'</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fully regulate the hard security area in Europe and place all the possible decisions within its reach;</li> <li>- supplant existing regional institutions with a loose security conference;</li> <li>- dilute the necessity of other existing regional organizations in Europe, first and foremost of the NATO.</li> </ul>
<b>Major Factors contributing to failure</b>	<p>Ideological: "capitalist encirclement" and "inevitable conflict" v. "Iron Curtain"</p> <p>Security: proliferation of buffer zones via Eastern European regime take over, Berlin blockade, nuclear bomb, aggressive Asia policy.</p>	<p>1<sup>st</sup> phase:</p> <p>Ideological: 'competitive coexistence'</p> <p>Security: the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the tense Berlin crisis of 1958-1961, the Sino-Soviet split and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the ongoing nuclear competition.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Failure of Soviet European policies, inability to maintain order in Eastern European without resort to military and the Western rapprochement via the Harmel Report.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Loosing control over the developments and the violent and painful process of disintegration of the Soviet Union.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Failure of democratic transformation and economic hardship;</li> <li>- Russia's conduct in the 'near abroad;'</li> <li>- The first and second Chechen wars</li> <li>- Decreasing momentum of cooperation after Sept. 11 and antagonism over NATO enlargement.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The initiative called into question existing security institutions, such as NATO or the OSCE, which was deemed unacceptable;</li> <li>- The initiative was perceived as a way to separate the United States from European security;</li> <li>- An established reputation of an</li> </ul>

					unpredictable and irresponsible partner after the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. - Different perceptions of problems with the security architecture.
<b>Major Factors contributing to Cooperation</b>	- Stalin's death and shift in ideological rhetoric from both sides.	2 <sup>nd</sup> phase: - Extensive Soviet public diplomacy efforts to rally the Western opinion for the ESC; Toning down of the hostile rhetoric towards the USA; - Redefinition of Soviet geopolitical identity as a European country; - USA pursuit for SALT talks and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). - Nixon- Brezhnev compromise: simultaneous European security and MBFR conferences.	- Rapprochement due to steep decline of the Soviet economy and a weight of a military burden; - Ideas (glasnost and perestroika, common European Home etc.) as the major driving force behind the decision-making; - Soviet Unilateral concessions in terms of disarmament and troop withdrawals; - Renouncement of the Brezhnev doctrine; - Readiness to enhance the concept of security beyond hard security and include human rights issues; - The shift in thinking on European issues: the German question and NATO enlargement.	- Russia 1 <sup>st</sup> policy and willingness to help aid with democratic transformation - Need to counter common threats and challenges; - Withering away of ideological opposition.	- The perceived need to cooperate with Russia on Afghanistan, the Middle East, energy policies, conventional arms control and disarmament and other global issues.
<b>Major Events</b>	The Berlin Conference and the Geneva Summit and the Ministerial	A general European conference in Helsinki (1972 – 1973)	The Summit of the Heads of States in Paris (1990)	OSCE Lisbon and Budapest Summits  NATO-Russia Summits	OSCE Summits
<b>Major Outcomes</b>	No cooperative outcome	The Helsinki Final Act of 1975	The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe	Founding Act, 1997 (PJC)  NATO–Russia Relations: A New Quality, 2002 (NRC)	The Corfu Process under the OSCE umbrella

## References

- Deutsch, W. K., et al., 1975. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., and Rittberger, V., 2000. Integrating Theories of International Regimes. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 3-33
- Hide-Price, A., 2007. European security in the twenty-first century, the challenge of multipolarity. London and New York: Routledge.
- Jervis, R. 1982. Security Regimes. *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring), pp. 357-378.
- Schroeder, P., 1994. Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory. *International Security*, Vol. 19, No.1 (Summer), pp. 108-148.